ZEBARI THINKS TURKS WANT BUFFER ZONE IN NORTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI THINKS TURKS WANT BUFFER ZONE IN NORTHERN
IRAQ

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4d/b


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 28 meeting, Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari told PolCounselor Matthew Tueller and NSC
Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk that he
held "direct, candid and open" discussions with Turkish PM
Advisor Ahmet Davutolgu's during Davutoglu's February 27
visit to Baghdad. The Turkish delegation would not agree to
a timetable for ending their CBO, but relayed an invitation
from President Gul to President Talabani to visit Turkey in
March. According to Zebari, the invitation put Talabani in
an awkward position; he accepted in principle, but refused to
commit to a date and probably will not be able to go as long
as Turkish military operations continue. Zebari believes the
Turks want to establish a buffer zone from which to launch
attacks into the KRG, He assessed that clashes between
Peshmerga and Turkish troops already stationed in the KRG
pose the principal escalation danger and volunteered that he
had already personally intervened on one occasion to order
Peshmerga not to fire on Turkish troops. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a February 28 meeting, Foreign Minister Hoshyar
Zebari told Political Counselor and NSC Senior Director for
Iraq and Afghanistan that he had "direct, candid and open"
discussions during February 27 meetings with a visiting
Turkish delegation headed by Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet
Davutolgu. The key deliverable was an invitation from
President Gul to President Talabani to visit Turkey in March.
President Talabani accepted the invitation in principle, but
did not agree on any of the three sets of dates (March 4/5/6;
7/8/9; or 17/18) the GOT offered. Both Talabani and Zebari
welcomed the Turkish invitation, but Zebari conceded Talabani
was in an awkward position and would probably not be able to
visit Turkey as long as military operations continued.
Lower-level meetings, while not planned, remained an option
but would require Executive Council and Political Council for
National Security blessing.


3. (C) Zebari stressed how patient the GOI has been since
the beginning of the Turkish raids in January, but
underscored that it also had to contend with the weight of
public opinion which increasingly demanded a GOI reaction.
Groups across the political spectrum are asking why the GOI
is not recalling its ambassador in Ankara or taking the
matter to the UN Security Council. The Executive Council
(3 1) feels the GOI should condemn the attacks and Zebari's
message to the Turks was that military operations must cease
immediately. The Turkish side refused to commit to a
time-frame. Zebari fears the ultimate Turkish objective is
to establish a 15 kilometer buffer-zone between the KRG and
Turkey from which to launch further attacks, and believes the
GOT will seize any pretext to continue the incursion,
increasing the risks to KRG civilians and infrastructure.


4. (C) Warning that "things were going to be messy," Zebari
reported that exchanges "touched on all the taboos." To move
forward, the Turks must make some concession, perhaps
involving the timetable for operations. The primary danger
is a confrontation between Peshmerga troops and Turkish
forces already stationed in the KRG. To emphasize his point,
Zebari volunteered that on at least one occasion he had
already "exceeded his responsibilities" and ordered Peshmerga
not to fire on Turkish troops.


5. (C) PolCouns said that continued
government-to-government dialogue at all levels, including
GOT/KRG contacts, was crucial to containing the dangers of
the current situation. Zebari remarked that GOT Iraq
Coordinator Murat Ozcelik, who accompanied Davutolgu to
Baghdad, had orders from Ankara to meet with KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani at an unspecified date.
CROCKER