VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI ON VETO, SFA, AND AHMADINEJAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000665

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI ON VETO, SFA, AND AHMADINEJAD
VISIT

REF: A. BAGHDAD 658 (WHY VP ADEL REFUSED TO SIGN)

B. BAGHDAD 573 (ADEL VETOES LAWS)

C. BAGHDAD 621 (PARLIAMENT SPEAKER ON PPL)

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: In a March 4 meeting, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi defended his decision to veto the Provincial
Powers Law (PPL) and said he would work closely with CoR
leaders and bloc heads to effect a compromise bill that would
be passed by the Presidency Council without another CoR vote.
The Ambassador urged Adel to act on this with a sense of
urgency so as to restore political momentum. Adel insisted
his veto will not delay provincial elections since the bill
was not scheduled to take legal effect until after the
elections are completed, and he discussed initial GOI efforts
to prepare for elections. The Ambassador briefed on the USG
vision for upcoming Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and
Status of Forces (SOFA) negotiations: Adel expressed his
intent to work closely to achieve a mutually-satisfactory
pact, but added that "we will have difficult days" along the
way. Adel averred that the most important point made during
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's visit was that Iraq is as
important to Iran as it is to the United States, and he said
the Iraqis obtained Iranian concessions on Maysan oil fields
and pushed back an Iranian attempt to garner express GOI
support for Iran's nuclear program. Adel groused about
allegedly inaccurate and inappropriate reporting by
USG-funded al-Hurra. End Summary.

PPL Veto Was Right Thing To Do, Will Not Delay Elections
-------------- -


2. (C) The Ambassador raised the matter of Adel's PPL veto,
stressing the importance of restoring momentum and a sense of
seriousness of purpose as demonstrated by the CoR's February
13 passage of the PPL and two other items. In defense of his
veto, Adel explained that he had met recently with six
provincial governors and provincial council members (as well
as their legal advisors) from all provinces except Ninewah
and Kirkuk and that all had expressed agreement with his
contention that the law as passed violated Iraq's
constitution. Adel's aide Fareed Yasseen chimed in that the
Governor of Anbar province even declared he was hoping Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi would also have vetoed the bill.
Adel said the PPL issue will be settled in one of two ways.
One, in the unlikely event that the CoR is able to override
the veto, he will challenge the bill's constitutionality in
court. In a second and far more likely scenario, Adel will
meet with CoR Speaker Mashadhani in several days and present
a document that outlines his specific objections to the bill
(he shared a copy with us (Ref A) and said he has already
sent a draft to fellow Presidency Council members Hashemi and
President Talabani for their input, which he will include in
his paper to the Speaker) and then work with the CoR
leadership and bloc leaders to cobble together an amended
bill for passage by the Presidency Council without another
CoR vote. (Note: In light of the numerous constitutional
objections that Adel raised in connection with his decision
to veto the law, proceeding in this fashion is a curious
choice. Article 138 (Fifth) of the Iraqi Constitution, which
delineates the process for Presidency Council ratification or
veto of legislation and CoR override, appears to require that
vetoed legislation return to the CoR for re-examination and a
vote before it is sent back to the Presidency Council for
approval. During a March 1 meeting, COR Speaker Mashadani
clearly expected that another vote in the COR would be
required unless the VP withdrew his objections (Ref C). End
Note). The Ambassador urged Adel to resolve the issue with a
sense of urgency.


3. (C) Adel declared that his veto will not delay provincial
elections since the bill was not scheduled to take legal
effect until after the elections are completed, a point
completely lost on Sadrist Trend bloc members who inserted an
express October 1 election date in the draft law. Adel
asserted that the Independent High Electoral Commission is
taking steps to prepare for elections, the GOI is making
security plans, and the Prime Minister's office is working on
a draft election law (he admitted he had not seen a copy).
He said the law will address the issue of IDP voting
procedures, open or closed list determination, and campaign
guidelines, but should not include a specific election date
which is a technical issue that should not be determined by
the CoR. Adel prefers that the elections take place on a
single day to deter fraud, but he acknowledged that this
might create security problems.

SFA/SOFA
--------------



4. (C) The Ambassador and NSC Senior Director McGurk briefed
on the USG vision for upcoming SFA and SOFA negotiations,
noting that the SFA sets forth a framework for bilateral
diplomatic, economic, political, cultural, and security
aspects of our relations and the SOFA is an enabling
mechanism for the security aspect. We contemplate that the
two agreements will be negotiated on parallel tracks. The
SFA will be signed by the heads of state and will be
negotiated at that level. The SOFA will be negotiated at the
same time by the two broad-based and technocratic negotiating
teams, and should be concluded at the same time as the SFA.
Adel said public USG assurances not to seek permanent
military bases has helped prepare the ground for
negotiations, and expressed hope that talks will be held in a
fully transparent manner in order to gain broad Iraqi
support. As for the GOI negotiating vision, he said the
Political Council for National Security (PCNS) decided that a
technical team drawn from relevant GOI ministries will
conduct the negotiations under the overall leadership of
Prime Minister Maliki, who will advise and consult the
Presidency Council and PCNS throughout the process. Adel
said the Iraq side is better prepared for upcoming talks than
it was for last year's Declaration of Principles
negotiations, adding that "we will have difficult days" and
must work hard together to achieve a good agreement.

Ahmadinejad Visit
--------------


5. (C) Adel averred that the most important point made during
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's visit was that Iraq is as
important to Iran as it is to the United States. Stating
that "your message was delivered directly," he pointed out
that Ahmadinejad's public statements were restrained and did
not refer to "the occupation." Regarding Ahmadinejad's
public assertion that Iraqis do not like the U.S., Adel
remarked that while the Iraqi people may not like the U.S.,
they do not like Iran either. He pointed to two significant
aspects of the joint Iraq-Iran statement. First, the parties
resolved a dispute involving Iranian slant drilling in Maysan
oil fields by agreeing to adopt "international standards" in
oilfield development. Second, the Iraqis held off an Iranian
effort to obtain express GOI support in the statement text
for Iran's stance on nuclear development.

ISCI Miffed at Al-Hurra
--------------


6. (C) Adel expressed concern over a recent spate of
assassinations of ISCI/Badr officials in southern Iraq,
including the killing of a senior police officer in Dhi Qar
who was on his way back from consultation with senior GOI
security brass in Basrah. He said the murders are still
under investigation but preliminary evidence points to "the
same people who killed our governors last year" (read JAM).
He also complained of alleged inaccurate and inappropriate
reporting by USG-funded al-Hurra, and cited an alleged
instance in which al-Hurra demeaned on offer extended by the
Governor of Najaf (an ISCI official) to allow a murdered
Iraqi journalist to be buried in Najaf's cemetery (a great
honor for Shia Muslims). According to Adel's account,
al-Hurra asserted that the governor should provide houses to
living journalists rather than graveyard space to dead
journalists. In a subsequent meeting reported septel, Amar
al-Hakim raised similar complaints about al-Hurra. The
Ambassador stated that while we have no control over al-Hurra
content, we have an interest in accurate, fair journalism and
will look into instances of inaccurate or unfair reporting by
al-Hurra.
CROCKER