BAHA AL-ARAJI: LACK OF TIMELINE IS BIGGEST U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BAHA AL-ARAJI: LACK OF TIMELINE IS BIGGEST U.S.
MISTAKE

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Waller for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 16 meeting with Poloffs, Sadr
Trend bloc leader Baha al-Araji acknowledged common U.S. and
Sadrist interests but catalogued a long list of what he said
were mistakes in America's handling of the post-regime
period. Foremost among these, he claimed, is the failure to
set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Contrary
to recent media reports, Araji maintained that Sadr was in
good health and remained in overall control of the Sadrist
Trend, although he criticized Ahmed al-Shaybani for speaking
in Sadr's name without authorization. He clarified that Sadr
was in a period of "separation, not retirement" and hinted
that Sadr would achieve the rank of ayatollah in less than
two years. Araji was optimistic about Sadrist gains in
provincial elections but emphasized the importance of
elections being conducted properly and warned of a
"revolution" if the public questioned the legitimacy of the
election results. Araji said Sadrists could cooperate with
PRTs, provided the work was done under the label of an NGO or
association unaffiliated with the U.S. He said the prospect
of Basrah morphing into a region had "positive and negative
aspects" but maintained any choice regarding federalism must
be "an Iraqi decision." End Summary.

Common interests, but American mistakes
--------------


2. (C) After several months of declining to meet with
Embassy officials, Sadrist parliamentarian Baha al-Araji met
with Poloffs on March 16. Poloffs began by emphasizing areas
of common interest between the Sadr Trend and the USG on
issues such as supporting a strong, unified Iraq, reducing
Iranian influence, and ensuring that Sadrists enjoy full
participation in Iraqi politics. Araji agreed with these
points and conceded that America's aims in Iraq are
well-intentioned. However, he then segued into a list of
errors he claimed the U.S. has made in the post-Saddam
period. According to Araji the fundamental problem is that
Americans approach Iraq with "an American mentality"
ill-suited to Iraq. As a result, he said, the "the people
who kill Americans are the same people who first welcomed
them with flowers." He professed to be astounded by what he
said was by far the most egregious U.S. mistake: the timeline
for withdrawal. He said the Iraqi resistance was largely
rooted in fear of an open ended occupation. Consequently,
the length of the timeline is less important than the
importance of establishing one. "It could be two years from
now, five years, regardless of time. Once you announce a
timeline, all the Iraqis that are fighting you will become
your friends," he said. Araji emphasized the non-sectarian
and nationalist credentials of the Sadr Trend, saying that
the Sadrists objected to Iranian influence more than any
other party and that in a telephone call Sadr told him "help
the Sunni before the Shi'a, and work in Sunni neighborhoods
before Shi'a neighborhoods."

Sadr in state of separation, not retirement
--------------


3. (C) Araji said no one in the American or Iraqi government
can understand Sadr, because "he is not a politician. He is
a man of religion." Araji clarified that Sadr was in a state
of "separation, not retirement" while studying sixteen hours
a day to complete the final stage of study before becoming an
ayatollah. He said that Sadr retained overall control over
the Sadr Trend and JAM. Hinting that Sadr's period of
separation may not last long, Araji said that while the
amount of time needed to complete the final stage of study
was not fixed (and could take as long as twenty-five years),
"Muqtada's father and grandfather completed it in less than
two years." Araji dismissed reports about Sadr's health,
saying only that he "tired of the situation in Iraq." Asked
if Sadr was also tired of problems within his own movement,
Araji first said he was "tired only of the politicians" and
criticized the media for distorting Sadr's words. However,
he then criticized Ahmed al-Shaybani for being outside of the
Sadr Trend but claiming to speak in Sadr's name, an offense
that he said crossed a red line. Alluding to the varied
composition of the movement, Araji conceded that some
Sadrists were simple and poor people (in contrast to the
"intellectuals" of the Da'wa Party),but said "If you are
married to a women and have children, you take care of all
them regardless...that is the definition of a group."

Fair elections will lead to Sadrist victories
--------------


4. (C) Asked about VP Abdel Mehdi's veto of the Provincial
Powers law, Araji expressed surprise but maintained that the
elections need to take place by October 1. He said the Sadr

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Trend planned to open its slate to independent candidates
with technical and administrative experience and said as many
as "50 percent" of the Sadrist slate might be composed of
non-Sadrists. Araji expressed confidence in the Sadrist's
electoral prospects, estimating the extent of popular support
as "All of Maysan, 50 percent of Dhi Qar and Basrah, 40
percent of Najaf and Karbala, and the wide majority in
Diwaniyah" with "not much" in Wassit and Babil. He cautioned
that Sadrist gains depended on the elections being conducted
properly and warned of a "revolution in all of Iraq" if there
were any concerns over the legitimacy of election results.
Poloffs emphasized that the U.S. is pressuring all parties to
ensure elections take place by October 1 in a fair and
transparent manner.

PRT cooperation, regions formation
--------------


5. (C) Turning to southern Iraq, Araji bemoaned the living
conditions, saying "not even animals" were capable of
enduring the living conditions in southern Iraq. Poloffs
mentioned the possibility of PRTs working with Sadrists to
target poor Shi'a neighborhoods. Araji supported the idea,
but only if the projects were done under the cover of an NGO
or association unaffiliated with the U.S. government. The
idea of Sadrists working openly with the USG was
"impossible," he maintained. Asked about the possibility of
Basrah becoming a region, Araji said it had "positive and
negative aspects." He emphasized the importance of it being
"an Iraqi decision" and said Basrah had become a "worry" for
the Gulf countries, Iran, and ISCI.


6. (C) Comment: Although often strident and militant in
public, in private Araji was an amiable interlocutor, joking
as he delivered Sadrist talking points. His description of
the Sadrist movement contrasts with recent reporting on
internal fragmentation and confusion among the Sadrists. An
indication of this fragmentation might be Araji's willingness
to meet American officials in the first place, as Poloffs
have tried to arrange a meeting for months without success.
We intend to meet again with Araji in the near future as part
of our larger effort to engage Sadrists in constructive
dialogue. End Comment.
CROCKER