ZEBARI THINKS TURKS WANT BUFFER ZONE IN NORTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000587 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: ZEBARI THINKS TURKS WANT BUFFER ZONE IN NORTHERN IRAQ Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4d/b ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 28 meeting, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told PolCounselor Matthew Tueller and NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk that he held "direct, candid and open" discussions with Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet Davutolgu's during Davutoglu's February 27 visit to Baghdad. The Turkish delegation would not agree to a timetable for ending their CBO, but relayed an invitation from President Gul to President Talabani to visit Turkey in March. According to Zebari, the invitation put Talabani in an awkward position; he accepted in principle, but refused to commit to a date and probably will not be able to go as long as Turkish military operations continue. Zebari believes the Turks want to establish a buffer zone from which to launch attacks into the KRG, He assessed that clashes between Peshmerga and Turkish troops already stationed in the KRG pose the principal escalation danger and volunteered that he had already personally intervened on one occasion to order Peshmerga not to fire on Turkish troops. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a February 28 meeting, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told Political Counselor and NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan that he had "direct, candid and open" discussions during February 27 meetings with a visiting Turkish delegation headed by Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet Davutolgu. The key deliverable was an invitation from President Gul to President Talabani to visit Turkey in March. President Talabani accepted the invitation in principle, but did not agree on any of the three sets of dates (March 4/5/6; 7/8/9; or 17/18) the GOT offered. Both Talabani and Zebari welcomed the Turkish invitation, but Zebari conceded Talabani was in an awkward position and would probably not be able to visit Turkey as long as military operations continued. Lower-level meetings, while not planned, remained an option but would require Executive Council and Political Council for National Security blessing. ¶3. (C) Zebari stressed how patient the GOI has been since the beginning of the Turkish raids in January, but underscored that it also had to contend with the weight of public opinion which increasingly demanded a GOI reaction. Groups across the political spectrum are asking why the GOI is not recalling its ambassador in Ankara or taking the matter to the UN Security Council. The Executive Council (3 1) feels the GOI should condemn the attacks and Zebari's message to the Turks was that military operations must cease immediately. The Turkish side refused to commit to a time-frame. Zebari fears the ultimate Turkish objective is to establish a 15 kilometer buffer-zone between the KRG and Turkey from which to launch further attacks, and believes the GOT will seize any pretext to continue the incursion, increasing the risks to KRG civilians and infrastructure. ¶4. (C) Warning that "things were going to be messy," Zebari reported that exchanges "touched on all the taboos." To move forward, the Turks must make some concession, perhaps involving the timetable for operations. The primary danger is a confrontation between Peshmerga troops and Turkish forces already stationed in the KRG. To emphasize his point, Zebari volunteered that on at least one occasion he had already "exceeded his responsibilities" and ordered Peshmerga not to fire on Turkish troops. ¶5. (C) PolCouns said that continued government-to-government dialogue at all levels, including GOT/KRG contacts, was crucial to containing the dangers of the current situation. Zebari remarked that GOT Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik, who accompanied Davutolgu to Baghdad, had orders from Ankara to meet with KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani at an unspecified date. CROCKER