Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD855
2008-03-20 14:47:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
WEEKLY MEETING WITH PM, MARCH 13: SOFA/STRATEGIC
VZCZCXRO0518 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0855/01 0801447 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 201447Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6356 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000855
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MASS MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: WEEKLY MEETING WITH PM, MARCH 13: SOFA/STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK NEXT STEPS, SECURITY, AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION
REF: BAGHDAD 00278
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 b. and d.
Summary
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000855
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MASS MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: WEEKLY MEETING WITH PM, MARCH 13: SOFA/STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK NEXT STEPS, SECURITY, AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION
REF: BAGHDAD 00278
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 b. and d.
Summary
--------------
1. (S) In a cordial meeting March 13 at Prime Minister
Maliki's weekly security meeting with Ambassador Crocker and
GEN Petraeus, Ambassador briefed Maliki on the dual-tracked,
concurrent negotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) and the Strategic Framework (SF) by a technical
experts team and by senior political leaders, respectively.
Maliki confirmed his strong preference for holding the ICI
ministerial in late May to avoid excessive travel in April.
GEN Petraeus briefed the PM on recent successes against AQI
and Shia extremists but noted that an up-tick in attacks by
AQI to relieve pressure on AQI in Mosul was to be expected as
Iraqi and Coalition operations there continue. Maliki
agreed, and pointed out that AQI likely seeks to influence
upcoming Congressional testimony by Ambassador Crocker and
GEN Petraeus. GEN Petraeus also advised the PM on options
for improved power generation, security issues in southern
Iraq, use of Iraqi funding for the Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP),and re-establishing and protecting
the Central Bank of Iraq. End Summary.
SOFA/SF Way Forward
--------------
2. (S) Ambassador laid out for the Prime Minister the
dual-track approach to the negotiation of the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Strategic Framework (SF).
The former would be negotiated by teams of technical experts
led by deputy foreign minister Mohammad al-Haj Hamoud and
Ambassador Robert Loftis; the latter had already been shared
with the Prime Minister, the Presidency Council (President
Talabani and Vice-Presidents Tariq al-Hashimi and Abdel
al-Mahdi),and the KRG President, Massoud Barzani. (Note:
These are the signers of the August Communiqu, aka the
3 1 1. End Note.) The SOFA talks should continue between
Hamoud and Loftis and their teams while Strategic Framework
talks take place at the deputy level.
3. (S) Ambassador called to Maliki's attention the
distinction between the somewhat standard enduring elements
of the SOFA, which the technical experts should be able to
reach agreement on without too much difficulty, and the
unique temporary elements of the SOFA, such as combat
operations, detention authorities, and jurisdiction over
contractors, which will be more difficult. He suggested to
Maliki that it would be best to negotiate simultaneously the
Strategic Framework at the 3 1 1 level and the SOFA's
enduring elements at the expert level to prepare the
atmosphere for dealing with the difficult aspects of the
SOFA. All the time, we must bear in mind that the two
accords are closely linked.
4. (S) Maliki observed that negotiations were getting started
later than he had envisioned and that more preparation would
have been better. Regardless of that, work must begin as the
negotiations, especially of combat operations, would be
politically sensitive. He noted that such a document would
require a national consensus for it to pass the Council of
representatives and reported that he had already raised with
cabinet names of delegates to the talks. Noting that he had
planned on only one team for the negotiations, he mused that
the format of the delegation(s) would have to change. Maliki
commented that he was not aware previously that there would
be two separate agreements. He then asked Ambassador if the
political and economic spheres would be included in the
Strategic Framework. After some discussion, he and
Ambassador agreed that economic and political elements of the
Strategic Framework should be integrated into the text vice
included as annexes. Maliki stated that he would discuss
with the Presidency Council the composition of a second team
to negotiate the Strategic Framework.
Meetings Abroad
--------------
5. Ambassador encouraged Maliki to take full advantage of
meetings April 16 in Brussels at NATO and the EU and on the
22 in Kuwait at the Neighbors Process conference. GEN
Petraeus pointed out that MNSTC-I commanding general, LTG
James Dubik, had briefed Maliki the previous day on his
recent NATO visit. Ambassador also noted the value of the
International Compact for Iraq ministerial taking place in
Europe ) an opportunity to engage Europeans to a greater
BAGHDAD 00000855 002 OF 003
extent in Iraq's progress. Maliki acknowledged the
importance of these meetings, but expressed his dislike of
traveling and concern about being absent from Iraq so often
given the current situation. He stated that he thought AQI
and Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Groups (JAM SG) were trying to
destroy Iraq,s security and noted that he had asked Dr.
