SHAWAYS GUARDED ABOUT SFA/SOFA PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000734 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SHAWAYS GUARDED ABOUT SFA/SOFA PROCESS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4d/b ¶1. (C) In a March 8 meeting, KDP Baghdad Representative (and former Deputy Prime Minister) Rosch Shaways told Ambassador Crocker, Senior Advisor to the Secretary on Iraq Satterfield and NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan McGurk that KRG leadership was prepared to take positive, practical steps to reduce tensions with Turkey. Shaways said the Political Council for National Security (PCNS) was largely opposed to the SFA/SOFA and intent on negotiating cultural and economic items before focusing on security issues. Shaways was unimpressed by Vice President Abdel Mahdi's Provincial Powers veto, but volunteered that the Vice President might be amenable to reconsidering. The hydrocarbons legislation package was a "nightmare" and Shaways would go no further than that the February 2007 draft was a good starting point for discussions. Nechirvan Barzani was ready to travel to Baghdad to engage in direct talks with the GOI, but would only do so after Prime Minister Maliki conveyed the right signal--presumably involving the dismissal of GOI Oil Minister Husayn Sharistani. Shaways agreed to press senior GOI leadership to speak out in the run-up to the fifth anniversary of the Gulf War. END SUMMARY. TURKEY - KRG ACTION SEEMS TO BE MOSTLY TALK ¶2. (C) Ambassador Crocker opened by saying the USG hoped for direct discussions between the KRG/GOT - preferably between KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Special Envoy Davutolglu, in a third country, if required. Shaways noted the GOT wanted a Nechirvan visit to be public but would consider a secret visit by someone other than Nechirvan, in a third country if necessary. Ambassador Crocker said he expected President Talabani to propose reactivation of the GOT/GOI/USG trilateral commission, which was something the US supported. All agreed that the Talabani visit to Turkey appeared positive, but could also create friction between Talabani and the Barzanis. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Crocker emphasized that the KRG had both to send unambiguous signs that KGK presence on Iraqi soil was unacceptable and come up with a plan to end the KGK's armed presence in Iraq; interdicting KGK movements and making arrests would send that kind of sign. The USG stood ready to push back against transfer pressure we knew the KRG would receive from the GOT. We would stress that the arrests were what was important and convey to the GOT that the KRG could hold the detainees. The KRG's primary concern had to be to find ways to move beyond the status quo. Shaways said he would convey this message to President Barzani, whom he described as ready to take positive, practical steps (which appeared mainly to consist of a statement) to defuse the crisis. Ambassador Crocker answered that a statement that the KGK was not welcome in the KRG would be helpful, but made it clear we expect other actions as well. SFA/SOFA - MARCH 5 PCNS - ALL WHO SPOKE OPPOSED SFA/SOFA ¶4. (C) Ambassador Crocker provided Shaways a general outline of the SFA/SOFA process and emphasized that the USG wanted to work concurrently on SFA "the broad strategic framework" and the SOFA, the "technical side the matters". Moving forward on both tracks was particularly important because the SOFA contained elements unique to Iraq including combat and detention authorities and immunities for parties working to support the mission. These SOFA elements were by their nature temporary and would no longer be required as Iraqi capacity improved; the end state would leave only the strategic agreement in place. Ideally all parties who signed the Leaders August declaration would also sign the SFA and the GOI had to spearhead a broad effort, from the very outset, to achieve this. The Group of Five (old 3 plus 1 plus1) would convene at an early occasion to set the groundwork; the goal was to avoid a repetition of the November SPD process when only two parties negotiated. ¶5. (C) Saying he wanted to "speak frankly," Shaways said there were "rumors" going around the March 5 PCNS that the SFA/SOFA would prolong Chapter VII status and the USG wanted to keep troops in Iraq indefinitely. Shaways described wide ("all who spoke") opposition across the range of authorities, location and contractor immunities issues. The feeling on the Kurdish side was that some elements in the PCNS were intent on scuttling the process. Shaways criticized the GOI's proposed SFA/SOFA framework (working level team/Presidency Council/PCNS/CoR) saying it would drag negotiations out for years. He remarked that during the meeting only Prime Minister Maliki understood the issues and offered practical guidance. Shaways modulated, however, adding Maliki was susceptible to the pressure of those seeking to disrupt the negotiations. Shaways volunteered that the KDP had no objections to the USG positions--negotiation mechanics were the key to success and BAGHDAD 00000734 002 OF 003 it was important the USG and the Kurds maintained open communication channels. Perhaps voicing a party-inspired line, Shaways mentioned that President Talabani harbored reservations about the SF/SOF agreements, which Shaways attributed to Talabani's stature and position. Shaways assessed that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh was the better point person to articulate the PUK position but concluded a uniform Kurdish position was paramount. