MALIKI TAKES ON BASRAH MILITIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000920 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINS PTER IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI TAKES ON BASRAH MILITIA Classified By: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER. REASONS: 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki on 24 March traveled to Basrah to announce the beginning of military operations to regain control of the city from armed militias. Interior Minister Bolani, Defense Minister Abdul Qadar and Minister of State for National Security Waeli are with the PM. Fighting between the Government,s security forces and gunmen using IED, mortar, and small arms, has occurred in downtown Basrah early in the day and sporadically thereafter. MND-SE has reported that Maliki has ordered Iraqi Army units from Karbala to Basrah to provide additional support to Basrah-based ISF units. ¶2. (C) At the Prime Minister,s direction, approximately six Iraqi Army, National Police, and Emergency Response battalions and mechanized units already have deployed to Basrah with several of the NP units taking up position in the downtown palace. Militia members reportedly have fortified some areas and taken control of police stations in the city, according to REO Basrah, as well as engaged in criminal violence in the cities of al Amarah and Al Qurnah north of Basrah. ¶3. (C) During the day, in response to a direct request from the PM, CF provided a "show of force" in the form of a flight of two F-16s over the city. Two more similar requests were actioned throughout the day. Command and Control Discrepancies ¶4. (C) Although it is widely assumed that Basrah Operations Command Major General Mohan has been removed from his position, he reportedly remains at the Basrah Operations Center and is involved in current operations, according to MND-SE. Maliki,s reported removal of Mohan and the scrapping of his phased approach to security operations in the city are indicative of his desire both to assert his control over Basrah security operations and to take a more aggressive approach. Governor Waeli and the Provincial Council also have been noticeably absent from the decision-making process, according to REO Basrah. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: It is not entirely clear to us what motivated the PM to decide suddenly to take on the militias in Basrah, though we suspect very real security problems in Basrah, his long-running feud with the governor, and his desire to force a showdown with Sadrist elements that continue to challenge his government all play a part. ISF manpower, equipment, and logistical shortfalls have potential to hamper Basrah security operations, potentially drawing in more ISF resources. Moreover, recent militia and insurgent perpetrated outbreaks of violence in Baghdad, Hillah, Mosul, and elsewhere could further stretch an already thin force. END COMMENT. CROCKER