TURKISH ENVOYS AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS GOI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000594 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKISH ENVOYS AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS GOI RELATIONS, PKK, ONGOING OPERATIONS REF: A. ANKARA 376 AND PREVIOUS (SITREPS) ¶B. BAGHDAD 570 (MCNS) Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu asserted to Ambassador that Turkish ground operations were inevitable after the October kidnapping of Turkish soldiers and refused to predict when the operation would end. Ambassador pressed for operations to end before they upset the fragile political balance in Iraq and urged frequent public messaging that Turkish actions in the north are aimed at the PKK only and are limited in scope and duration. Both agreed that President Talabani's official invitation to visit Ankara in the near-term is an important aspect in managing both bilateral and internal Iraqi tensions, although Ambassador noted that Talabani is unlikely to go so long as there are Turkish troops on the ground in Iraq. Ambassador urged that Talabani's delegation include Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) representatives. Davutoglu and GOT Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik cautioned that including someone from the KRG would be very difficult but that a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) representative might be acceptable. Davutoglu agreed with Ambassador that the solution to the PKK problem lies in political and diplomatic actions and not just military, but provided scant details on Turkish plans other than the Talabani visit and increased bilateral engagement. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador met February 27 with Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu and GOT Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik at the start of the Turkish envoys' one-day visit to Baghdad. Accompanying Ambassador were Political-Military Minister-Counselor Marcie Ries, NSC Senior Director Brett McGurk, and Senior Advisor David Pearce. Accompanying Davutoglu and Ozcelik were PM Deputy U/S Hakan Fidan, Turkish CDA Ahmet Yazal and several Turkish embassy officials. The delegation's schedule included meetings with FM Zebari and VP Hashimi, a lunch hosted by President Talabani and an end-of-day briefing with MNF-I CG Petraeus and Ambassador before departure. Operations Should Come to a Close ASAP -------------- ¶3. (S) Ambassador expressed appreciation for the visit, which he said would help keep relations steady and on track. The meetings should provide a good sense on how Iraqi reactions (to Turkish military operations) are shaped. Particularly since just before the Turkish ground operations began (ref a),Ambassador emphasized that he has been intensively engaged with the Iraqi leadership, especially Kurdish leaders, to ensure that events do not spiral out of control. He said since the extremely tense first day of the ground incursion on February 21, tensions have lessened but the cumulative effect of ongoing operations continues to take a toll. As operations continue, emotions in Iraq are rising. For example, Ambassador noted, at the Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS) on February 24 (ref b),the Iraqi leadership raised several exaggerated rumors about Turkish activities, such as an intention by the GOT to introduce the Turkish armed forces to the entire north. This underscores the need to wrap up the kinetic operations as soon as possible, the Ambassador pressed; the longer it goes on, the higher the risk of something untoward occurring that escalates the conflict and destabilizes Iraq. Talabani Invite to Turkey; KRG Inclusion in Talks Vital -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Ambassador said he had reinforced with President Talabani that his invitation to Ankara is important and he should accept it, including with careful thought about how best to organize the visit and contribute to bilateral relations. However, Ambassador noted, the timing could be problematic; we are not sure that Talabani can conduct a visit while Turkish operations are ongoing. We are trying hard to keep Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masood Barzani linked up and cooperating, Ambassador stated. A split in the Kurdish ranks under this stress would not be good for them, for Iraq, for the U.S. or for Turkey. In that vein, Ambassador continued, direct GOT engagement with the KRG is vitally important, particularly over the longer-term. For that reason, Ambassador urged, it is important that when Talabani goes to Turkey, representative(s) from the KRG join his delegation. Under the umbrella of a state visit, including the KRG could be used as a beginning for some direct public discussion. ¶5. (S) In the context of improving Iraqi-Turkish-Kurdish relations, Ambassador said it is time to look again at the BAGHDAD 