UNAMI SRSG DISCUSSES ELECTIONS, ANKARA TRIP, SOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000742 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: UNAMI SRSG DISCUSSES ELECTIONS, ANKARA TRIP, SOFA AND REFUGEES WITH AMBASSADOR Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). USG Participants Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Special Advisor David Satterfield Brett McGurk, NSC Ali Khedery, Special Assistant to Ambassador Crocker Susan Riggs, Notetaker UNAMI Participant SRSG Staffan de Mistura D-SRSG David Shearer D-SRSG Andrew Gilmour Elpida Rouka, Special Assistant to SRSG de Mistura ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 9, the Ambassador met with UNAMI Special Representative (SRSG) Staffan de Mistura upon his return from Ankara. The Ambassador and the SRSG discussed the veto of the Provincial Powers Law, provincial elections, and the SRSG,s thoughts on a way forward. De Mistura said he planned on &going full speed.8 De Mistura described his meeting in Ankara and how the Turks were looking for assurances that UNAMI was not working towards an Article 140 referendum. He also discussed the possibility of a way to approach KRG President Barzani on Kirkuk. The SRSG updated the Ambassador on UNAMI assistance to the Iraqis on the SOFA negotiations, stating it would be easier for the US to work with a well-prepared team. He also discussed the possibility of Stockholm as a potential venue for the ICI conference; the upcoming neighbors conference in Kuwait; the status of the IOM/UNHCR/IMC refugee-return assessment; the new UNAMI compound in Baghdad; and his upcoming trip to Washington in May. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On March 9, the Ambassador met with UNAMI Special Representative Staffan de Mistura upon his return from Ankara. The Ambassador brought up the veto of the Provincial Powers Law and asked for the SRSG,s thoughts on a way forward with the legislation and provincial elections. De Mistura said he planned on ignoring all of the delaying tactics by the GOI, claiming, &We,re going full speed.8 UNAMI has already screened over 1,000 applicants for the remaining eight Governorate Electoral Office (GEO) director positions and has found over 800 to be qualified. Interviews in Baghdad are proceeding over the next two weeks. He anticipates UNAMI will meet the 43-day deadline for having the remaining eight GEO directors in place. De Mistura commented there were still political realities to be faced. He believed that those who are manipulating the law because they are afraid of losing provincial elections should be publicly exposed. The SRSG wanted to know if only Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi was behind the veto of the Provincial Powers Law (PPL) or if there were others. The Ambassador responded that it appeared to be an ISCI move, as the UIA is upset, and that Hashimi appears ambivalent. The SRSG also informed the Ambassador UNAMI was bringing in a legislative drafting team. The Ambassador mentioned our own team of election-drafting experts funded by USAID, and recommended both teams get together to coordinate their activities so, "we don't confuse the Iraqis." (Note: UNAMI and USAID met on March 11 to coordinate the teams' work and will ensure they work closely together. End Note.) ¶3. (C) The SRSG mentioned his previously-canceled trip to Najaf was back on for the following Tuesday; he was still planning on meeting with Sistani and wanted to know if there was anything we wanted him to bring up. The Ambassador commented that Adel's veto of the PPL has increased tension in the Shia community and that Sistani would not look favorably on this. He opined that if Sistani could help settle it, that would be a good thing. De Mistura suggested Sistani might bring it up himself as he considers the current government "a mess" and he will not allow his image to be used by any political campaign. The Ambassador asked the SRSG to find out what he could from Sistani on regions formation and what might happen in Basrah. ¶3. (C) De Mistura informed the Ambassador he had a good meeting in Ankara. He said Ankara was keen on UNAMI making progress on disputed internal boundaries in the south of Iraq and to not only focus on the north. Essentially the Turks wanted to be assured UNAMI was not preparing for an Article 140 referendum in June. He reassured them that it would not be possible and the Kurds were not pushing for it. Ankara also voiced its support for a unified Iraq, but does not want the Kurds to have either Kirkuk or the oil. They were concerned to see so much movement by UNAMI. De Mistura told Ankara that he "could not do nothing,8 and the Kurds would have to see some success or they would withdraw from the process, and that would be bad for Turkey. He said there was misunderstanding about UNAMI's technical assistance on disputed internal boundaries. Ankara wanted it to be BAGHDAD 00000742 002 OF 003 political assistance, not just technical. De Mistura informed them "everything UNAMI does is political here." On another topic, Ankara is interested in seeing permanent US bases in Iraq, but not in the north, which surprised de Mistura. ¶4. (C) The SRSG voiced concern over the "medical situation" in Iraq, as seemingly all of Iraq's senior leadership has suffered some