DPM SALIH ON VIOLENCE IN SHIA AREAS, ECONOMIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000944 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU KU IZ SUBJECT: DPM SALIH ON VIOLENCE IN SHIA AREAS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL SUMMITS, TURKEY Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih told Ambassador March 25 that he believes Moqtada al-Sadr has decided to try to bring down the government. They discussed developments around the south and in Baghdad regarding the increased violence since March 23. Ambassador asked Salih to assist with accelerating the shift of development and reconstruction assistance to an Iraqi-funded and led process and noted the May 29 date for the upcoming International Compact for Iraq (ICI) summit. He urged the DPM to ensure that Prime Minister Maliki attend the Neighbors' Ministerial in Kuwait. Ambassador provided an update on the start of Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement negotiations. Salih said Turkish Special Envoy Ozcelik's visit was useful and we need to take advantage of this opening to press forward on improving Iraq-Turkey relations. He added that a meeting between Ozcelik and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani may be possible when Barzani comes to Baghdad, now possibly around March 31. End Summary. Sadrists' Activity -------------- ¶2. (C) Salih said Moqtada al-Sadr has made a decision to bring down the government. Sadrist Council of Representatives bloc leader Baha al-Araji came to us and asked us to help, Salih noted. Ambassador replied that al-Araji told us that there may be a public statement today. Salih added that al-Araji asked to see him tonight and opined that perhaps there is conflict within the Sadr movement. Ambassador said al-Araji is not comfortable with bringing down the government, to which Salih noted that it is sometimes unclear who al-Araji represents and he is sometimes wrong about things. ¶3. (S) Regarding the uptick in violence in the last few days, Salih opined that the government is going after nationalist Sadrists and not the special groups, causing a violent response. Ambassador replied that it was not the impression we have, the violence in Kut and Karbala is from the special groups. He continued that there is a lot of activity out there and turbulence within the Sadrist movement, which is probably accelerated via a centrifugal force involving several events, including Kut, Karbala, Iraqi security �00A;forces' operations in Basra, the arrest of special groups commander Shibli, and Iran. Salih asked if now was the time for an all-out major campaign to dismantle the Sadrists "once and for all." Ambassador said the current environment may not lend itself to an all-out effort. For example, if Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) went into Sadr City, it would have to use units that it could count on, which might be dominated by Badr Corps. Additionally, expanded action would run the risk of unifying the Sadrist movement. The trend away from support to militias and violence could be reversed. ¶4. (S/NF) Salih asked what the Ambassador thought Iran's role has been in recent rocket attacks against the International Zone. Ambassador said the rockets are recent and Iranian made, but it is not clear whether the increased indirect fire was a result of an Iranian "wink and a nod" or a dramatic change in their tactics. Salih opined that the latest barrages may simply be a reminder that they are here and "can do nasty things." Ambassador noted that Iran plays on divisions, too; the recent activity could be a brutal manifestation of their policy to keep matters off balance in Iraq and ensure ferment within the Shia community. Encouraging an Iraqi Lead on Economic Development, Reconstruction -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador raised the importance of accelerating the shift of development and reconstruction assistance from the U.S. and the Coalition to Iraq, noting that the U.S. is reviewing all of its assistance programs. For example, the Prime Minister has agreed to sharply increase Iraqi funds for job creation and vocational programs and in particular to co-fund the JTERP joint employment program for Sons of Iraq. We need Iraq to look at other programs it could co-fund or assume, including the Community Stabilization Program, which specializes in short-term jobs in post-kinetic environments. Ambassador asked for Salih to help with this transition and a structured discussion with the GOI on how best to move ahead. Salih offered to join a meeting between the CETI Minister-Counselor and Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr on March 26 to discuss budget issues and asset transfers (Note: this meeting was later cancelled because of indirect fire strikes. End note). Ambassador said we developed a concept paper on ways Iraq could launch a major centrally-directed BAGHDAD 00000944 002 OF 003 infrastructure investment program ("Iraq 2020"). Ambassador noted that he had joined MNF-I Commanding