MCNS ON FEBRUARY 24 DISCUSSES TURKISH INCURSION,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000570 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER SY IZ TU SUBJECT: MCNS ON FEBRUARY 24 DISCUSSES TURKISH INCURSION, INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES, MOD'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTING CASH TRANSFERS, THE PORT OF UMM QASR, PROGRESS ON THE BASRAH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, THE COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND, AND SECURITY FOR THE ARBAEEN OBSERVANCE REF: A. ANKARA 00331 ¶B. BAGHDAD 00502 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/REL AS UK) Deputy Prime Minister (D/PM) Barham Saleh opened the February 24 Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) meeting with a discussion of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq (ref. A). National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie presented a list of intelligence collection priorities to which the MCNS agreed after some discussion. Minister of Defense (MinDef) Abdel Qadr argued that another ministry should be charged with the responsibility to conduct and guard cash transfers once MNF-I relinquishes the duty on March 1. After discussion, it was agreed that MNF-I would consider extending its duty until the Iraqi Army (IA) was trained to perform the task. The D/PM outlined efforts to improve security at the port of Umm Qasr and the Gulf Region Division (GRD) of the U.S. Army corps of Engineers (USACE) presented a short briefing on the Basrah Children's Hospital project. The Director of Counter-Terrorism forces opened a discussion on the role of C/T forces, but the full presentation was deferred until the PM was in attendance at a subsequent MCNS. The Deputy Minister of State for National Security (D/MSNS) briefly stated plans underway for the protection of religious pilgrims to Karbala observing the Arba'een event. The MCNS instructed him to proceed with a security coordinating committee comprising the same members as those who coordinated security for the Ashura holy days. End Summary. Turkish Incursion -------------- ¶2. (S/REL AS UK) D/PM Barham Saleh, filling in for PM Maliki in London for medical treatment, opened the meeting with a call for an unambiguous GOI public statement condemning the violation of national sovereignty by Turkish forces. He observed that statements issued thus far had been ambiguous. (Note: This was apparently a reference to GOI spokesman Ali Dabbagh's comment earlier that the incursion did not constitute a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. End note.) The D/PM also called for an agreement with the GOT to forestall unilateral Turkish action against PKK terrorists. ¶3. (S/REL AS UK) MinDef Abdel Qadr reported on the actions by Turkish forces thus far, articulating concerns that the true intentions of the Turkish forces were not known. He stated ominously that the Turkish forces were in a position to threaten Mosul and Kirkuk. Minister of Interior Bolani joined in, suggesting the attack against PKK terrorists was a pretext for other Turkish intentions. He stated that it was important to avoid a face-off with the Turks and to tell the Iraqi people the steps the GOI was going to take. Minister of Foreign Affairs (ForMin) Zebari expressed fears that mistakes could occur, leading to unforeseen consequences. He repeated the other ministers' concerns that the GOI simply did not really know the GOT's intentions. Iraqi Chief of Staff Joint Forces General Babakir Shawkt noting that the Turks were doing deep reconnaissance operations, conveyed his concerns that if Turkish forces penetrate too far into Iraqi territory, the Peshmerga may act against them. ForMin Zebari suggested that the Turks wish to expand their area of operations, noting the long-standing presence of Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) in northern Iraq. He called the targeting of bridges particularly worrisome. However, Zebari also noted that President Gul has indicated a desire to visit Baghdad and to meet with Massoud Barzani at that time. The acting Minister of Justice noted that the MCNS should recommend to cabinet actions to take, not to direct specific actions. He also observed that the GOI should await the high-level Turkish visit before acting. ¶4. (S/REL AS UK) Ambassador Crocker intervened that any official GOI statement issued should be a calm, careful, deliberate one, not an emotional reaction. Details on the ground matter and must be considered. He noted that the USG had told the GOT that operations against the PKK in northern Iraq should be limited in scope and duration, limited to PKK targets, and avoid harming civilians or causing collateral damage. He stated that the Turkish SOF would remain in their bases, which MNF-I officers present confirmed. Wrapping up, he noted that the USG had heard that the GOT wished to send an emissary; this would be a welcome BAGHDAD 00000570 002 OF 003 SUBJECT: MCNS ON FEBRUARY 24 DISCUSSES TURKISH INCURSION, INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES, MOD'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTING CASH TRANSFERS, THE PORT OF UMM QASR, PROGRESS ON THE BASRAH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, THE COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND, AND SECURITY FOR THE ARBAEEN OBSERVANCE step. ¶5. (S/REL AS UK) UK Ambassador Prentice also noted that his government is urging the GOT to limit its operations and to conclude them as soon as possible. Also, HMG was advising the GOT that the situation with the PKK could not be resolved through purely military means. ¶6. (S/REL AS UK) The D/PM took the points and wrapped up discussion of the topic by re-stating his position that the GOI must issue an unambiguous statement that --decries the violation of Iraqi sovereignty, --denounces the targeting of infrastructure, --calls on the GOT to cease operations, --emphasizes the GOI's commitment to fighting terrorism, and --calls on the GOT to meet with GOI officials, including KRG representatives. Intelligence Priorities -------------- ¶7. (S/REL AS UK) NSA Rubaie presented a list of collection priorities for the intelligence services of Iraq to pursue. In brief they were: --Al Qaeda --Neighboring countries malign influences --Baathists and Former Regime Elements --Organized Crime --Oil and energy resources protection --Border security --Corruption --Infiltration of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) --Awakening/Volunteers command and control (preventing local citizen groups (CLCs or Sons of Iraq) from becoming anti-government organizations --Armed Militias ¶8. (S/REL AS UK) In response to this presentation, Interior Minister Bolani objected that intelligence had no utility - it cannot be used in court