Rubbaie and Baghdad Operations Center Commander GEN Abud to
review the Baghdad security plan. (Note: In an earlier
meeting between Ambassador and Deputy Prime Minister Barham
Salih (ref. B),it was agreed to try to push the ICI
ministerial to the latter half of May. End Note.)
Security Situation
--------------
6. (S) GEN Petraeus told Maliki that ISF and Coalition had
killed a suicide vest coordinator and making progress against
the AQI emirs (military commanders) and the southern Karkh
IED organizer. (Note: Karkh is an area of central Baghdad
west of the Tigris River. End Note.) GEN Petraeus noted
that this recent upturn in violence to relieve pressure on
AQI in Mosul was to be expected as Iraqi and Coalition
operations continued in Ninewa Province. GEN Petraeus urged
Maliki to allow LTG McCrystal to give Maliki a briefing on
the situation, confiding that, at present, he was more
worried about JAM Special Groups than about AQI. Maliki
agreed, and then pointed out that AQI and SGs were aware of
the upcoming Congressional testimony and likely sought to use
increased violence before the hearings to influence politics
in the United
States and undermine the testimony of the Ambassador and GEN
Petraeus. In particular, he conjectured that former regime
elements in Syria were using their contacts in Iraq to foment
increase violence before the hearings and suggested that Iran
was working to influence tribes in southern Iraq.
7. (S) Referring to the situation in southern Iraq, Maliki
noted that some politicians with ties to other countries were
working to disrupt things. For that reason, Maliki said that
he called for a Crisis Action Committee to review the
situation. GEN Petraeus expressed his concern about Iranian
and JAM SG influence in the South, particularly in DhiQar and
Muthanna. He noted that the Government of Iraq needed to
support the tribes to counter the growing
perception that Iran was running things in the South. Maliki
took the point but made it clear he did not want armed
community volunteers or Sahwas established in southern Iraq
as has been the case in provinces such as Anbar. Rather than
Sahwas, Maliki assessed that Tribal Councils would suffice in
the South.
8. (S) GEN Petraeus observed that security operations in Kut
had gone very well. He highlighted the very effective use of
television by the Iraqi Security Forces in Kut to get the
message out to the local population and keep the people
informed about what was happening there.
Electricity
--------------
9. (S) GEN Petraeus advised Maliki that General Electric was
serious about returning to Iraq and helping restore and
improve the power generation and distribution grid in Iraq.
GEN Petraeus noted that he recommended to the CEO of GE that
they dispatch teams to Baghdad and Basrah. They want to
re-establish business in Iraq. Maliki told GEN Petraeus that
other companies had been presented to him, but he had wanted
a company that had the stature of GE. He invited GEN
Petraeus to join him for his next meeting with the Minister
of Oil and the Minister of Electricity. GEN Petraeus agreed
to attend. GEN Petraeus noted that while a
single-source contract probably would be the best course of
action in this case, the Ministry of Electricity should also
hire legal experts who can evaluate contracts and guarantee
Iraq gets full value from the contract. In response to
Maliki's question, GEN Petraeus advised him
that GE could do a project to generate electricity from gas
now being flared in the oil fields but war not directly
involved in oil production.
10. (S) GEN Petraeus stressed with Maliki the importance of
cutting through Iraqi red tape and bureaucratic procedures
and emphasized that the Ministry of Finance needs to have
dedicated funding to support major projects, funds the
Ministry of Electricity needs to purchase fuel oil. Due to
programmed increases in power generation capacity, 500
million dollars of fuel oil would be enough to Generate a
substantial increase in power this summer. Maliki took the
point, and stated that he had told the Minister of Finance to
establish a special fund to provide Ministry of Electricity
BAGHDAD 00000855 003 OF 003
what it needed. He added that he was now holding a weekly
joint meeting with the Ministers of Oil and of Electricity.
He noted that Iraqi companies and
entrepreneurs are interested in investing in power
generation.
Counter-Terrorism Bureau
--------------
11. (S) GEN Petraeus brought up the subject of the
Counter-Terrorism law, noting that it had been with the
Council of Ministers since 2 February. Maliki noted that the
Counter-Terrorism bureau was in an extra-legal state, and he
added that some of his political opponents would not support
it. He hoped to have the Council of Ministers approve its
legal establishment soon.
Central Bank of Iraq
--------------
12. (S) Maliki reported that the security situation at the
Central Bank of Iraq was a mess following the fire that
destroyed many records which was determined to be an inside
job of arson (ref. bank fire). GEN Petraeus suggested that
the Iraqi Army (IA) must protect it. Maliki agreed, and also
suggested relocating it to a parcel of land in the
International Zone (IZ) or adjacent to it. GEN Petraeus
concurred, adding that subsequently the IZ could be expanded
to include the relocated CBI.
