JAM FREEZE ENTERS "PHASE OF DOCTRINAL AND

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: JAM FREEZE ENTERS "PHASE OF DOCTRINAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT" UNTIL AUGUST 16

REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3242 (SADR'S CEASEFIRE)

B. 07 BAGHDAD 3375 (SADR-BADR AGREEMENT)

C. 07 BAGHDAD 4048 (JAM FREEZE UPDATE)

D. BAGHDAD 3961 (IRAQI NATIONAL GATHERING

E. BAGHDAD 239 (SADRIST ON LTSR)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (S) Summary: After a flurry of mixed public signals
regarding the future of his "freeze" on the Jaysh al-Mehdi
(JAM) militia, Muqtada al-Sadr announced a ceasefire
extension through August 16 via Sadrist prayer leaders on
February 22. At the same time, Sadrist officials appear to
have embarked on a PR campaign, presumably aimed at
rehabilitating the group's tattered public image in advance
of future provincial elections, that seeks to re-spin the
Sadrist Trend and JAM as part of a social and religious-based
movement focused on public service. A senior Sadrist
official even characterized the freeze extension as a "phase
of doctrinal and psychological development." The freeze
extension order reportedly sparked anger and dismay in some
Sadrist circles (evidenced by a rocket attack on the
International Zone the day after the announcement) and will
likely further and possibly accelerate the movement's
fragmentation. Slightly more than six months after the
initial freeze took effect, the Sadr movement is divided,
uncertain, and defensive in the face of what many of its
members see as a concerted siege by the GOI, ISCI/Badr, and
the U.S. Not only have JAM Special Groups continued to
operate outside Muqtada's control, he has offered his close
supporters mixed signals on whether he will lead a political
movement into upcoming elections that many Sadrists believe
will confirm the Sadrist Trend's legitimacy as the true voice
of Iraq's Shia masses. In this leadership vacuum
(exacerbated by Muqtada's extended absences from Iraq),
alternative groupings are making plays to assume the mantle
of Sadr's father, some of them claiming a different attitude
toward the Iraqi constitution, the democratic process, and
even the Coalition presence. Whether they can successfully
do this remains very uncertain, but the situation may offer
some opportunity for the USG and GOI to reach out to
Sadr-dominated communities and develop a new sort of
relationship with them. End Summary.

Sadr's Sermon: Thanks for Your Service, Keep to the Freeze
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Sadr's JAM freeze extension order came after a flurry
of mixed signals from Sadrist mouthpiece Salah al-Obaidi,
mounting speculation about the freeze among non-Sadrist
Iraqis, and, reportedly, considerable clamor from many JAM
circles for an end to the cease-fire and a return to
sanctioned violence. Sadr had ample grounds for justifying
an end to the freeze had he so chosen. After all, Sadrists
have been alleging since last October that the GOI and
ISCI/Badr (with USG/Coalition complicity and assistance)
demonstrated bad faith by using the freeze as an opportunity
to illegally arrest and kill JAM elements throughout
south-central Iraq, particularly in Karbala, Qadisiyah, and
Dhi Qar. To a far lesser extent, Sadrists cited periodic
Coalition raids into Sadr City as a pretext to cancel the
freeze. Pressure within Sadr ranks for cease-fire
termination grew to the extent that Sadr felt compelled to
re-assert his authority in a December 2 statement in which he
counseled patience and continuation of the freeze "until
Almighty God wills otherwise."


