BAHA AL-ARAJI: LACK OF TIMELINE IS BIGGEST U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000807 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: BAHA AL-ARAJI: LACK OF TIMELINE IS BIGGEST U.S. MISTAKE Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Waller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 16 meeting with Poloffs, Sadr Trend bloc leader Baha al-Araji acknowledged common U.S. and Sadrist interests but catalogued a long list of what he said were mistakes in America's handling of the post-regime period. Foremost among these, he claimed, is the failure to set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Contrary to recent media reports, Araji maintained that Sadr was in good HEALTH and remained in overall control of the Sadrist Trend, although he criticized Ahmed al-Shaybani for speaking in Sadr's name without authorization. He clarified that Sadr was in a period of "separation, not retirement" and hinted that Sadr would achieve the rank of ayatollah in less than two years. Araji was optimistic about Sadrist gains in provincial elections but emphasized the importance of elections being conducted properly and warned of a "revolution" if the public questioned the legitimacy of the election results. Araji said Sadrists could cooperate with PRTs, provided the work was done under the label of an NGO or association unaffiliated with the U.S. He said the prospect of Basrah morphing into a region had "positive and negative aspects" but maintained any choice regarding federalism must be "an Iraqi decision." End Summary. Common interests, but American mistakes -------------- ¶2. (C) After several months of declining to meet with Embassy officials, Sadrist parliamentarian Baha al-Araji met with Poloffs on March 16. Poloffs began by emphasizing areas of common interest between the Sadr Trend and the USG on issues such as supporting a strong, unified Iraq, reducing Iranian influence, and ensuring that Sadrists enjoy full participation in Iraqi politics. Araji agreed with these points and conceded that America's aims in Iraq are well-intentioned. However, he then segued into a list of errors he claimed the U.S. has made in the post-Saddam period. According to Araji the fundamental problem is that Americans approach Iraq with "an American mentality" ill-suited to Iraq. As a result, he said, the "the people who kill Americans are the same people who first welcomed them with flowers." He professed to be astounded by what he said was by far the most egregious U.S. mistake: the timeline for withdrawal. He said the Iraqi resistance was largely rooted in fear of an open ended occupation. Consequently, the length of the timeline is less important than the importance of establishing one. "It could be two years from now, five years, regardless of time. Once you announce a timeline, all the Iraqis that are fighting you will become your friends," he said. Araji emphasized the non-sectarian and nationalist credentials of the Sadr Trend, saying that the Sadrists objected to Iranian influence more than any other party and that in a telephone call Sadr told him "help the Sunni before the Shi'a, and work in Sunni neighborhoods before Shi'a neighborhoods." Sadr in state of separation, not retirement -------------- ¶3. (C) Araji said no ONE in the American or Iraqi government can understand Sadr, because "he is not a politician. He is a man of religion." Araji clarified that Sadr was in a state of "separation, not retirement" while studying sixteen hours a day to complete the final stage of study before becoming an ayatollah. He said that Sadr retained overall control over the Sadr Trend and JAM. Hinting that Sadr's period of separation may not last long, Araji said that while the amount of time needed to complete the final stage of study was not fixed (and could take as long as twenty-five years), "Muqtada's father and grandfather completed it in less than two years." Araji dismissed reports about Sadr's health, saying only that he "tired of the situation in Iraq." Asked if Sadr was also tired of problems within his own movement, Araji first said he was "tired only of the politicians" and criticized the media for distorting Sadr's words. However, he then criticized Ahmed al-Shaybani for being outside of the Sadr Trend but claiming to speak in Sadr's name, an offense that he said crossed a red line. Alluding to the varied composition of the movement, Araji conceded that some Sadrists were simple and poor people (in contrast to the "intellectuals" of the Da'wa Party),but said "If you are married to a women and have children, you take care of all them regardless...that is the definition of a group." Fair elections will lead to Sadrist victories -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked about VP Abdel Mehdi's veto of the Provincial Powers law, Araji expressed surprise but maintained that the elections need to take place by October 1. He said the Sadr BAGHDAD 00000807 002 OF 002 Trend planned to open its slate to independent candidates with technical and administrative experience and said as many as "50 percent" of the Sadrist slate might be composed of non-Sadrists. Araji expressed confidence in the Sadrist's electoral prospects, estimating the extent of popular support as "All of Maysan, 50 percent of Dhi Qar and Basrah, 40 percent of Najaf and Karbala, and the wide majority in Diwaniyah" with "not much" in Wassit and Babil. He cautioned that Sadrist gains depended on the elections being conducted properly and warned of a "revolution in all of Iraq" if there were any concerns over the legitimacy of election results. Poloffs emphasized that the U.S. is pressuring all parties to ensure elections take place by October 1 in a fair and transparent manner. PRT cooperation, regions formation -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to southern Iraq, Araji bemoaned the living conditions, saying "not even animals" were capable of enduring the living conditions in southern Iraq. Poloffs mentioned the possibility of PRTs working with Sadrists to target poor Shi'a neighborhoods. Araji supported the idea, but only if the projects were done under the cover of an NGO or association unaffiliated with the U.S. government. The idea of Sadrists working openly with the USG was "impossible," he maintained. Asked about the possibility of Basrah becoming a region, Araji said it had "positive and negative aspects." He emphasized the importance of it being "an Iraqi decision" and said Basrah had become a "worry" for the Gulf countries, Iran, and ISCI. ¶6. (C) Comment: Although often strident and militant in public, in private Araji was an amiable interlocutor, joking as he delivered Sadrist talking points. His description of the Sadrist movement contrasts with recent reporting on internal fragmentation and confusion among the Sadrists. An indication of this fragmentation might be Araji's willingness to meet American officials in the first place, as Poloffs have tried to arrange a meeting for months without success. We intend to meet again with Araji in the near future as part of our larger effort to engage Sadrists in constructive dialogue. End Comment. CROCKER