VP ABD AL-MEHDI, AMB, AND S/I DISCUSS SADRIST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000963

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP ABD AL-MEHDI, AMB, AND S/I DISCUSS SADRIST
INSURRECTION, ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, REGIONAL RELATIONS, AND
SOFA/SFA NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. In a March 27 meeting with Ambassador
Crocker and S/I Satterfield, VP Adel Abd al-Mehdi weighed in
on the current Sadrist insurrection, labeling the Sadrists as
"fragmented and weak." He also highlighted the incredible
restraint that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) has
shown in the face of the recent attacks, indicating that ISCI
and the ISCI-affiliated Badr Brigades were not going to be
drawn into this conflict. During the meeting, Adel also
informed the Ambassador and Satterfield of his intention to
attend the upcoming Arab League summit in Damascus, which was
met with displeasure. Defending his decision to attend, Adel
told the Ambassador and S/I that Iraq had to live in the
neighborhood, and it was in their best interest to establish
and maintain relations with its neighbors. Adel also
discussed the SOFA/SFA negotiations, with both sides agreeing
on the importance of these agreements and the need for mutual
involvement. End Summary.

The Sadrist Insurrection: March Madness
--------------


2. (S) After exchanging pleasantries, Adel immediately
launched into the Sadrists, claiming that the Special Groups
were targeting ISCI leaders' homes in the Red Zone, including
his. Attempting to assuage Adel's concerns, the Ambassador
informed him that the military experts believed that many of
the hits in both the IZ and the Red Zone have been the result
of luck rather than skill or science, positing that they are
not well-aimed and that the militias were not even using
launch tubes. The Ambassador also declared that the CF have
been careful and measured in response, as they do not want to
give the SG any propaganda tool that might be used to
influence public opinion. Though there have been some
skirmishes between CF and ISF and the SG, provoked by the SG,
the Ambassador noted that CF has been restrained and the
situation has not escalated. He also praised Adel, ISCI, the
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) for their restraint, and he
mentioned the positive phone call he had with Sayyid Abd al
Aziz al-Hakim.


3. (S) After informing the Ambassador that the Presidency
Council was going to issue a statement about the situation,
Adel mentioned that he had already spoken with Prime Minister
Maliki several times. Appearing somewhat displeased with the
timing of the military operation in Basrah, Adel questioned
whether preparations for the offensive were sufficient. Adel
also told the Ambassador that he had been in contact with the
Governor of Kut, who believes the Sadrists are much weaker
now. In Adel's estimation, they are also much more
fragmented than before, and have lost the support of the
population. He also posited that their civil disobedience
campaign has been based on coercion and intimidation, to
which the Ambassador replied that "it appears they are headed
into al-Qaeda territory," with their actions.


4. (S) In response to Adel's complaint that the media was
trying to turn the current insurrection into an ISCI-JAM
confrontation, the Ambassador defined the current conflict as
"the GOI fighting criminal elements." He added that people
should know the truth about the SG's activities, stating that
they were attacking schools and markets, and intimidating the
population. Adel agreed, and said that the Sadrist movement
has a very limited following, stating that they have no
support in Diwaniyyah, Karbala, Samawa, and that even in
Najaf the movement was small. He also believes that their
following is limited in Baghdad as well. After stating that
attempts need to be made to reach out to the moderates among
the Sadrists, Adel mentioned a letter he had recently
received, allegedly issued by Muqtada al-Sadr himself, in
which al-Sadr called on his followers to take advantage of
the 72-hour deadline to cease hostilities issued by Maliki.
Referring to this document, he indicated that this was yet
more evidence that the movement was fragmented and falling
apart, to which the Ambassador and Satterfield reacted in
agreement. (Note: This document was provided to the
Ambassador and has been translated).



5. (S) Later in the meeting, the Ambassador returned to their
earlier conversation about the Sadrist insurrection,
reiterating that it was very important for the GOI to get the
story out about the Sadrist attacks against homes and
schools, indicating that they needed to dispel Sadrist claims
that their actions were only directed at the ISF and CF.
Adel said there would be a campaign, and then he shared that
he had been informed about a Sadrist movement in Nasiriyyah
by the Thi Qar governor, who believed that a show of airpower
over Nasiriyyah would be good. Ambassador Crocker told Adel
that he had spoken with General Othman, who informed him that

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additional forces would be moved into Kut. Adel reiterated
that the Sadrist movement was small, and that if the
communique issued by al-Sadr was indeed true, then there
really is confusion and dissent in the ranks.