sort of medical problem. He feared it could be an issue in upcoming disputed boundary negotiations. He suggested the 3 plus 2 (president, two vice presidents, prime minister and KRG president) each nominate a younger person who are smart, trusted and energetic to work with UNAMI. On Article 140, De Mistura said that Iraqis "are obsessed with sovereignty" and would not abide by a decision that looks as if UNAMI or the US is "giving" a piece of land to one side or the other. He wants to conduct a series of town hall meetings in the next 18-20 days so Iraqis can voice their concerns and feel they were heard. He also suggested the Ambassador and perhaps the EU Ambassador join him to see KRG President Barzani to let him know the Kurds have overreached and to accept a compromise on Kirkuk. He said the Kurds would lose on a referendum and would hate a "special status" for Kirkuk, but that they might have to accept "joint administration" and fly two flags. ¶5. (C) The SRSG also mentioned that Iraqi NSA Rubaie and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hammoud (Iraq,s lead on the SOFA) approached him requesting UNAMI assistance in negotiating with the U.S. De Mistura opined that UNAMI assistance would be a good thing because it would be easier for the U.S. to work with a well-prepared team. He said he has a French and a Romanian ambassador who will work with the Iraqis and the Japanese have also expressed an interest. The Ambassador explained that the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) would not be terribly lengthy and would formalize the Declaration of Principles signed earlier. It would cover political, economic and cultural engagements, along with others, just not security. That would be covered under the SOFA, which will be technical and more in-depth. ¶6. (C) De Mistura informed the Ambassador the UN Human Rights Report would come out March 15 and should have already been received by the Embassy. He said the Minister for Human Rights had seen it and finds it quite balanced. He stated his team in New York is also happy with it. The SRSG reiterated his belief the report needs to be taken in the context of the environment and that one can not equate a suicide bomber with a detainee deprived of legal counsel for a few days. He complained the UN team did not have access to Coalition detainees and suggested this was a mistake because the U.S. likely has nothing to hide. The Ambassador responded that the US was fulfilling its Geneva Convention responsibilities by allowing the Red Cross to visit the detainees, but would explore the possibilities with General Petraeus. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador then mentioned that DPM Barham Saleh called UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari suggesting Sweden host the next International Compact on Iraq (ICI). De Mistura offered to contact the Swedish Ambassador and Foreign Minister to discuss the possibility. S/I Satterfield offered the option of Brussels as another possibility. The SRSG concurred and suggested April 25, 26 or the morning of the 27th in either Stockholm or Brussels as the Neighbors Conference would be on April 22 in Kuwait, and the Secretary General would not be able to attend that. De Mistura stated he wished he had something more substantive for the conference, adding that he wants to talk about refugees, which led him to describe the solution to the USD 8 million Iraq will give to UNHCR for Iraqi refugees in Jordan. He described the scene as the Iraqi Foreign Minister handing the check to the Jordanian Foreign Minister, who will touch it for only a brief moment before handing it the UNHCR representative. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador said that he hoped to see the IOM/UNHCR/IMC refugee return assessment soon. D-SRSG David Shearer informed the Ambassador the assessment would take place in April and last two to three months. He said the Minister of Migration is worried about the Prime Minister,s reaction to the results. Shearer wanted to ensure the action plan from last year is still moving. The Ambassador said the survey was very important because, &It,s what our troops have to deal with out in the neighborhoods.8 De Mistura also said Makhmour was on the Talabani agenda for his trip to Ankara. (Note: Talabani separately told the Ambassador that Makhmour was not raised while he was in Ankara. End Note.) ¶9. (C) De Mistura thanked the Ambassador for his support in allocating the Georgian Compound as the site for UNAMI's new compound. He said he may need additional assistance as the BAGHDAD 00000742 003 OF 003 GOI informed him they would be happy to give the site to UNAMI, but had promised it to the Georgians. He thought this was unusual as the Georgian diplomatic representation is located in Amman and were unlikely to need so much land; however he planned to contact the Georgian Ambassador in Amman to inquire. The SRSG informed the Ambassador he would be going to the US to discuss the new compound with the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and may visit Washington. The Ambassador asked De Mistura's view on engaging with the US Congress, at which the SRSG smiled and said he was allowed to meet with committees to educate them on UNAMI engagement, but that he could not lobby them. CROCKER