00000594 002 OF 004 Makhmour refugee camp issue and whether such progress as Kurdish language rights in Turkey might lessen the reluctance of the refugees to return to Turkey. Ambassador mentioned that, among several issues on which the U.S. is pressing President Barzani, the issue of the KRG asking the Turkish special forces based in northern Iraq to leave will remain. Ambassador reiterated the importance of using the Turkish visit to lower the temperature and urged the envoys to reiterate useful messages, i.e., that the operations are solely against the PKK and not against Iraq or the Kurds and that they will be limited in duration and scope and will end as soon as possible. We Understand Need for Dialogue -------------- ¶6. (S) Senior Advisor Davutoglu responded by thanking the U.S. for its increased cooperation in fighting the PKK. He said particularly after PM Erdogan met President Bush, the coordination with the U.S. has been excellent and the GOT is "very grateful." Davutoglu admitted that the success of any military operation requires diplomatic and political elements. He asserted that the GOT had been very patient since the October kidnapping of its soldiers who were brought to northern Iraq; Turkey could have retaliated immediately but it would have caused problems between the GOT and GOI/KRG and the GOT and USG. Instead, the GOT has upped the tempo of its direct coordination with the GOI, Davutoglu noted, including PM to PM talks as well as Davutoglu's discussions with GOI spokesman Ali Dabbagh and Ozcelik's contacts with PM Maliki's advisors. Prior to this increase, we also had channels to the north (KRG),some of them open. A common strategy against terror is in all of our interests, Davutoglu said; this includes not only diplomatic and political initiatives, but also military. Cannot Predict When Operations Will End -------------- ¶7. (S) Davutoglu noted that the GOT instructed the Turkish General Staff (TGS) that the sole target of military operations is the PKK and that even under provocation, Turkish forces should not fight the Peshmerga or the Iraqi Security Forces. The targets and the scope of the operations are clear, Davutoglu emphasized; Turkey, too, wants to bring the soldiers home to their families as soon as possible. But the timing of withdrawal will depend on when objectives are achieved. Since the day ground operations began on February 21, Davutoglu said the GOT continues to make efforts to engage with the GOI, USG and "the north." For example, on the accusations that airstrikes destroyed key bridges, Davutoglu asserted the bridges were primitive footpath bridges used to supply terrorists and not bridges used by civilians. He said the message "to the north" (i.e., Masood Barzani) noted that there were no civilian casualties, no operations in settled areas and no bad confrontations between Turkish forces and the Peshmerga. The GOT asked that the KRG and GOI not provoke the situation and offered to repair any civilian bridge destroyed. Davutoglu claimed that after these messages were passed, the statements from the north were moderated. Public Messages Are Important -------------- ¶8. (S) If Turkey's intention was to create problems for Iraq, Davutoglu asserted, Turkey could have done so via numerous means -- including economic sanctions or the closing of the Habur Gate. Instead, Turkey established links with the north. But the way ahead also depends on the attitude of the Kurds and their public statements. Both countries need to control "psychologies" and be aware of each country's public reaction. "High emotion" displayed by the Kurdish leaders may end up making it difficult for Turkey to end military operations soon. Ali Dabbagh's statement on the eve of the visit, Davutoglu said, caused extreme upset and made the GOT believe the GOI wanted to sabotage the visit. Referring to a U.S. request for more useful messaging by Turkey that emphasized limited operations against the PKK (and not Iraq or the Kurds) and made reference to non-military options, Davutoglu said Turkey had responded positively, including via PM Erdogan's televised remarks. Kurds Are Difficult but We Want Talabani to Visit -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) Davutoglu said that the PKK is also a threat to Iraqi Kurds; the Kurds should work with Turkey against the PKK, like in the 1990s. Kurdish rhetoric is a problem and has caused missed opportunities in the past to get a GOT-KRG dialogue going, such as when Masood Barzani's comments BAGHDAD 00000594 003 OF 004 comparing Kirkuk to Diyarbakir last February derailed a planned meeting between KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani and then-FM Gul. The GOT needs to see a change in the KRG mentality, Davutoglu continued, before Turkey can welcome a KRG delegation. As for the Turkish Special Forces based in northern Iraq since 1997, Davutoglu said their removal would have to be in parallel with the PKK's