PRT MAYSAN: JAM AND THE TRIBES, URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000831

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT MAYSAN: JAM AND THE TRIBES, URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Darrell Jenks for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (U) This is a PRT Maysan reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: The extent of Mahdi Army influence on dense
urban and sparse rural populations in Maysan remains in
dispute. Most evidence points to an elected and
JAM-dominated provincial government controlling Maysan,s
urban centers balanced against tribal leaders controlling
populations in outlying, rural areas. A contingent of young,
unemployed males in both urban and rural areas are aligning
with Iraqi Police, militias, criminal elements posing as
militias, and organized criminal elements. This complex
mixture is further complicated by increasing Iranian activity
in the province. End summary.


3. (C) In discussions of the pervasiveness of the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) in Maysan Province, and its role in tribal
affairs, an issue that frequently emerges is whether JAM
leadership is capable of generating tribal support for Office
of Muqtada al-Sadr (OMS) policy statements. Conventional
wisdom on Maysan holds that tribes are weaker than JAM, and
thus susceptible to the JAM-controlled provincial government.
While some observers argue that tribes are weak and
manipulated by a more "sophisticated" and urban-centered JAM,
others contend that JAM has no real influence outside major
population centers.


4. (C) Recent conversations with tribal sheikhs have
suggested that Maysanis living in rural areas work hard to
earn a living and have little time for, nor interest in,
politics. At last count, sixty-five percent (509,551
residents) of Maysan's population lived in urban areas.
Marsh Arabs (Ma'dan) are returning from life in Baghdad, but
resettling in cities or towns instead of their families'
farms or marshlands. The legitimately-elected provincial
government is pulled from the ranks of an irregular militia.
Urban areas are overcrowded and dominated by militarized
religious stakeholders and independent or organized criminal
elements. All these elements, coupled with high unemployment
for unskilled, unmarried young males form a backdrop for
repression of the urban population.


5. (C) To further complicate the urban-rural dynamic, Iran
has asserted itself through its agents and proxies. Its
actors use Maysan as a point of entry, a STAGING area, and a
foothold in Iraq and contend for power with existing
provincial power players. Iran has difficulty gaining
genuine support beyond acceptance of money and training.
Reports of a vote-buying scheme illustrate concerns that Iran
plans to promote Islamic parties and candidates and exclude
independent candidates in the upcoming elections.


6. (C) Comment: By most counts, JAM is in control of
Maysan,s dense population centers while, with the exception
of young, unemployed men, tribal sheiks control the thinner
outlying populations. Tribal leaders are more likely to
follow the teachings and proclamations of the Grand Ayatollah
al-Sistani, while a JAM-dominated urban population is more
likely to support provincial JAM representatives and
government officials. Further, Iran is establishing a
foothold in the province. It is likely, though, that Maysani
leadership, both urban and rural, is more interested in
Iranian tangibles, including money, training, and community
projects, than submitting to dictates from Tehran. End
Comment.
CROCKER