3. (C) Staying with overtly religious trappings to reinforce
the religious nature of his movement and infuse his message
with religious legitimacy, Sadr's February 22 four-page
freeze extension order was delivered as part of a sermon read
by prayer leaders in Sadrist-controlled mosques throughout
Iraq. The text of the sermon was addressed directly to JAM
members and was replete with Islamic symbols and calls for
divine blessings, all expressed in rhythmic sentences.
Almost as an ending afterthought, Sadr stated he had extended
the freeze until August 16 and offered JAM soldiers his
"thanks and appreciation for your understanding and your
patience and your Jihad and the continuation of your
resistance against Godlessness and infidels, and for your
love of Islam and the faithful and Iraq and Iraqis."
Moving from Thuggery to Theology?
--------------


4. (C) The announcement of the freeze extension has been
accompanied by an apparent Sadrist campaign to further repair
the Trend's ragged public image by recycling the
long-standing spin that the Trend and JAM are
social/religious entities devoted to Islam and public
service. A senior Trend official confirmed to London-based
"Al-Zaman" and "Le Figaro" newspapers that Sadr is furthering

his Islamic studies in Qom, a development that a senior aide
to ISCI chieftain Abdel Aziz al-Hakim told us is particularly
worrisome to ISCI because it threatens to bestow
fatwa-issuing authority and an aura of religious legitimacy
that Sadr currently lacks. Sadrist official and Karbala
Deputy Governor Jawad al-Hasnawi told us the Trend is
evolving from an organization focused on armed resistance
against "the occupation" into an Islam-based social
organization that delivers public services. Though Sadrists
will defend themselves if attacked, he continued, they favor
public protests and general strikes over violence as a method
of resistance. This tracks with recent public statements by
Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Obaidi, who stated that the Trend
is "passing through the stage of political resistance after
its involvement in an armed resistance." Liwa Sumaysim,
former GOI Tourism Minister and head of the Trend's political
committee, told the Iraq press that while the first six-month
freeze was a "phase of obedience" for the JAM, the six-month
extension marks "the phase of doctrinal and psychological
development." We note that the Sadrist attempt to re-cast
JAM in this manner is eerily reminiscent of the PR efforts of
rival ISCI to dress up its Badr militia as a "social and
political organization."

Effects of Freeze
--------------


5. (S) If the past six-month freeze period was indeed a
"phase of obedience" in which Muqtada and his top lieutenants
assessed JAM loyalty through adherence to the freeze order,
all reports indicate that the Sadrist movement has
experienced turmoil and fragmentation through the
estrangement or expulsion of disobedient elements since the
freeze went into effect last August. Furthermore, the anger
and dismay with which the freeze announcement was reportedly
received in some Sadrist circles indicates that further
fragmentation will likely occur in the coming months, both
among political Sadrists and among JAM/armed gangs. For
example, one-time senior political Sadrist Adnan Shahmani
broke with the Trend to form the Iraqi National Gathering as
a rival movement with claims to reject violence and carry
forth the teachings of Muqtada's late father Muhammad Sadiq
al-Sadr (Ref D). It remains uncertain, however, whether this
entity will attract either a significant number of
disaffected Sadrists or anything like a popular following.
Sadrist official Jawad al-Hasnawi predicted more such
splintering as the Trend prepares election slates that will
inevitably alienate some Sadrists who are not proposed as
candidates.


6. (S) Among armed elements, the freeze has made clear that
all of those who purport to act in Sadr's name are not
necessarily under the operational control of Sadr and his top
commanders. With Sadr reportedly out of Iraq for extended
periods, reporting suggests that some of his nominal
followers are developing independent power centers of their
own, particularly in the provinces. For example, JAM
leadership in Basrah is increasingly fractured and hence
ineffective in controlling the various factions within its
ranks, as best evidenced by the inability of Sadrist/JAM
leaders in Basrah to effect the release of CBS journalist
Richard Butler from a JAM splinter group, if in fact the
release effort was sincere. In spite of continuing
announcements by Salah al-Obaidi and other senior Sadrists
that those who violate the freeze order are no longer part of
the Sadr movement, renegade Special Groups and splinter
groups continue to disregard the ceasefire (perhaps most
frequently in Basrah and some neighborhoods of Baghdad) by
attacking Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Iraqi
civilians. Some observers maintain these groups seek to
provoke the Coalition into an over-reaction that would
galvanize and unify groups into concerted resistance against
"the occupation," a response that the GOI's JAM crackdown has
thus far failed to generate.


