MCNS ON MARCH 23 REVIEWED RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000995 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER KU AE SA IZ SUBJECT: MCNS ON MARCH 23 REVIEWED RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS, BASRAH SECURITY, AND STAFFING THE IRAQI ARMY REF: BAGHDAD 00880 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S REL MNFI) Prime Minister Maliki opened the March 23 Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by soliciting comments on responding to recent rocket and other attacks in Baghdad. Following discussion, all agreed with GEN Petraeus that intelligence to target the perpetrators and their support networks must be used to stop the attacks. In discussing Basrah, Maliki made it clear that action now was needed before the second city of Iraq slipped out of GOI control. (Note: PM Maliki plans to visit Basrah March 24-25. End Note.) Minister of Defense Abdel Qadr noted that Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Commander LTG Dubik was working closely with Basrah Operation Commander LTG Mohan to equip and support Mohan's plan of action in Basrah. Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdel Qadr noted ongoing operations in Ninewa. He wrapped up the meeting with a presentation on continuing efforts to staff the Iraqi Army (IA) and develop its logistics capacity. End Summary. RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS -------------- ¶2. (S REL MNFI) The PM opened the meeting with expression of concerns about the recent rocket and other attacks in Baghdad, underlining the seriousness of AQI or other extremist groups having success. He stated that if they were allowed to carry out attacks without facing a strong response, they would build on their successes to recruit others and undermine the sense of security that had been growing in the city recently. Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Waeli suggested that putting out ambushes and having a quick response force ready to go would help. He also suggested large numbers of static forces to control the city. MOD pointed out that better equipment, such as infra-red and thermal cameras, was needed to identity the locations of the perpetrators, though he noted that three of four rocket attacks March 23 had originated in Sadr City. ¶3. (S REL MNFI) GEN Petraeus reminded the committee that AQI and other extremists such as Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM) Special Groups (SG) were clever, were now demonstrating their continued resilience and willingness to engage in violence, and would not be caught so easily with enhanced equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces. He cited their use of timers on rockets so that they were absent from rocket launch sites at the time of launches as an example. He also noted that it would be impossible to have every space in Baghdad under constant surveillance, adding that Coalition Forces (CF) have the technology to identify the origins of the attacks. Concurring with MOD's information about Sadr City launch sites, he stated that locating the launch sites is not the challenge. Better intelligence and a commitment to shut down the support networks are needed, he declared. PM Maliki agreed, directing the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) and military and police intelligence services to work together to develop targets to shut down the attacks in Baghdad. He reiterated his strong concern that success by AQI or others in Baghdad would build their confidence for further operations. BASRAH SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (S REL MNFI) MOD gave a summary of recent meetings with the Basrah Operations commander, LTG Mohan and his plan for dealing with insecurity in Basrah. He noted the efforts of MNSTC-I under LTG Dubik to provide the resources Mohan needs. A joint MNSTC-I/ISF committee had been formed to coordinate implementation of Mohan's plan. MOD also reported that his personnel had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of ISF in Basrah, considered the possibility of switching commanders of forces in Basrah, explored a weapons turn-in/buyback program option, settled on the need for a special port security force, and agreed to increase electricity in Basrah at night. He concluded his remarks by reminding the committee that the PM will have overall direction of the security operation for Basrah. ¶5. (S REL MNFI) MSNS Waeli provided a litany of reasons for the problems in Basrah. He noted the ease of smuggling in weapons on small boats, the influence of Iran, fanatical Islamist groups that target CF and Iraqi professionals as well as any they do not like, and that the smuggling of drugs funds illegal activity. He cited that agendas of the many BAGHDAD 00000995 002 OF 002 political parties in Basrah as contributing to instability and chaos in Basrah. He also stressed the impact of Kuwait, Saudi, and Emirate influences in Basrah, noting the tribal links between Basrawis and Emirate tribes. Finally, he opined that the criminal forces in Basrah who sought instability for their lucrative activities were aware of the upcoming U.S. elections and Iraqi provincial elections and were attempting to influence the elections' outcomes. ¶6. (S REL MNFI) Waeli called for steps to control the land and sea borders, clear weapon caches, and go after high-level targets. Minister of Justice Safa al Safi interjected that the situation in Basrah was bad, his employees fear to work there. INIS and MSNS replied to the PM that they do have useful intelligence but they need more. INIS indicated that its Basrah expert was available to brief the PM. GEN Petraeus strongly encouraged MSNS Waeli to take the lead on coordinating intelligence in Basrah, suggesting he (Waeli) move there temporarily to better oversee unified intelligence efforts in the troubled province. PM Maliki reminded the Committee of his plan to go to Basrah to send a clear statement of the national government's commitment to the people of Basrah. Ninewa Operations -------------- ¶7. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed efforts to strengthen ISF in Ninewa to prepare for sustained operations against AQI there. He reported on the re-assignment of certain battalions of IA and also of Special Operations Forces (SOF). GEN Petraeus noted that as ISF and CF put pressure on AQI and others in Mosul and the rest of Ninewa, a strong reaction can be expected. He reminded the committee that LTG Riyadh had a good plan for Mosul as did the IA third division commander for western Ninewa province. Patience and commitment were required. Baiji would be the next area of major counter-terrorists operations -- their funds support Saddamists in Baghdad. Increasingly, the SGs of JAM, with support from Iranian Quds force present a strong threat to Iraqi security. GEN Petraeus applauded PM Maliki's leadership in tackling the problems in Basrah and Ninewa; smiling appreciatively, Maliki suggested that praise be held until after victory. Iraqi Army Staffing and Logistics -------------- ¶8. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed the progress that had been made in staffing the IA and getting support elements such as armed engineering battalions integrated with combat divisions. He noted that 10 of 13 divisions were complete. In response to National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie's question, he indicated that substantial progress had been made in building warehouses and improving the logistics of the IA. He also stated that his Ministry and the IA had good training programs in place. The minister also reported that they were exploring ways to hire civilians for certain roles. GEN Petraeus voice appreciation for the efforts to date, noting that the Iraqi surge of forces was nearly four times greater than the CF surge, and that it was a permanent increase in active personnel. He also cited the improvements made already with the National Police (NP),who had been written off a year ago as beyond reform. Next on the list for reform and training are the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). (Note: among other distinctions, the NP can operate across provincial boundaries while IPS generally operates within a province. End Note.) CROCKER