U.S./IRAQ SOFA: NEGOTIATING ABOUT NEGOTIATING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000739

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ
SUBJECT: U.S./IRAQ SOFA: NEGOTIATING ABOUT NEGOTIATING

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: The first meeting of the full U.S. and
Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement negotiating teams on March
11 was largely a ceremonial affair in which the two sides
introduced themselves and their opening positions. The press
was not present. The Iraqis continued to press their vision
of a single "agreement" that would encompass the full range
of political, economic, diplomatic and security relationships
between the two countries. Moreover, the Iraqis argued that
the negotiations should proceed step by step, starting first
with the economic realm and only moving on to other issues
after that was completed. The U.S. team argued for a
separate arrangement on the Strategic Framework and an
agreement on the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. These
should be pursued simultaneously, but the Strategic Framework
should be negotiated at the political level while a technical
team negotiates the SOFA. While the issue was not entirely
resolved, the Iraqis agreed to refer to "agreements and
arrangements" in their press communique. In a private
conversation after the plenary, Iraqi Head of Delegation
Ambassador Mohammed Haj Hamoud admitted to U.S. SOFA
Negotiator Ambassador Robert Loftis that the Iraqi construct
was unworkable and asked for help in persuading the Prime
Minister to change his instructions. We anticipate that most
of the negotiations from here forward will be with Ambassador
Hamoud and a small group of advisors, rather than in plenary
sessions. End Summary.

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Different Expectations and Mandates
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2. (C) The first plenary session of Status of Forces
Agreement negotiations convened in Baghdad at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on March 11, 2008, and immediately revealed a
gap in understanding of what each side came to the table to
negotiate. The Iraqi delegation, led by Deputy Foreign
Minister Mohammed Haj Hamoud, believes itself to be under
instructions to negotiate both the Strategic Framework (plus
a series of agreements in the non-security spheres) and the
SOFA, preferably as a single document. The U.S. side, led by
Ambassador Loftis, is empowered solely to work on the Status
of Forces Agreement.


3. (C) Accompanying the U.S. delegation, NSC Senior Director
Brett McGurk explained the U.S. vision of the distinction
between the SOFA and the Strategic Framework - with the
latter addressing the broad spheres of our relationship,
including economics, cultural, diplomatic, and security. He
further explained that this Framework document will be signed
by President Bush and Iraq's national leadership. Ideally,
it should be negotiated at the national leadership level,
with technical negotiations on the SOFA (which is the key
enabler to the security vision outlined in the Framework
document) proceeding in parallel between the two expert
teams. (Comment: The Strategic Framework is designed in part
to take the spotlight off the SOFA and place our security
relationship in a broader frame - which will be essential to
the Iraqis ultimately selling the SOFA to their people and
the parliament. Iraqi hesitancy to address SOFA issues is
likely due in part to the fragile political situation and
contentious issues that the SOFA (including authorities for
combat, detention, and jurisdiction over private contractors)
will entail. End Comment.)


4. (C) In his opening statement, Ambassador Hamoud expressed
the GOI's strong commitment to creating a long term strategic
relationship with the United States, emphasizing frequently
that such a relationship must respect the sovereignty of
Iraq. He acknowledged receipt of our drafts on the Strategic
Framework and the Status of Forces, and said that the Iraqi
delegation needs some time to study the documents, and to
prepare its responses and lists of questions and comments.
Hamoud also noted that his government is in the process of
preparing its authorization to negotiate, and asked for a
document from the United States empowering the United States
team to negotiate. (Comment: Although not common, some
governments do ask for such authorizations "for the record."
End Comment.) Hamoud added that between the preparations and
his other duties, including foreign travel, the Iraqi team
would not be able to meet again until Sunday, March 23.


5. (C) Loftis described the U.S. vision of the SOFA as
addressing both the enduring relationship and the special
requirements of the current situation in Iraq. Regarding the
former, the United States envisions an agreement much like
those it has with other friends and partners. To assist Iraq
in the current security environment, the agreement should
also grant temporary authorities to conduct combat
operations, detain persons for imperative reasons of
security, and maintain exclusive jurisdiction over certain
categories of Department of Defense (DOD) contractors.

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Loftis also noted that the U.S. would approach Iraq about
U.S. jurisdiction over certain non-DOD contractors, outside
of this agreement. The Iraqi side did not respond
substantively.


6. (C) After further discussion about the two sides'
differing mandates, Ambassador Hamoud produced a short draft
press release noting that the two sides had met to begin
negotiation of a long term "Agreement on Cooperation and
Friendship." Pushing back against this phrasing, Loftis and
McGurk won agreement that the communique issued by the Iraqi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs should simply say that the two
sides were engaged in negotiations on "reaching agreements
and arrangements on long term cooperation and friendship
between the two countries, including an agreement on the
temporary presence of U.S. forces."

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Structure of Negotiations
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7. (S) After the plenary session, Ambassador Loftis met
alone with Ambassador Hamoud to discuss further the structure
of the negotiations. Hamoud said that the structure on the
Iraqi side is unworkable, but that it reflects what he
believes are the current instructions from Prime Minister
Maliki that one team negotiate both the Strategic Framework
and the Status of Forces Agreement, focusing first on
economic issues. He asked that Ambassador Crocker persuade
the Prime Minister to move responsibility for the Strategic
Framework away from Hamoud's team to the Executive Council.
Hamoud reiterated that he has little confidence in many
members of his team, and that he expects to do much of the
negotiation with only a handful of advisors.


8. (C) Note: The Iraqi team has strongly requested that the
members of its delegation, including the lead, not be
publicly identified by name. End Note.

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Assessment
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9. (S) Comment: The results of the first plenary are not
surprising, and reflect both Iraqi inexperience and high
expectations. Private conversations indicate that the Iraqis
will refine their teams for a more productive approach. Once
that happens, we anticipate that the Iraqi team will be more
willing and ready to engage on the substance of status of
forces issues.
CROCKER