Commander's Emergency Response Program
--------------
13. (C) GEN Petraeus explained to Maliki that there was a
pre-existing account and legal procedure that would allow the
Government of Iraq to fund projects being executed by the
U.S. military under the Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP). Maliki seemed pleased and commented that he
was open to the suggestion for Iraqi contributions to CERP.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MASS MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: WEEKLY MEETING WITH PM, MARCH 13: SOFA/STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK NEXT STEPS, SECURITY, AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION
REF: BAGHDAD 00278
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 b. and d.
Summary
--------------
1. (S) In a cordial meeting March 13 at Prime Minister
Maliki's weekly security meeting with Ambassador Crocker and
GEN Petraeus, Ambassador briefed Maliki on the dual-tracked,
concurrent negotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) and the Strategic Framework (SF) by a technical
experts team and by senior political leaders, respectively.
Maliki confirmed his strong preference for holding the ICI
ministerial in late May to avoid excessive travel in April.
GEN Petraeus briefed the PM on recent successes against AQI
and Shia extremists but noted that an up-tick in attacks by
AQI to relieve pressure on AQI in Mosul was to be expected as
Iraqi and Coalition operations there continue. Maliki
agreed, and pointed out that AQI likely seeks to influence
upcoming Congressional testimony by Ambassador Crocker and
GEN Petraeus. GEN Petraeus also advised the PM on options
for improved power generation, security issues in southern
Iraq, use of Iraqi funding for the Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP),and re-establishing and protecting
the Central Bank of Iraq. End Summary.
SOFA/SF Way Forward
--------------
2. (S) Ambassador laid out for the Prime Minister the
dual-track approach to the negotiation of the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Strategic Framework (SF).
The former would be negotiated by teams of technical experts
led by deputy foreign minister Mohammad al-Haj Hamoud and
Ambassador Robert Loftis; the latter had already been shared
with the Prime Minister, the Presidency Council (President
Talabani and Vice-Presidents Tariq al-Hashimi and Abdel
al-Mahdi),and the KRG President, Massoud Barzani. (Note:
These are the signers of the August Communiqu, aka the
3 1 1. End Note.) The SOFA talks should continue between
Hamoud and Loftis and their teams while Strategic Framework
talks take place at the deputy level.
3. (S) Ambassador called to Maliki's attention the
distinction between the somewhat standard enduring elements
of the SOFA, which the technical experts should be able to
reach agreement on without too much difficulty, and the
unique temporary elements of the SOFA, such as combat
operations, detention authorities, and jurisdiction over
contractors, which will be more difficult. He suggested to
Maliki that it would be best to negotiate simultaneously the
Strategic Framework at the 3 1 1 level and the SOFA's
enduring elements at the expert level to prepare the
atmosphere for dealing with the difficult aspects of the
SOFA. All the time, we must bear in mind that the two
accords are closely linked.
4. (S) Maliki observed that negotiations were getting started
later than he had envisioned and that more preparation would
have been better. Regardless of that, work must begin as the
negotiations, especially of combat operations, would be
politically sensitive. He noted that such a document would
require a national consensus for it to pass the Council of
representatives and reported that he had already raised with
cabinet names of delegates to the talks. Noting that he had
planned on only one team for the negotiations, he mused that
the format of the delegation(s) would have to change. Maliki
commented that he was not aware previously that there would
be two separate agreements. He then asked Ambassador if the
political and economic spheres would be included in the
Strategic Framework. After some discussion, he and
Ambassador agreed that economic and political elements of the
Strategic Framework should be integrated into the text vice
included as annexes. Maliki stated that he would discuss
with the Presidency Council the composition of a second team
to negotiate the Strategic Framework.
Meetings Abroad
--------------
5. Ambassador encouraged Maliki to take full advantage of
meetings April 16 in Brussels at NATO and the EU and on the
22 in Kuwait at the Neighbors Process conference. GEN
Petraeus pointed out that MNSTC-I commanding general, LTG
James Dubik, had briefed Maliki the previous day on his
recent NATO visit. Ambassador also noted the value of the
International Compact for Iraq ministerial taking place in
Europe ) an opportunity to engage Europeans to a greater
BAGHDAD 00000855 002 OF 003
extent in Iraq's progress. Maliki acknowledged the
importance of these meetings, but expressed his dislike of
traveling and concern about being absent from Iraq so often
given the current situation. He stated that he thought AQI
and Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Groups (JAM SG) were trying to
destroy Iraq,s security and noted that he had asked Dr.
Rubbaie and Baghdad Operations Center Commander GEN Abud to
review the Baghdad security plan. (Note: In an earlier
meeting between Ambassador and Deputy Prime Minister Barham
Salih (ref. B),it was agreed to try to push the ICI
ministerial to the latter half of May. End Note.)