7. (S) While the freeze may not fully display the Sadrists as
men of peace - an image they may not wear comfortably in any
event - it does have public relations benefits for the
movement. It permits the Sadrists to continue to
rehabilitate the group's public image that was badly
tarnished by the August 2007 assault on Karbala's sacred
Hussein and Abbas shrines during the Shia Shabaniyah
commemoration. The freeze also provides the Sadrists cover
to claim that they are not the aggressors in any altercation
in which they are involved. Ongoing bad blood between the
Sadrists and ISCI/Badr (the Sadrists insist that the mutual
non-aggression pact signed by Sadr and Hakim last October is
null and void due to alleged ISCI/Badr transgressions) all
but ensures that even freeze-abiding JAM elements may be
involved in such altercations.


8. (S) These latter points are important as the Trend, ISCI,

and other Shia parties gear up for provincial elections,
currently contemplated to be finished by October 1 thanks to
the efforts of the Trend's CoR bloc to insert an election
date in the since-vetoed Provincial Powers Law, that will
decide local control of the Shia heartland and go far in
determining whether the area remains divided into nine
provinces or consolidated into one or more regions. The
Sadrists boycotted 2005 provincial elections, a move they
came to recognize as a mistake not to be repeated. Trend
officials express confidence (tempered by conviction that
ISCI will try to manipulate the election process) that their
grass-roots following in Baghdad and south/central Iraq can
be mobilized to ensure convincing Sadrist wins that will
unmask ISCI and Dawa as hollow parties that lack a popular
base. However, Muqtada's commitment to such elections
remains uncertain. PRT reporting suggests that the general
assumption in south/central Iraq is that the ceasefire will
not prevent the Sadrists from using violence and intimidation
to achieve electoral success, although JAM activity will be
calibrated to avoid a popular backlash. Basrah's Badr leader
has already told REO Basrah that Badr is aware of a JAM
Special Group "hit list" that targets Badr leaders and
potential candidates in the run-up to the elections. We have
heard from many sources that the Sadrists will likely also
intimidate voters and poll workers during the election.

Comment
--------------


9. (S) Sadr's decision to extend the freeze could not have
been easy: after all, the freeze has divided his movement,
arguably made him appear weak in the face of alleged GOI/Badr
aggression, and could have been revoked with at least some
justification at any time over the past four months. Indeed,
the extension announcement has already been met with
criticism and dismay by Sadr's more militant followers. Sadr
has shown himself to be an ambivalent militia leader, unhappy
with the damage JAM was doing to his image as a religious and
social leader and heir to the legacy of his father. Over the
past six months, Muqtada has aggressively sought to enforce
the freeze in many areas, hoping both to rehabilitate his
image and regain control over his fractured organization. To
date, the result has been more fracturing than unifying. Not
only have Special Groups continued to operate outside his
control, he has offered his close supporters mixed signals on
whether he will lead a political movement into upcoming
elections, even as many of them had assumed elections would
finally confirm the Sadrist Trend's legitimacy as the true
voice of Iraq's Shia. In coming months, we expect Sadrists
to contrast the forbearance and piety of their leader with
the corruption and ineffectiveness of elected ISCI and Dawa
officials while using the threat of lifting the ceasefire as
a form of intimidation. However, the Sadr movement is
divided, uncertain, and defensive in the face of what many of
its members see as a concerted siege by the GOI, ISCI/Badr,
and the U.S. In this leadership vacuum (exacerbated by
Muqtada's extended absences from Iraq),alternative groupings
are making plays to assume the mantle of Sadr's father, some
of them claiming a different attitude toward the Iraqi
constitution, the democratic process, and even the Coalition
presence. Whether they can successfully do this remains very
uncertain, but the situation may offer some opportunity for
the Coalition and the GOI to reach out to Sadr-dominated
communities and develop a new sort of relationship with them.
CROCKER