elimination as they serve a deterrent function. ¶10. (S) Davutoglu made clear that the GOT would like President Talabani to visit as soon as possible, within days or weeks but not months. President Gul invited him personally and he accepted. The GOT is concerned about mixed signals since the ground operations began regarding this visit; Turkey cannot guarantee to have its troops out of Iraq beforehand. If the PKK steps up attacks in Turkey as the Kurdish new year approaches in March, we will be hard-pressed to extend the invitation again. Such a trip, in fact, could help end operations sooner, Davutoglu asserted. ¶11. (S) Ozcelik said that the GOT needs to know what Masood Barzani is thinking and expressed concern about Masood's pride getting in the way of moving ahead in the relationship. Turkey has no intention of playing Talabani against Masood Barzani. The GOT can work with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani. If President Talabani visited Turkey without the condition that Turkish troops are out of Iraq, it will show that the Iraqi President, a Kurd, is trying to put things on the right track. The GOT understands, Ozcelik continued, that a future solution lies in working with both Barzanis. Perhaps for the Talabani visit, a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) representative could join the delegation but not an official of the KRG. It is a delicate line we must straddle. Iraqi Politic is Fragile -------------- ¶12. (S) Ambassador agreed that moving ahead requires careful calculation but said he wanted to underscore the fragility of the Iraqi political construct. It will take constant effort by all of us to keep things in balance, he said. The issue of public statements needs to be understood in the context of Iraqi politics. When Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh makes a statement, it is in part to moderate Kurdish reaction against the GOI because of political tensions. Ambassador repeated that the longer the kinetic operations, even within the set parameters, the more stress is put on both the delicate political balance in Iraq and on key leadership relationships. It is the KRG that is Problematic -------------- ¶13. (S) Political and diplomatic action is needed to eliminate the PKK problem, Ambassador said. Talabani's visit is an important vehicle for the two governments to discuss how to work together, and the KRG and KDP are an essential part of the final solution. Talabani is a moderate force for Iraq. Ambassador said that for Masood Barzani and the KDP, it is important to realize that they do not see the situation the same way as Turkey. Ambassador explained that at the core of their concerns lies the belief that the GOT has made a fundamental decision that the KRG should not exist. ¶14. (S) Davutoglu complained again of the missed opportunities in 2007, but expressed the belief that once the Turkish public saw a visit by the Kurdish Iraqi President, such demonstrated cooperation would "open new gates" with the KDP and help with the Turkish public's ability to tolerate relations with the KRG. He said there is a constitutional question, and while it is unresolved, Iraqi Shia and Sunni will not like it if we get too close to the KRG. Once the constitutional process is resolved, we can talk to the KRG, Davutoglu opined; in fact we can talk to the KDP and PUK now. Ozcelik continued by noting that the GOT understands the KRG is a part of Iraq and hopes the KRG understands that the GOT and KRG have reconcilable differences on such issues as territorial aims. Turkey is the most helpful neighbor to Iraq, Ozcelik added. Ambassador said it is important that the GOT find a way to move ahead now and use this opportunity for a new start -- "leap over some small barriers that have prevented dialogue." Ambassador asked Davutoglu to elaborate on his constitutional point. Davutoglu explained that constitutional review is ongoing and the Sunnis have concerns about federalism, regions formation and disputed territories (i.e., Article 140),asserting that "the Iraqi political map is not finished." (Note: Ozcelik later privately asked PolMil MC to disregard Davutoglu's comments on the constitutional issue. End Note). Comment -------------- BAGHDAD 00000594 004 OF 004 ¶15. (S/NF) Davutoglu's comments that the Turks will be in Northern Iraq until the mission succeeds did not help matters much here. In our view, the longer the operation continues, the deeper the cleavages between the Prime Minister and KRG leaders, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and so on, with attendant consequences for our agenda here. That said, we understand the meeting between Talabani and Davutoglu went quite well, with Talabani accepting the invitation proferred, albeit keeping his options open about when he will make the trip, as going while there are still Turkish troops in Iraq would clearly be very badly received by his constituents. CROCKER