MCNS ON MARCH 23 REVIEWED RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000995

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER KU AE SA IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS ON MARCH 23 REVIEWED RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS,
BASRAH SECURITY, AND STAFFING THE IRAQI ARMY

REF: BAGHDAD 00880

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (S REL MNFI) Prime Minister Maliki opened the March 23
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by
soliciting comments on responding to recent rocket and other
attacks in Baghdad. Following discussion, all agreed with
GEN Petraeus that intelligence to target the perpetrators and
their support networks must be used to stop the attacks. In
discussing Basrah, Maliki made it clear that action now was
needed before the second city of Iraq slipped out of GOI
control. (Note: PM Maliki plans to visit Basrah March 24-25.
End Note.) Minister of Defense Abdel Qadr noted that
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
Commander LTG Dubik was working closely with Basrah Operation
Commander LTG Mohan to equip and support Mohan's plan of
action in Basrah. Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdel Qadr noted
ongoing operations in Ninewa. He wrapped up the meeting with
a presentation on continuing efforts to staff the Iraqi Army
(IA) and develop its logistics capacity. End Summary.

RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS
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2. (S REL MNFI) The PM opened the meeting with expression of
concerns about the recent rocket and other attacks in
Baghdad, underlining the seriousness of AQI or other
extremist groups having success. He stated that if they were
allowed to carry out attacks without facing a strong
response, they would build on their successes to recruit
others and undermine the sense of security that had been
growing in the city recently. Minister of State for National
Security Shirwan al-Waeli suggested that putting out ambushes
and having a quick response force ready to go would help. He
also suggested large numbers of static forces to control the
city. MOD pointed out that better equipment, such as
infra-red and thermal cameras, was needed to identity the
locations of the perpetrators, though he noted that three of
four rocket attacks March 23 had originated in Sadr City.


3. (S REL MNFI) GEN Petraeus reminded the committee that AQI
and other extremists such as Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM) Special
Groups (SG) were clever, were now demonstrating their
continued resilience and willingness to engage in violence,
and would not be caught so easily with enhanced equipment for
the Iraqi Security Forces. He cited their use of timers on
rockets so that they were absent from rocket launch sites at
the time of launches as an example. He also noted that it
would be impossible to have every space in Baghdad under
constant surveillance, adding that Coalition Forces (CF) have
the technology to identify the origins of the attacks.
Concurring with MOD's information about Sadr City launch
sites, he stated that locating the launch sites is not the
challenge. Better intelligence and a commitment to shut down
the support networks are needed, he declared. PM Maliki
agreed, directing the Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INIS) and military and police intelligence services to work
together to develop targets to shut down the attacks in
Baghdad. He reiterated his strong concern that success by
AQI or others in Baghdad would build their confidence for
further operations.

BASRAH SECURITY
--------------


4. (S REL MNFI) MOD gave a summary of recent meetings with
the Basrah Operations commander, LTG Mohan and his plan for
dealing with insecurity in Basrah. He noted the efforts of
MNSTC-I under LTG Dubik to provide the resources Mohan needs.
A joint MNSTC-I/ISF committee had been formed to coordinate
implementation of Mohan's plan. MOD also reported that his
personnel had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of ISF in
Basrah, considered the possibility of switching commanders of
forces in Basrah, explored a weapons turn-in/buyback program
option, settled on the need for a special port security
force, and agreed to increase electricity in Basrah at night.
He concluded his remarks by reminding the committee that the
PM will have overall direction of the security operation for
Basrah.


5. (S REL MNFI) MSNS Waeli provided a litany of reasons for
the problems in Basrah. He noted the ease of smuggling in
weapons on small boats, the influence of Iran, fanatical
Islamist groups that target CF and Iraqi professionals as
well as any they do not like, and that the smuggling of drugs
funds illegal activity. He cited that agendas of the many

BAGHDAD 00000995 002 OF 002


political parties in Basrah as contributing to instability
and chaos in Basrah. He also stressed the impact of Kuwait,
Saudi, and Emirate influences in Basrah, noting the tribal
links between Basrawis and Emirate tribes. Finally, he
opined that the criminal forces in Basrah who sought
instability for their lucrative activities were aware of the
upcoming U.S. elections and Iraqi provincial elections and
were attempting to influence the elections' outcomes.


6. (S REL MNFI) Waeli called for steps to control the land
and sea borders, clear weapon caches, and go after high-level
targets. Minister of Justice Safa al Safi interjected that
the situation in Basrah was bad, his employees fear to work
there. INIS and MSNS replied to the PM that they do have
useful intelligence but they need more. INIS indicated that
its Basrah expert was available to brief the PM. GEN
Petraeus strongly encouraged MSNS Waeli to take the lead on
coordinating intelligence in Basrah, suggesting he (Waeli)
move there temporarily to better oversee unified intelligence
efforts in the troubled province. PM Maliki reminded the
Committee of his plan to go to Basrah to send a clear
statement of the national government's commitment to the
people of Basrah.

Ninewa Operations
--------------


7. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed efforts to strengthen ISF in
Ninewa to prepare for sustained operations against AQI there.
He reported on the re-assignment of certain battalions of IA
and also of Special Operations Forces (SOF). GEN Petraeus
noted that as ISF and CF put pressure on AQI and others in
Mosul and the rest of Ninewa, a strong reaction can be
expected. He reminded the committee that LTG Riyadh had a
good plan for Mosul as did the IA third division commander
for western Ninewa province. Patience and commitment were
required. Baiji would be the next area of major
counter-terrorists operations -- their funds support
Saddamists in Baghdad. Increasingly, the SGs of JAM, with
support from Iranian Quds force present a strong threat to
Iraqi security. GEN Petraeus applauded PM Maliki's
leadership in tackling the problems in Basrah and Ninewa;
smiling appreciatively, Maliki suggested that praise be held
until after victory.

Iraqi Army Staffing and Logistics
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8. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed the progress that had been made
in staffing the IA and getting support elements such as armed
engineering battalions integrated with combat divisions. He
noted that 10 of 13 divisions were complete. In response to
National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie's question, he
indicated that substantial progress had been made in building
warehouses and improving the logistics of the IA. He also
stated that his Ministry and the IA had good training
programs in place. The minister also reported that they were
exploring ways to hire civilians for certain roles. GEN
Petraeus voice appreciation for the efforts to date, noting
that the Iraqi surge of forces was nearly four times greater
than the CF surge, and that it was a permanent increase in
active personnel. He also cited the improvements made
already with the National Police (NP),who had been written
off a year ago as beyond reform. Next on the list for reform
and training are the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). (Note:
among other distinctions, the NP can operate across
provincial boundaries while IPS generally operates within a
province. End Note.)
CROCKER