IRAQI DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SURVEYS IRAQI JOINT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000768 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2018 TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PINS PNAT PTER SUBJECT: IRAQI DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SURVEYS IRAQI JOINT FORCES Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. SUMMARY: (SBU) At the monthly Defense Attach Association of Iraq (DAAI) meeting on March 4, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCOS),General Nasier Abadi, presented a frank overview of the Iraqi military and the challenges it faces in the coming years. He observed that the current counterinsurgency focus necessitated rapid growth of mainly the Army but said the Navy and Air Force would also grow once the military transitioned into a more conventional role. General Abadi revealed the Army was transforming its Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) into more mobile Light Infantry Battalions in order to patrol newly-developed exclusion zones around key oil pipelines. The Army is also creating an Infrastructure Repair Battalion (IRB) focused on securing and maintaining the nation-wide electrical supply and distribution grid. General Abadi candidly discussed significant inadequacies, the remedying of which depended on future technical and training assistance from Coalition Forces. He concluded with an assessment that the Iraqi Joint Forces could take over the lead for a substantial portion of the counterinsurgency effort by the end of 2008 and become self-reliant in logistics sometime in 2009. Regarding external defense and long-term training and equipping of forces, he acknowledged the long-term requirement for Coalition Forces. These assessments echo those expressed by Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie and Minister of Defense Abdel Qadr. END SUMMARY. Current Overall Situation -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At the monthly DAAI meeting, General Abadi presented a frank overview of the Iraqi military and the challenges it faces in the coming years. He pointed out that since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has faced difficulties in establishing any new or reformed institutions because there are few experienced leaders. Abadi also noted the significant political and sectarian issues which divide Iraq and spill over into the military. He acknowledged reconciliation efforts by the government--especially towards former Sunni officers and NCOs--and believed these would help alleviate some of the military's leadership deficit. Regarding the current security situation, General Abadi was upbeat on security improvements, but cautioned that significant threats remain. Of those, he assessed Al-Qaeda (AQI) as the most dangerous, but suggested their organization had been severely disrupted by Coalition and Iraqi actions. He stressed that Baghdad remains the main focus of the security effort, but noted that significant military operations continue elsewhere, particularly in Ninewa province. Strategic Military Priorities and Force Generation -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Turning to strategic military priorities, General Abadi listed the first priority as internal security and the defeat of terrorists/violent extremists. Practically, teralis translates into immediately developing the Iraqi Army as a robust counterinsurgency organization. But Abadi emphasized that as the internal security situation improves, the Iraqi Joint Forces will transition into a more conventional defensive posture, i.e. external defense of the State of Iraq in conjunction with regional and international security arrangements. Iraqi Army -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Regarding the individual force components, General Abadi summarized the Army's specific counterinsurgency mission as defeating terrorists and extremists, denying them safe-havens, protecting strategic infrastructure, and disrupting terrorist lines of communication and support. Abadi explained this mission necessitated a rapid force generation--in 2004, the Iraqi Army numbered only 33,000, but has since grown to over 200,000 personnel in less than four years. As this growth progressed, the Army's priorities changed. In 2006, it was rapid recruitment. This shifted to the education/training in 2007. Now, the Army is focusing on developing a robust logistical capacity particularly at the division-level, where the Army is establishing regional logistic centers capable of rapidly supplying forces locally. Iraqi Navy and Air Force -------------- ¶5. (SBU) General Abadi reiterated that current slow growth BAGHDAD 00000768 002 OF 002 rate of the Iraqi Navy and Air Force would rapidly accelerate once the police became the primary internal security force and the military resumed a more conventional role. For now, these two forces will provide direct support to the counterinsurgency mission using their limited available forces. The Iraqi Navy, for example, will focus on the protection of Iraqi territorial waters, search and rescue, and countering smuggling and illegal activity at sea using six patrol boats and sixteen small craft. The Iraqi Air Force will support the effort with a very limited number of helicopters and small fixed wing aircraft, although they are programmed to receive more soon. The Air Force also has an additional mission to provide limited VIP airlift. Protecting Infrastructure: New Units -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Turning to Prime Minister Maliki's emphasis on the provision of services to Iraqi citizens, General Abadi revealed that the Iraqi Army will transform its 17 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs),which were formed to directly counter terrorist and criminal destruction along oil pipelines and electricity supply routes, into more mobile Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs). These new units will occupy and rapidly transit special exclusion zones currently under development along key oil pipelines, particularly the two between Kirkuk-Bayji and Baghdad-Bayji. During the first half of 2008, the Army will also form a highly specialized Infrastructure Repair Battalion (IRB) focused on assessment, inspection, maintenance, and repair of the high voltage distribution system. Abadi added that the IRB will also be in charge of erecting new 400KV towers, installing conductors and transformers, as well as developing the ability to simultaneously repair major breaks at two different locations. Significant Inadequacies -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Even though the Iraqi military is making good progress, General Abadi lamented significant inadequacies which will take years to rectify. As noted earlier, the Iraqi Air Force is small and as yet unable to perform any kind of close air support (CAS) missions. The Army also has no significant fire support for its ground forces. There is no combat medical evacuation system or military hospital support. The military lacks a robust technical intelligence and secure communications capability. Finally, the current Iraqi military is geared almost exclusively towards counterinsurgency with few resources trained and equipped for conventional defense. Abadi said the Iraqi Joint Staff was addressing these shortfalls, but admitted that their solution depended on modern equipment and well-trained forces provided by others. In that regard, he thanked the Coalition Forces-- particularly the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq (MNSTC-I)--for their critical support in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and training. Abadi's Conclusions -------------- ¶8. (SBU) General Abadi closed his presentation by reiterating his two most important priorities: leadership and logistics, both of which he declared would be tackled vigorously in the coming months. He noted that significant force structure has been added in the past few years but expressed his belief that Coalition Forces support will still be necessary in the future, especially for defense against external threats. CROCKER