General in writing Prime Minister Maliki to propose discussion of such an effort. Ambassador added that the GOI's National Development Strategy would be a natural framework, and determining how it fits with International Compact for Iraq (ICI) and what foreign donors are doing will be key. He said that PM Maliki could launch such an initiative with a speech to the Council of Representatives (COR) early in this session to lay out the GOI's vision and demonstrate a plan to the Iraqi people. ¶6. (C) Salih said he read the Iraq 2020 concept paper and thought it was too long-term in its approach. It does not focus enough on immediate needs. Salih said "we are awash with money but cannot manage to spend it." He described five major projects that the GOI could move on very quickly, within three months: 4,500 new schools, 11 hospitals (four are already under construction),major road projects, irrigation projects and work on the railway system. He said the GOI would work with the provinces and with the private sector; "we need to create jobs," and construction is a good way to do it. Salih added that these ideas could be ready very soon. Ambassador undertook to share with Salih the letter to PM Maliki and offered support to Salih's proposals in the context of that letter. ¶7. (C) Salih also raised the idea of the GOI providing matching funds for U.S. projects. Ambassador said we need to see more than just matching funds. Iraqis must demonstrate they can take over major projects. For example, the Prime Minister is interested on a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) basis, but there is as yet no legal or regulatory framework for such investments, and the Ministry of Electricity lacks administrative capacity. CETI Minister-Counselor noted that Minister of Electricity Kareem is seeking an international law firm to develop the legal framework, but the GOI will also need a major investment bank to put such deals together. Salih said the GOI recognizes it needs private sector help and he would appreciate discussing the idea further. International Compact for Iraq (ICI), Arab League Summit and Iraqi Neighbors Ministerial -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Salih undertook to confirm PM Maliki's participation at the ICI on May 29 and said he is also working on getting the PM to attend the Neighbors Ministerial in Kuwait on April ¶22. DPM noted that some Arab leaders are going to the Arab League summit in Damascus, including the Kuwaiti Emir, the Qatari Emir, the UAE President, the Omani Sultan and Libyan President. Ambassador pressed Salih to ensure PM Maliki's participation in Kuwait, noting it was an essential opportunity, but not in Damascus. Salih expressed concern about an effort by some in the GOI to raise long-standing bilateral issues with Kuwait during a visit for the Neighbors event, which he said would not yield positive results given the Kuwaiti government's weakness. He noted the GOI would have a better chance to resolve these issues by working with the U.S. and UK governments. SOFA/Strategic Framework Agreement -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador provided the DPM an update on the Strategic Framework and Status of Forces agreements negotiations. Salih opined that the SFA would be "easy," while the SOFA would be much more difficult. Ambassador replied that everything in Iraq is hard and it's hard all the time. Salih said negotiations should be at the Executive Council level (3 1). Ambassador said copies of the drafts were given to the Executive Council and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masood Barzani. Visit of Turkish Special Envoy Ozcelik -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) DPM Salih characterized his meeting with Turkish Special Envoy Murat Ozcelik on March 24 as a "good discussion." He expressed reservations about Ozcelik's idea to have Article IV of the September 28 GOT-GOI counter-terrorism agreement negotiated by their respective militaries. He said the KRG Prime Minister now may come to Baghdad on Monday, at which time Ozcelik would return to Baghdad for a meeting, probably accompanied by Turkish PM advisor Ahmet Davutoglu. Salih agreed with Ambassador that there appears to be tension between Ozcelik and Davutoglu for primacy on the Iraq account. He said "now we have something real" to work on (with Turkey),and we need to think through various concepts, such as a joint high committee and a tripartite security committee. Salih said Ozcelik told him that the GOT told the Turkmen in Kirkuk that their future BAGHDAD 00000944 003 OF 003 lies with the Kurds. On the high committee, Salih said President Talabani and PM Maliki need to discuss and finalize, but if it is at the Deputy Prime Minister level, he would be happy to do it. He said a tripartite Turkey-Iraq-U.S. mechanism would be very useful. DPM Salih conveyed that Ozcelik said contacts with KRG President Masood Barzani could be "eventually" possible after contacts with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani. CROCKER