MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEADLOCK IN BASRAH

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000969 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING CAPTION) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR MOPS PINS SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEADLOCK IN BASRAH Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Basrah is gripped by military and political deadlock six days into Maliki's "Charge of the Knights" offensive. PM Maliki seems unwilling to compromise his hard-line stance against JAM even as the militia consolidates its position in Basrah's neighborhoods; on March 28 he rebuffed an OMS delegation. Senior Basrawi ISF officials are privately very pessimistic and the worsening humanitarian situation risks turning the populace against ISF and the GOI. End Summary. Military stalemate -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Militia and ISF have settled into a stalemate, with neither side making much progress since March 27. Mortar, rocket, small-arms, and RPG fire have been reported throughout areas of contention within the city; the Basrah Palace, where Maliki has his headquarters, is now under frequent IDF attack with one round narrowly missing the PM. JAM is consolidating its position and hundreds of IED emplacements have been reported throughout the city and on main roads. A military defeat for the militias is unlikely and would take at least days and probably weeks. Maliki has told MND-SE, Basrawi advisors with him in the Palace and General Mohan that he has a &secret plan8 for an offensive that will kick off later on the 29th; Maliki has not divulged the plan and as of 1800 hours Mohan claimed to not yet know the details. Anxiety and stress among ISF officials -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Basrah's senior ISF officials are showing the strain of the current situation. In a March 29 conversation with the REO, IP Chief Jalil, normally calm and unflappable, seemed almost hysterical, saying that militias were expanding their areas of control and that without heavy air support and CF ground troops Basra "would be lost within one or two days." He said there was a heavy Iranian presence, including snipers, IEDs, rockets, and logistical support. Jalil added that Mohan is exhausted and becoming ineffective. A brief phone call with General Mohan showed him to be angry and uncommunicative. Political Deadlock -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) On March 28, Gov. Waeli told the British Consulate that a high-level delegation will meet in Basrah within the next 24 hours to discuss reconciliation. While the REO is unsure who will be attending this meeting, the British Consulate believes that at least five participants will be Sadrists. PM Maliki has refused to meet Hazim al-Aranji and Muhand al-Gharawi, two senior advisors from OMS' Najaf office. The Minister of Justice said he would meet with them in the PM's stead, but the outcome of that meeting is unknown. Worsening humanitarian situation -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Basrawi support for the ISF is beginning to weaken due to the humanitarian crisis. In response to an earlier request by Governor Waeli, the curfew was lifted for 12 hours on March 28 to address basic needs. Unfortunately, a virtual curfew still exists as Basrawis were either not informed or were too afraid to leave their homes. Citizens lack access to adequate amounts of food, water, medicine, and medical supplies, with access to safe drinking water the most pressing need. While MND-SE has begun developing a strategy to provide support to the Basrah Palace and ISF, there is no clear plan to assist civilians. UNICEF and ICRC are both planning to deliver humanitarian aid if and when the security situation permits. MND-SE, British Consulate, and REO officials met two times on March 29 to discuss a humanitarian strategy for the general population. CROCKER