Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD659
2008-03-05 16:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

AL-FADHILA BLOC CHAIRMAN, OFFICIALS WEIGH IN ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL KISL IZ 
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VZCZCXYZ9577
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0659 0651618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051618Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6077
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000659 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL IZ
SUBJECT: AL-FADHILA BLOC CHAIRMAN, OFFICIALS WEIGH IN ON
PROVISIONAL POWERS LAW VETO

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000659 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL IZ SUBJECT: AL-FADHILA BLOC CHAIRMAN, OFFICIALS WEIGH IN ON PROVISIONAL POWERS LAW VETO Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Embassy officials on March 4 at the Council of Representatives, al-Fadhila bloc chairman Hassan al-Shammari and other al-Fadhila CoR members expounded on several topics, including Vice-President al-Mehdi's recent veto of the Provisional Powers Law, the feasibility of holding provisional elections on October 1, and President Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Iraq 2008. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Meeting with Embassy officials at his party bloc's office in the CoR, al-Shammari commented on Vice-President Adil Abd al-Mehdi's recent veto of the Provisional Powers Law, voicing his displeasure with the decision. Alluding to collusion between Abd al-Mehdi and President Jalal Talabani on this veto, he hinted that though Abd al-Mehdi wielded the veto, it actually served both men's interests. In his estimation, just as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) fears that provincial elections could empower the Sadrists in the south, the elections could also threaten Kurdish claims over Kirkuk and even Mosul. Thus, both sides worked in concert to scuttle the legislation. ¶3. (C) Al-Shammari also remarked on how al-Mehdi's veto will make holding the planned October 1, 2008, elections difficult, if not impossible. Commenting that even without this veto, it could take three to four months to get an election law through the Council of Representatives, he added that the GoI Independent Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) had informed him that it needs about eight months to prepare for these elections. Joining the discussion, one of his bloc members also added that several major issues have yet to be resolved, including the thorny issue of voter registration among internally displaced people. In sharp criticism of the Vice-President, he added that Abd al-Mehdi does not represent the Shia, but only his party, and is only looking out for his party's interests. Another bloc member claimed that if the VP does not reconsider his decision, the fledging spirit of trust developed during inter-bloc negotiations leading up to the Febraury 13 CoR package would disappear and the CoR would find it difficult to pass any new laws. ¶4. (C) In continuing his discussion on the elections, al-Shammari and the five other CoR members emphatically agreed that the next election has to have an open list of candidates, and that Iraqis would likely boycott the polls if this were not the case. One of the bloc members detailed al-Fadhila's strength throughout the south, arguing that in addition to Basrah and ad-Diwaniyah, al-Fadhila is also strong in an-Nasiriyah, as-Samawah, and Karbala, and that the party is attracting large numbers of independents. ¶5. (C) As-Shammari also shared his view on the recent Iranian presidential visit, stating that it will take time to see if any of the agreements signed by the two governments actually prove beneficial. Comparing President Ahmadinejad's recent trip to previous trips to Iran by Prime Minister Maliki and President Talabani, al-Shammari opined that nothing substantial came from those visits even though numerous agreements were signed by the respective parties. He added that the visit was mostly a public relations exercise, with the primary beneficiary Ahmadinejad. Though al-Shammari did not participate in the visit, one of his party members did meet with Ahamadinejad as a member of the Council of Representatives delegation. CROCKER

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