6. (S) Continuing, the Ambassador said he assumed that the
no-confidence vote against the PM in the COR, which was
initiated by the Sadr Trend, was going nowhere. Adel assured
him it had no support other than from the Sadrist bloc.
Tawafug has refused, and so have the Kurds. He also said that
Sadr Trend and COR member Baha al-Araji called him, but that
he and the Sadrists were only playing games. Adel said that
even though ISCI had differences with the PM, now was the
time to stand behind him. Any defeat of Maliki at this stage
would be catastrophic, a point on which both the Ambassador
and S/I Satterfield agreed.

On the Road to Damascus
--------------


5. (S) Adel also used this occasion to inform the Ambassador
and S/I Satterfield that he would be representing the GOI at
the Arab League summit, which will be held this weekend in
Damascus, Syria. The Ambassador discouraged Adel from
attending, noting that his presence would be interpreted as
significant. Adel countered that his absence would likewise
be significant, which both the Ambassador and S/I Satterfield
said is exactly what the U.S. wants. Responding that his
attendance at the summit reflects the will and desire of all
of the major players in the GOI, he added that the GOI needs
to be well-represented at this event, which he said FM Zebari
is not comfortable attending. Ambassador Crocker stated
flatly that "if the GOI insists on making its friends
unhappy, perhaps he (Adel) should use this occasion to be
clear with the Syrians." Appearing defensive, Adel stated
that he has always been clear with the Syrians, and also with
the Iranians. In addition, he said that he has always been
clear and straight with the Americans, from the time
Ambassador Paul Bremer was head of the CPA until the recent
visit of Vice President Cheney. When the Ambassador later
asked Adel how long he would be out of Iraq, Adel indicated
only 3-4 days. Both the Ambassador and Satterfield again
urged Adel not to attend, with Satterfield saying that he
should send FM Zebari in his place. Attempting to evade the
suggestion, Adel said that the FM was already occupied with
preparatory meetings for the summit.

Iraq and Its Neighbors
--------------


6. (S) Commenting on his upcoming trip to Damascus, Adel said
that Maliki has given him security reports which show Syria's
continued interference in Iraq. Adel promised to confront
the Syrians with this information. Ambassador Crocker
signaled that the U.S. has clear evidence that the Syrians
are still supporting the transit of suicide bombers to Iraq.
Stating that the Iraqis also have evidence of this, as well
as of Iranian involvement in Iraq, he asked rhetorically what
Iraq could do -- break relations with its neighbors? The
Ambassador rebutted that it does not appear that Ahmadinejad
returned home to Iran and decided to stop interfering in
Iraq, and cited evidence of recently-made Iranian weapons
that have been discovered among the Sadrists. Adel responded
that the issue is not just about Iraq, but also Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. Ambassador Crocker cooly
noted that "Iraq has to live in the neighborhood, but the
neighbors can't get away with murder."

SOFA/SFA Negotiations
--------------


7. (S) Regarding the SOFA/SFA negotiations, Adel shared that
he had a good meeting with Deputy FM Hamoud, in which they
discussed the SOFA talks. Noting that the talks are now in
their third day, the Ambassador commented that the PM
understands the negotiations much better, and that the U.S.
and GOI teams are focused on these talks. Remarking that the
SFA will be conducted at a higher level than the SOFA talks,
he indicated that the PM appears ready to task these talks to
the Executive Council or the Political Committee for National
Security. Adel interjected that he could assist with the
negotiations. Both the Ambassador and Satterfield strongly
cautioned against allowing the PM's office staff to assume a
dominant role in the talks, warning that the USG cannot
repeat the problems that were encountered during the
Declaration of Principles and UNSCR renewal negotiations.
Adel also said that the U.S. can take advantage of the
situation, which the Ambassador responded to by saying that
the U.S. and the GOI need a deal negotiated between friends
and allies. Adel agreed, and cautioned against making the
talks a two-stage process. He added that the PM needs to be

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included in the talks from the beginning, and that both
parties need to move forward on this issue together.
Ambassador Crocker concurred, and reiterated that there
cannot be a repeat of the Declaration of Principles.
Returning to the main topic of the meeting, Adel also said
that the crackdown on the Sadrists would have positive
results. Before departing, Adel reminded Ambassador Crocker
not to forget about Nasiriyyah, and he also mentioned that
the Sadrists were receiving their orders from Najaf.
CROCKER