PRT-WASIT: UPDATE FROM WASIT POLICE CHIEF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000582

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRT-WASIT: UPDATE FROM WASIT POLICE CHIEF

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (U) This is a PRT-Wasit reporting cable.


2. (S/NF) Summary. Wasit Iraqi Police (IP) Chief, Major
General Abdul Haninn Hamud expects Sadrist elements to honor
the Muqtada al Sadr (MAS) ceasefire extension, but expressed
the need to mount operations with CF in Jaysh al Mahdi
(JAM)-controlled neighborhoods. Haninn described the
CF-trained Al Kut SWAT (KSWAT) and Special Response Team
(SRT) as the most tactically proficient units in the Wasit IP
force, noting that they received high marks in recent IP
training exercises observed by MOI and CF officials. Haninn
expects little support from the Governor or the Provincial
Council and stated that several PC members actively work
against him. He suspects some provincial government
officials triggered a recent MOI investigation of a detainee
release that he had authorized, though Haninn expects easy
exoneration. End summary.


3. (S/NF) On 12 Feb, Haninn told PRT and 214 FB XO that
internal splits in the Sadrist movement would not jeopardize
the ceasefire. Regarding potential operations against JAM
strongholds - operations which are encouraged by provincial
leadership - MGH said "I am ready," but emphasized that
"American support" would be vital for success. (Note.
Current CF units supporting Wasit IP are Police Transition
Teams (PTTs) and a USSF Operational Detachment Alpha. End
note.)


4. (S/NF) MGH noted with pride that in a 06 Feb training
exercise observed by MOI officials and CF trainers, Wasit IP
units performed exceptionally well. He described KSWAT as
the most effective unit, and acknowledged that KSWAT CDR Lt
Aziz is the most tactically-proficient IP leader. When
informed that government officials and local citizens
regularly describe incidents in which Aziz's KSWAT
intimidates and abuses citizens and engages in corrupt
practices, Haninn admitted to a lack of control over Aziz and
attributed this to Aziz's relationship with CF. According to
Haninn, Aziz does not report through the IP command when
conducting operations with CF, which he says are numerous.
(Note. USSF have done no kinetic operations in recent weeks
with Lt Aziz, suggesting that Aziz is often acting without
oversight from either Haninn or CF. Additional PRT reporting
on the political implications of KSWAT actions is
forthcoming. End note.)


5. (S/NF) Haninn refuted allegations that he knelt to
pressure from a powerful tribal leader and released a
dangerous detainee. The detainee, Ali Kharen Walleed, was
arrested in Al Hay, and transferred to Al Kut, but an
influential Shayikh notified Haninn that IPs had detained the
wrong person, and that Ali's father and brother were wanted,
not Ali. Haninn investigated this claim and immediately
ordered Ali's release. Governor Abd Latif al Turfa, Haninn
alleged, called Vice President Adil Mehdi to trigger the MOI
investigation, in hopes that Haninn would be relieved.
(Note. The Governor did not support Haninn's appointment as
IP Chief, backing instead MG Khalid, the Provincial Joint
Coordination Center (PJCC) Director and a Badr Organization
Colonel. End note.) Haninn confidently predicts that the
"administrative" MOI investigation will exonerate him.


6. (S/NF) Comment: MG Haninn has the most demanding job in
Wasit. He must reform a bloated, militia-infiltrated IP
force, contend with chronic shortages in the supply of
weapons, ammunition and vehicles, pursue strong militia
forces, and protect allies, family and himself. Meanwhile
his ranks are filled with subordinates loyal to Badr or
various JAM factions, and different political, tribal and CF
leaders simultaneously pressure him to pursue or not pursue
certain targets, according to their interests. Finally,
legislative and executive officials, acting on behalf of a
variety of interests, constantly maneuver to discredit and
discard Haninn.


7. (S/NF) Comment C't'd: MG Haninn has a reputation for
strict adherence to the rule of law, dating back to his last
tenure as IP Chief in 2004-2005. He has expressed repeatedly
his hatred for militias and for Iranian influences in Wasit.
Given his views, one would expect Haninn to use his position
as IP Chief to aggressively battle the insurgency. However,
in Wasit, counterinsurgency is something of a misnomer as the
fabric of political power is woven with strands of sympathy
and acquiescence to various Sadrist, Badr, militia and
Iranian interests. Haninn may appear slow in transforming
the IP force and passive in pursuing militia, but he is under
immense pressure to negotiate his every step with multiple,
conflicting powers. Understanding the currents of power and
aiding Haninn to successfully navigate them is our best
course of action, especially as his likely replacement, MG

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Khalid, would not be as independent, principled or committed
to working with CF. End comment.
CROCKER