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador stated that the purpose of the SFA/SOFA process was, unequivocally, to end Iraq's Chapter VII status. These were bilateral agreements - a crucial difference - and the ultimate goal was to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty. After asking to see the documents the PCNS considered in their meeting, Ambassador Crocker suggested the PCNS discussion veered off course because the only paper before the Iraqis was a table of contents to a typical SOFA - devoid of context or explanation - which the Embassy had earlier provided. (Comment. The Iraqis have told us repeatedly and consistently that the Iraqi people and the parliament will not accept a SOFA unless it is viewed as part of a broader relationship. Our negotiating strategy is thus emphasizing the broader SFA with the principal leaders, and focusing on the SOFA as the technical enabler for achieving our common security vision. Both efforts, however, must proceed and be concluded in parallel. End Comment.) The table of contents issues were the type of detail the working level, not the PCNS, should consider. The Ambassador told Shaways that we would leave with him a draft SFA - which includes all the elements of our relationship, and should be the focus of the political leadership. ¶7. (C) Senior Director McGurk asked what other items the PCNS considered and Shaways said the table of contents and a briefing paper by Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Haj Hamoud were the only material the PCNS reviewed before conducting a general discussion. The Ambassador asked for Vice Presidents Hashemi and Abdel Mahdi's reactions. Shaways explained that Hashimi opposed the agreements and appeared to be against a continued US military presence in Iraq. He was also the driving force behind the push to negotiate economic and cultural issues first, and save security issues for last. Adel appeared principally concerned about contractor immunities. Ambassador Crocker emphasized that we wished to discuss all issues concurrently and that time was against us. PROVINCIAL POWERS - VP ABDEL MAHDI'S VETO - NOT A GOOD IDEA ¶8. (C) Shaways described the Kurdish bloc's shifting tactics which saw them initially aligned with ISCI on the Provincial Powers vote, only to end up voting with Fadhila. Shaways thinks Vice President Mahdi's veto was imprudent; it set a bad precedent and would ultimately reduce trust between the blocs. But, he concluded, that was democracy. Ambassador Crocker stressed that momentum was critical and pressed Shaways and the CoR's Kurdish Alliance to encourage Abdel Mahdi to rescind his veto and resolve concerns about the law through other means, perhaps borrowing a page from Vice President Taraq el Hashimi's book and amending legislation. Shaways reported that Adel was already mulling the idea. Ambassador Crocker explained that administration critics were beginning to describe the veto as a sign of ongoing legislative paralysis. If the situation did not change before April, Ambassador Crocker predicted he would be in for a difficult time during his Congressional testimony. HYDROCARBONS--SHARISTANI/HARWAMI - IT'S PERSONAL ¶9. (C) All present agreed that the pending Hydrocarbons legislation package was a "nightmare." The Ambassador noted that the un-amended February draft should be acceptable to all parties but the Kurds appeared now to be walking away from it. Shaways hedged, saying the February draft was the best starting point for discussions. The Ambassador stressed that agreement was critical to attract investment and the ongoing squabble deprived the GOI of tremendous revenue streams. S/I mentioned Cambridge Energy Research Associates were prepared to send consultants to Iraq to provide an assessment of the global market. S/I thought this was something the GOI should consider and cautioned that, in a surging oil market, US policy makers and the US public expected Iraq to pay its own expenses. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador stressed that resolving these problems required senior level GOI/KRG contact and Shaways assured Ambassador Crocker that Prime Minister Barzani was available to travel to Baghdad after the Arab Parliamentary Union conference in Erbil. "But only" he continued, "if he receives positive signals from Prime Minister Maliki." The Sharistani/Harwami problem had now become personal and without concessions--presumably involving Sharistani's dismissal--there would be no progress on the hydrocarbons package. To Shaways' request that the Ambassador advise both BAGHDAD 00000734 003 OF 003 sides, Ambassador Crocker answered we were ready to offer advice, but wanted Nechirvan in Baghdad to conduct negotiations. The Ambassador added that the visit should occur before the CoR reconvened on March 18; Shaways demurred, saying these trips required substantial advance work. MOSUL - KURD/SUNNI RELATIONS--JUST TO IRRITATE MALIKI? ¶11. (C) Shaways reported Kurdish parties were in continuous contact with the Sunni IIP in Ninewah Province. Ambassador Crocker underscored how important this was because the impression that the KRG harbored territorial ambitions in Ninewah may have given AQI room to infiltrate Mosul. The Kurdish side needed to set the right atmosphere to solve Article 140 disputed territories issues. Shaways assured Ambassador Crocker that the Kurds were reaching out to Ninewah's Sunni elements. To Ambassador Crocker's quip that the Kurds might be doing it just to irritate Prime Minister Maliki, Shaways replied "not exactly." Shaways noted the Kurds considered the Sunnis the Iraqi political spectrum's only moderates (along with the Kurds) and agreed that all reconciliation initiatives, but particularly Article 140, required Sunni buy-in. FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ WAR - IRAQI LEADERS MUST SPEAK ¶12. (C) Senior Director noted that 5th Anniversary of the Iraq war was approaching and it would be useful for the US public to hear Iraqi voices speaking of US servicemen and women's sacrifices and describing the country's positive direction since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Ambassador Crocker added that in addition to the fifth year anniversary, we would soon mark the four thousandth US combat death. In this context, statements from Iraqi leadership were vital. Shaways' suggested Iraqi leaders could better make the case by traveling to the US; Ambassador Crocker answered that the leaders were more useful doing the tough work here: the visual of Iraqi leaders working in concert in Iraq to move the country forward would have the greater impact on the US public. CROCKER