Security Situation
--------------
6. (S) GEN Petraeus told Maliki that ISF and Coalition had
killed a suicide vest coordinator and making progress against
the AQI emirs (military commanders) and the southern Karkh
IED organizer. (Note: Karkh is an area of central Baghdad
west of the Tigris River. End Note.) GEN Petraeus noted
that this recent upturn in violence to relieve pressure on
AQI in Mosul was to be expected as Iraqi and Coalition
operations continued in Ninewa Province. GEN Petraeus urged
Maliki to allow LTG McCrystal to give Maliki a briefing on
the situation, confiding that, at present, he was more
worried about JAM Special Groups than about AQI. Maliki
agreed, and then pointed out that AQI and SGs were aware of
the upcoming Congressional testimony and likely sought to use
increased violence before the hearings to influence politics
in the United
States and undermine the testimony of the Ambassador and GEN
Petraeus. In particular, he conjectured that former regime
elements in Syria were using their contacts in Iraq to foment
increase violence before the hearings and suggested that Iran
was working to influence tribes in southern Iraq.
7. (S) Referring to the situation in southern Iraq, Maliki
noted that some politicians with ties to other countries were
working to disrupt things. For that reason, Maliki said that
he called for a Crisis Action Committee to review the
situation. GEN Petraeus expressed his concern about Iranian
and JAM SG influence in the South, particularly in DhiQar and
Muthanna. He noted that the Government of Iraq needed to
support the tribes to counter the growing
perception that Iran was running things in the South. Maliki
took the point but made it clear he did not want armed
community volunteers or Sahwas established in southern Iraq
as has been the case in provinces such as Anbar. Rather than
Sahwas, Maliki assessed that Tribal Councils would suffice in
the South.
8. (S) GEN Petraeus observed that security operations in Kut
had gone very well. He highlighted the very effective use of
television by the Iraqi Security Forces in Kut to get the
message out to the local population and keep the people
informed about what was happening there.
Electricity
--------------
9. (S) GEN Petraeus advised Maliki that General Electric was
serious about returning to Iraq and helping restore and
improve the power generation and distribution grid in Iraq.
GEN Petraeus noted that he recommended to the CEO of GE that
they dispatch teams to Baghdad and Basrah. They want to
re-establish business in Iraq. Maliki told GEN Petraeus that
other companies had been presented to him, but he had wanted
a company that had the stature of GE. He invited GEN
Petraeus to join him for his next meeting with the Minister
of Oil and the Minister of Electricity. GEN Petraeus agreed
to attend. GEN Petraeus noted that while a
single-source contract probably would be the best course of
action in this case, the Ministry of Electricity should also
hire legal experts who can evaluate contracts and guarantee
Iraq gets full value from the contract. In response to
Maliki's question, GEN Petraeus advised him
that GE could do a project to generate electricity from gas
now being flared in the oil fields but war not directly
involved in oil production.
10. (S) GEN Petraeus stressed with Maliki the importance of
cutting through Iraqi red tape and bureaucratic procedures
and emphasized that the Ministry of Finance needs to have
dedicated funding to support major projects, funds the
Ministry of Electricity needs to purchase fuel oil. Due to
programmed increases in power generation capacity, 500
million dollars of fuel oil would be enough to Generate a
substantial increase in power this summer. Maliki took the
point, and stated that he had told the Minister of Finance to
establish a special fund to provide Ministry of Electricity
BAGHDAD 00000855 003 OF 003
what it needed. He added that he was now holding a weekly
joint meeting with the Ministers of Oil and of Electricity.
He noted that Iraqi companies and
entrepreneurs are interested in investing in power
generation.
Counter-Terrorism Bureau
--------------
11. (S) GEN Petraeus brought up the subject of the
Counter-Terrorism law, noting that it had been with the
Council of Ministers since 2 February. Maliki noted that the
Counter-Terrorism bureau was in an extra-legal state, and he
added that some of his political opponents would not support
it. He hoped to have the Council of Ministers approve its
legal establishment soon.
Central Bank of Iraq
--------------
12. (S) Maliki reported that the security situation at the
Central Bank of Iraq was a mess following the fire that
destroyed many records which was determined to be an inside
job of arson (ref. bank fire). GEN Petraeus suggested that
the Iraqi Army (IA) must protect it. Maliki agreed, and also
suggested relocating it to a parcel of land in the
International Zone (IZ) or adjacent to it. GEN Petraeus
concurred, adding that subsequently the IZ could be expanded
to include the relocated CBI.
Commander's Emergency Response Program
--------------
13. (C) GEN Petraeus explained to Maliki that there was a
pre-existing account and legal procedure that would allow the
Government of Iraq to fund projects being executed by the
U.S. military under the Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP). Maliki seemed pleased and commented that he
was open to the suggestion for Iraqi contributions to CERP.
CROCKER