PM ADVISOR: MALIKI NEEDS REALISTIC GOALS IN BASRAH

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000953 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2022 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR: MALIKI NEEDS REALISTIC GOALS IN BASRAH Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) In a March 27 meeting punctuated by explosions and sirens in the background as indirect fire pummeled the International Zone, PM Maliki's political advisor, Sadiq Rikabi, predicted that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would gain the upper hand in Basrah within the next two to three days, an outcome that he said would lead to lower levels of Sadrist violence in Baghdad and elsewhere. However, Rikabi expressed concern that the ISF did not have clear, discrete, achievable goals (e.g., arresting specific JAM Special Group leaders) for its current security operations. Rikabi indicated that the PM's ultimatum -- that militia members surrender their heavy weapons within 72 hours -- was unrealistic since disarmament was necessarily a long-term project. He hinted that he is therefore advising the PM to focus on achieving a few near term objectives so that the focus can move from security operations to some form of dialogue. For the moment, however, Rikabi assessed that Maliki was not yet prepared to negotiate with the Sadrists. Although Rikabi claimed that the ISF were targeting criminals irrespective of their identity, he was unable to provide a convincing rebuttal to the Sadrist complaint that JAM is being targeted while Fadhilah's militia and the Badr Corps are not. (On a related note, Rikabi categorically denied rumors that the Da'wa Party is creating its own militia in Karbala. "The time to do that would have been three to five years ago. Today, everyone hates the militias, even those who are compelled to work with them," said Rikabi.) ¶2. (S) Rikabi, who was clearly concerned that Maliki had bitten off more than he and the ISF could chew, said that Maliki's political fortunes are now inextricably bound up with the success of the Basrah operation. He noted scathingly that the Iraqi Presidency Council had yet to produce a statement of support for the Basrah operation, even though President Talabani had promised Maliki he would do so. Rikabi noted darkly that the Kurds were essentially taking a wait-and-see attitude to the crisis. Rikabi also complained that the UK position was "entirely unclear" while the U.S. position was only "somewhat clear." Poloff assured Rikabi that the USG remained supportive of the GOI and of Maliki, although he noted that that there were aspects of the Basrah operation that appeared to have been poorly coordinated both within the GOI and between the PM and the Coalition. Rikabi seemed to agree, although he said Maliki felt obligated to act in light of reports that the security situation in Basrah had been rapidly deteriorating. Rikabi noted that Grand Ayatollah SISTANI had not directly expressed a view, which Rikabi interpreted as tacit approval of the GOI's efforts. CROCKER