PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000092 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018 TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL IZ SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE OF PIC REF: 07 BAGHDAD 3318 BAGHDAD 00000092 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie Ries for re asons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) On December 16th, Basrah become the second province to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) with a federally-mandated provincial operations command in charge of the province,s security forces. Established in several volatile provinces by Prime Minister Maliki, these operations commands are intended to provide the necessary security forces within the province until the provincial police are sufficiently trained and equipped. Additionally, they provide an increased level of security and rapid emergency response capabilities for the provinces in the event of a security situation which exceeds provincial capacity. Provincial operations commands also supersede operational control of local authorities over ISF and provide to Prime Minister Maliki and the OCINC the means for direct involvement in local security issues. -------------- -------------- Operations Commands Establishing Federal Control of Provinces -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Operations commands are meant to serve as the coordinating body for all security operations within a province where the local police force cannot independently maintain security. Iraqi Army and National Police assistance to fledgling local police forces (IP) is not new in Iraq; many IPs still lack equipment, training, and are too physically distant from local disturbances to be able to adequately maintain local security. Normally, the Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) maintains operational control over his IPs while coordinating operations with the Governor and Provincial Council through the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). The federally-mandated operations centers, alternatively, are commanded by an Army Commander who reports up the Ministry of Defense chain of command up to the Office of the Prime Minister, retaining provincial security in the hands of the central government. In more accurate terms, Karbala transfers to "Federal Iraqi Control." ¶3. (C) With the presence of an operations command, the governor retains civil administrative control of the province as the chief executive officer and can continue to monitor the security situation through the PJCC (where it is up and running). The PDOP remains the direct commander of the IPs, which maintain responsibility for law enforcement, but the operations command commander has ultimate authority over all ISF activities in the province. Additionally, Coalition Forces conducting counter-terrorism operations coordinate their activities through the operations command commander where one exists. -------------- The KOC and the BsOC -------------- ¶4. (C) Prime Minister Maliki established the Karbala Operations Center (KOC) by Prime Ministerial Directive (#34) on June 6, 2007 to respond to local instability from intra-Shia fighting and the absence of sufficient numbers of capable, reliable police to protect the population. In addition to Karbala locals, there are religious pilgrims who visit the Shia holy shrines on religious holidays, whose numbers can reach a million. Also of note are the criminal elements crossing into Karbala from al-Anbar and Babil provinces. In late August, the Karbala police, largely made up of Badr Organization members and affiliates, clashed violently with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) members when the latter group attempted to overrun a shrine. Over the ensuing hours, the KOC played a role in mobilizing Iraqi Army reinforcements which helped to effectively bring the conflict to an end and eventually coordinated arrest operations against many of the culprits. While this outburst delayed PIC and cost KOC Commander Salem al Maliki his job, it also proved that the operations center concept had an important role to play in managing crisis situations. ¶5. (C) Prime Ministrial Directive #167 established the Basrah Operations Center (BsOC) on June 15, 2007 because the local IPs were unable (or unwilling) to combat militia infighting BAGHDAD 00000092 002.2 OF 003 and rampant criminality. Shia militias and criminal gangs, struggle for power in Iraq,s most prosperous province has led to significant violence, corruption, and mistrust within the population and provincial political and security structures. Basrah Operations Center Commander MG Mohan has worked closely with Basrah PDOP to cleanse local security forces and integrate forces from outside the province. ¶6. (C) Similar to operations centers in other provinces, the KOC and the BsOC have operational control over the Iraqi Police (IP),the Facilities Protection Service (FPS),the Iraqi Army (IA) units and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) deployed to the province, and the provincial intelligence and security centers. -------------- -------------- Operations Centers: The Standard Rather Than the Exception -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Operations centers currently function in Baghdad, Diyala, Karbala, and Basrah provinces, and Samarra city in Salah Ad Din province, suggesting that they will soon become the norm rather than the exception. At the September 16 Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS) meeting, PM Maliki stressed the importance of creating additional operations centers in Ninewa and al-Anbar province. During a press interview last month with a regional newspaper, General Nassir Abadi, MOD Deputy Commander of the Joint Forces, proclaimed operations centers a new requisite for a province's transfer to PIC. -------------- -------------- From "Provincial Iraqi Control" to Simply "Iraqi Control" -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Initially, the Joint Committee for the Transfer of Security Responsibility (JCTSR)(reftel),which makes decisions regarding PIC and which consist of representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Iraqi National Security Council, MNF-I, and the U.S. and UK Embassies, considered operations centers obstacles to PIC for a number of reasons: - The need for national security assets indicates the province is far from the "low" threat level required for PIC. - Operations Centers become the lead security body in the province, removing operational control from provincial authorities who have traditionally been the GOI-designated security lead after PIC. - All provinces should already have a PJCC to coordinate all security-related activities. ¶9. (C) In late summer 2007, the JCTSR reevaluated the PIC process. It concluded that a province is ready for PIC when the Iraqi Security Forces are capable of maintaining local day-to-day security without direct Coalition involvement. The presence of an operations center was seen as an enabler, rather than a shortcoming. Thus, the JCTSR re-evaluated the PIC Implementation Authorization to take the following into account: - The GOI has the authority to provide federal assistance to a troubled province that faced a potential crisis situation. A province may utilize the ISF (Iraqi Army and National Police) to achieve or maintain a 'low' threat level. - Security responsibility can be transferred from the MNF-I to the GOI. At the same time, the GOI can then appoint operational security responsibility to the operations command commander while civil administrative authority remains with the governor. - PJCCs are coordination and reporting bodies, but operations centers provide needed operational control when provincial security assets are not fully capable of sustaining the appropriate level of security. -------------- Legal Authority for the Operations Centers -------------- BAGHDAD 00000092 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (C) PM Maliki has been able to stand up ISF command centers owing to his position as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, there are limits to the IA,s authorities in the provinces. The IA can exercise domestic law enforcement functions in accordance with Iraqi law in order to augment local IPs. However, the lapsing of the &State of Emergency8 prevents them from exercising powers beyond existing and usual Iraqi law. (Note: Theoretically, the IA cannot exercise emergency powers because the State of Emergency has lapsed. The law requires the Council of Representatives renew the State of Emergency every 30 days; the renewal has not occurred since April 2007. End Note.) This means that the IA lacks the powers accorded to the Coalition Forces by the UNSCR, e.g., to detain individuals for security reasons. ¶11. (C) Additionally, the PIC Implementing Agreement, the MOU that outlines the terms and conditions under which PIC occurs, states a province can PIC while in a &state of crisis.8 The Agreement allows the Prime Minister to assign to one entity the lead responsibility for resolving the security crisis; however, this condition is temporary and control returns to provincial authorities once the crisis is resolved. The Prime Minister has not specifically declared Karbala or Basrah provinces &in crisis,8 however, the prime ministerial directives establishing the separate operations centers could be interpreted as doing so. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Operations commands provide a pragmatic solution to security needs but also have the effect of importing central government control over local police in the provinces. Once the security situation normalizes some consideration will have to be given to whether this change should be permanent. For now, operations centers provide the centralized command and control that is necessary for the PIC process to continue in provinces with security challenges local police cannot handle alone. END COMMENT. CROCKER