VP ABDEL MEHDI VETOS PROVINCIAL POWERS LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000573

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP ABDEL MEHDI VETOS PROVINCIAL POWERS LAW

REF: BAGHDAD 485 (ADEL MULLING VETO)

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On February 26, Vice President Adel Abdel
Mehdi vetoed on constitutional grounds the Provincial Powers
Law passed February 13 as part of a three-item package by
Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR). The other two items
of the package -- a 2008 GOI budget and an Amnesty bill --
were not included in the veto and have been signed into law.
President Talabani and Vice President al-Hashemi did not join
him in the veto. Although Adel stated in his veto
explanation letter to the CoR that he wishes to retain a
provision of the Provincial Powers bill that sets October 1
as the date by which provincial elections must be held, his
veto leaves Iraq without statutory authority for an election
date. While the veto is defensible on constitutional
grounds, it could pose a set-back for Iraq's political
progress, particularly if the CoR (which is out of session
until March 18) objects to the unraveling of its carefully
engineered three-item compromise. It also opens Adel's
party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),to
allegations by the Sadrists, Prime Minister Maliki's Dawa
party, and others that Adel has unjustly overruled
legislative intent with the real agenda of delaying
provincial polling to save ISCI from electoral defeat. End
Summary.

Adel Says No Deal
--------------


2. (C) Adel's staff informed us that the Vice President,
acting in his capacity as a member of the GOI Presidency
Council empowered to ratify or reject legislation passed by
the CoR within a prescribed period of review, formally
notified the CoR in writing on February 26 that he had vetoed
the Provincial Powers law, one of the three legislative items
passed by the CoR on February 13 as part of an omnibus
package. The other members of the Presidency Council --
President Talabani and Vice President al-Hashemi -- did not
join him in the veto. VP Adel is taking the view (apparently
without consultation with CoR leaders, who are out of
Baghdad) that the components of the omnibus package are
severable for purposes of Presidency Council disposition, and
thus the package's other two items -- a 2008 GOI budget and
an Amnesty bill -- are not affected by the veto and have been
signed into law. Adel issued the veto in spite of USG advice
to seek an alternative remedy to address his misgivings about
the bill (reftel).


3. (C) Adel's letter stated the veto was based primarily on
constitutional concerns about a provision of the bill that
gives provincial councils and the CoR (by an absolute
majority vote and upon the Prime Minister's recommendation)
concurrent power to dismiss provincial governors, an issue
over which ISCI and Maliki's Dawa party clashed repeatedly
without compromise in the run-up to the February 13 CoR vote.
Adel lamented to the Ambassador that some ISCI CoR members
allowed the Dawa insistence on concurrent powers to prevail
with the assumption that Adel's veto would stand as a
fail-safe mechanism. Adel claims that the provision violates
Article 115 of the Iraq constitution, which holds that "all
powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal
government belong to the authorities of the regions and the
governorates that are not organized in a region."


4. (C) In recent conversations with the Ambassador and as set
forth in his CoR veto letter, Adel maintained that he
continues to support and will seek to retain a provision of
the bill that sets October 1 as the date by which provincial
elections must be held. Haitham al-Husseini, a senior aide
to ISCI chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, affirmed this
contention and glossed over the almost-certain likelihood of
continued Dawa-ISCI friction over the bill by stating that it
can be remedied "through minor legal and technical
corrections" to bring it into compliance with the
constitution.


5. (C) In discussions with the Ambassador February 25 and 26,
Adel said he understood clearly how strongly we felt about
the veto. He stressed that he was taking this step only
after very candid thought and consultation that left him
convinced that the law violated the constitution. It would
serve no purpose to allow a law to pass that would then be
overturned by the court. He emphasized that he understood
our message and would work intensively to seek changes that
would get majority approval when the CoR reconvenes. He said
that this would not require a great deal of time -- both the
problem and the solution lay within the Shia Alliance.


6. (C) Comment: The impact of the veto remains to be seen.
It is unlikely to add to ethnic or sectarian tensions since
the law was of primary interest to the Shia. It will deepen

BAGHDAD 00000573 002 OF 002


the rift among the Shia, between Dawa and Sadr on one hand
and the Supreme Council on the other. We will need to engage
the CoR leadership to insure they do not react in a way that
risks the fledgling spirit of compromise developed in the
last session. We will also keep the pressure on Adel and Abd
al-Aziz Hakim (both as ISCI head and leader of the Shia
alliance in the CoR) to develop workable alternatives and
then muster the organization in the CoR to get them passed.
It will also be key to insure that election preparations
carry forward.
CROCKER