to prosecute. ForMin Zebari complained of intelligence targeting corruption when Iraq already has several anti-corruption agencies. The acting Minister of Justice, Safa al Safi, raised the same point. ¶9. (S/REL AS UK) General Babakir and the deputy director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) replied that money was the lifeblood of terrorism and organized crime - intelligence must be used to combat corruption. They also noted that the job of intelligence was to share with the relevant operational ministries or agencies their finding. The intelligence services are not to execute operations. The D/PM underlined this point - intelligence agencies may not execute operations. Addressing concerns that the list presented was in priority order, UK Ambassador Prentice called on NSA Rubaie to make it explicit that the ten priorities were of equal importance. Rubaie agreed he would amend the text so it was clear these collection priorities were not listed in order of importance - all ten are important, he added. D/PM wrapped up the point with a statement that all were in agreement that all ten of the items were priorities for the intelligence services. Cash Transfers -------------- ¶10. (S/REL AS UK) MinDef Qadr raised the issue of the Iraqi Army (IA) taking from MNF-I the responsibility for transferring large, official amounts of cash on behalf of the GOI, due to begin March 2008. He stated that nowhere else in the world did the army bear this responsibility - and the expense for salaries, fuel, etc. to make the transfers. D/CG Rollo intervened to note that, given the security situation in Iraq, it was not unreasonable for the IA to take on this responsibility. In response to the D/PM's question, MinDef said that the IA was not ready for this burden in March. The D/PM suggested that the IA needed more time to prepare and asked General Rollo if MNF-I could continue with the tasks for a little while longer. General Rollo noted that MNF-I had already had extensive discussions with the MOD on this issue. However, he acknowledged that if the Iraq Army was not ready this is something that MNF-I would need to discuss further with the Iraqi Army and would do so. D/PM Saleh thanked the D/CG and reminded the MCNS that this was an opportunity for the GOI to take on responsibilities normally fulfilled by a sovereign state. BAGHDAD 00000570 003 OF 003 SUBJECT: MCNS ON FEBRUARY 24 DISCUSSES TURKISH INCURSION, INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES, MOD'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTING CASH TRANSFERS, THE PORT OF UMM QASR, PROGRESS ON THE BASRAH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, THE COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND, AND SECURITY FOR THE ARBAEEN OBSERVANCE Umm Qasr Security -------------- ¶11. (S/REL AS UK) The D/PM reported that a Government of Iraq study recommended that port security at Umm Qasr should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). However, operational responsibility for ensuring security should be given to the Basrah Operations Center. Management of the technical and administrative aspects of the port would remain with the Ministry of Transportation. The acting Minister of Justice objected that this issue was about more than security and should be taken by the full Cabinet, however the D/PM asserted that it was agreed and that Mohan should be issued with a directive to develop a plan to deliver port security. This would be followed up by a visit of the D/PM, NSA, Minister of Defense and Deputy Minister of Transport the next day to assert the GOI,s commitment to the issue (Note: This was subsequently canceled due to the weather in Basra, but has been rescheduled for 12 March. End Note.) Basrah Children's Hospital -------------- ¶12. (C/REL AS UK) General Adams of the Gulf Region Division (GRD) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers briefed on the progress thus far on construction of the Basrah Pediatric Hospital. This is a project involving GRD, USAID, the Ministry of Health, and Project Hope (a U.S.-based charitable organization). The project is on track to open in November ¶2008. Outstanding issues include providing reliable power 24 hours a day from the national power grid (stand-by generators will be installed but cannot be used as the main source of electricity),technical training for the operators of the advanced equipment, and maintenance training for hospital staff who will service the equipment once Project Hope ends its servicing. ¶13. (C/REL AS UK) General Rollo observed that this hospital project is potentially a real success story, but repeat of the sort of IED attack on Dr. Fox of Project Hope when he was visiting the hospital while on a trip from the US would risk undermining its chances of success and must be stopped. International charities would be loath to provide funding if their representatives were attacked. Security for Basrah is now in the hands of Iraqi authorities - they must see to it that nothing delays the opening of this children's hospital. The D/PM took the point, adding that the GOI would also follow-up on the electricity issue. Counter-Terrorism Force -------------- ¶14. (S/REL AS UK) The Director of the Counter Terrorism force began to deliver a brief on his forces, including its four regional centers, its special forces, and the battalions already working in Mosul and Basrah. While he was explaining its structure and activities, D/PM Barham Saleh interrupted and called for the presentation to be postponed until PM Maliki could be present. He noted that the C/T force is outside the National Security architecture. Minister of Interior Bolani observed that he coordinated with neighboring ministers regularly on C/T affairs, implying the C/T director was operating outside his authorities. The D/PM repeated his statement that this discussion would take place at the next MCNS attended by the PM. Arba'een -------------- ¶15. (S/REL AS UK) The D/MSNS outlined plans underway for protecting the Arba'een pilgrims. (Note: Arba'een, transliteration of Arabic forty, is a major Shi'a religious observance recalling the 40 days of mourning that followed the death of Husayn bin Ali at the Battle of Karbala. February 28 this year in the Gregorian calendar. End Note.) He noted that attacks against pilgrims had already taken place and asked that the MCNS re-constitute the members of the Ashura security committee in the National Operations Center as an Arba'een security committee. He added that four battalions of Iraqi Security forces, two each from the IA and the Iraqi Police, had already been dispatched to Karbala. The MCNS granted his request for - the D/PM instructed MOI, MOD, and the other relevant security organs to form the committee to coordinate protection of Arba'een pilgrims. CROCKER