NEIGHBORS PROCESS: UNAMI ROLLS UP ITS SLEEVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000509

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EG IR IZ KU TU UN SY
SUBJECT: NEIGHBORS PROCESS: UNAMI ROLLS UP ITS SLEEVES

Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4(B
) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: At his February 20 introductory call at
Embassy Baghdad, Ambassador Gerard Sambrana, Special
Political Advisor to SRSG de Mistura, exchanged views on the
Neighbors Process with PolMil M/C and PolCouns. Sambrana
communicated de Mistura,s commitment to try to improve the
"process" of the Neighbors Process and was eager to hear U.S.
views on how progress might be made. He described the
support mechanism which was being put into place with
UNAMI,s help, his understanding of GOI views of the process,
and discussed the upcoming calendar of working group meetings
leading up to the April 22 Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in
Kuwait. PolMil M/C and PolCouns related U.S. views of what
had been accomplished to date and how the Neighbors Process
could further contribute to a stable Iraq. Sambrana revealed
that de Mistura had offered him up to the GOI as an advisor
regarding upcoming bilateral negotiation of security
agreements with the U.S. END SUMMARY.

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UNAMI IS HERE TO HELP
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2. (C) Sambrana explained that de Mistura had asked him to
spearhead UNAMI,s efforts to energize regional engagement
with Iraq,s neighbors, while noting that he was currently
&between assignments8 as a French diplomat. SRSG de
Mistura considered providing technical assistance to the GOI
with respect to the Neighbors Process as being within
UNAMI,s mandate under UNSCR 1770. Sambrana appeared eager
to carry out this mandate, both by assisting the GOI to
create a support mechanism for the Neighbors Process and by
using UNAMI,s good offices and his own ideas to invigorate
the effort. While newly arrived in Iraq, Sambrana brings
credibility to his position as a diplomat of some thirty
years experience and the former French Ambassador to Eritrea.

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WHAT THE PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD DO
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3. (C) Based on his meeting with Iraqi DFM Abbawi the
previous day, Sambrana concluded that Iraq saw the Neighbors
Process as furthering the goals of national reconciliation
and economic development, but that it did not expect dramatic
results. The GOI saw the working groups as venues to
facilitate discussion at a technical level, but not as
decision-making bodies. The greatest challenges to the
Neighbors Process which Sambrana identified were the lack of
trust among the participants, their lack of a common vision
of the future of Iraq, and their differing opinions regarding
the current state of affairs in the country. Despite these
obstacles, Sambrana was forthright in his assurances that
both he and SRSG de Mistura would try to push the process to
achieve results.


4. (C) While agreeing with Sambrana,s assessment of the
challenges inherent in the process, PolCouns and Pol-Mil M/C
outlined the benefits already achieved for Iraq. The
inaugural Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Sharm al-Sheikh
and the months that followed saw a significant change in the
attitudes of GOI leaders, PM Maliki in particular, towards
Iraq,s neighbors and the UN. The GOI was now willing to
consider the UN and to some degree the other participants as
potential partners in building a stronger Iraq. As to the
effect of the process on the neighbors, it was apparent that
Syria and Iran were not willing to subject their
relationships with Iraq to the same scrutiny as the others.

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SUPPORT MECHANISM FOR THE NEIGHBORS PROCESS
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5. (C) Sambrana related that UNAMI was proceeding to work
with the Iraqi MFA on establishing a support mechanism for
the Neighbors Process on the basis of terms of reference
which had been circulated to the Neighbors, UN Missions in
New York (agreement to which was apparently achieved by
non-objection rather than affirmative expression of
agreement, according to Sambrana). The support mechanism
will be headed by Mohammed al-Humaimidi, a professional Iraqi
diplomat who had been deputy chief of mission in New York.
His unit will be located within the Iraqi MFA with a staff of
eight junior and mid-level diplomats: two supporting the
ministerials and two dedicated to each working group (energy,
refugees, border security). At the request of the GOI, UNAMI
will provide a five day block of training for the staff in
March and will consider Iraqi requests for computers and
other equipment, to include VTC connectivity with UNAMI.


BAGHDAD 00000509 002 OF 002


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IMPROVING THE PROCESS AND THE WAY AHEAD
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6. (C) Sambrana expressed support for moving forward quickly
with another round of working groups before the third
Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Kuwait set for April 22.
Sambrana foresaw a regularized series of meetings to support
steady progress, including UNAMI country team meetings in
Amman every 1-2 months, meetings with the UN coordinators
from the Neighbors participants in Amman every 2-3 months,
and further meetings with the participating governments.


7. (C) Sambrana reviewed the state of play regarding the next
round of working groups. The Energy Working Group was set
for March 2-3 in Istanbul. Syria had not yet set the next
iteration of the Border Security Working Group which was to
take place in Damascus, possibly because it was also
concerned with hosting the upcoming Arab League summit.
(NOTE: This conflicts with FM Zebari's statement to the
Ambassador that Syria would host the working group in early
March. END NOTE) If the SARG was unable or unwilling to
move forward, Sambrana indicated that Iraq would propose
Egypt or Kuwait as substitute host. There would be a
preparatory meeting for the Refugee Working Group on March 24.


8. (C) Fostering better integration between the output of the
working groups and the agenda of the Expanded Ministerial
will be one of his goals, related Sambrana. He felt that the
working groups should be able to produce proposals that would
be discussed and approved at the Expanded Ministerial and
clearly reflected in its communiqu. He also indicated that
he thought each working group should produce agreed minutes,
something which had not been done previously.

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NEW WORKING GROUPS A BRIDGE TOO FAR
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9. (C) Sambrana floated the idea of adding a working group on
water, an issue affecting all of the participants in the
Neighbors Process since they shared watersheds, and inquired
about possible connections between the Neighbors Process and
the ICI and IRFFI. PolCouns explained that water and
counterterrorism had been mooted as possible additional
working group topics before the Istanbul ministerial, but
that it had been decided that adding further working groups
would overtax the process. PolCouns related that the U.S.
saw the ICI, which involved specific commitments by the GOI,
as the primary conduit for economic cooperation between Iraq
and the international community, while the Neighbors Process
primarily focused on political and security issues. He asked
for Sambrana,s support in using the Neighbor,s Process to
expedite the exchange of ambassadors between Iraq and its
Arab neighbors.

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BORDER SECURITY
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10. (C) PolMil M/C outlined GOI bilateral diplomacy with its
neighbors which had achieved some success at improving border
security, supplementing the regional approach. The Border
Security Working Group could usefully build confidence among
the neighbors by agreeing to a small number of
noncontroversial concrete items. PolMil M/C offered that the
U.S. and other observers (G8, UN) were possible sources of
technical expertise to assist with such items, for example
information-sharing between governments. It would also be
invaluable if the Neighbors would follow through on their
commitment, stated in the Istanbul communiqu, to open
missions in Baghdad. The same could be said of international
NGOs.

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IRAN, SFA NEGOTIATION
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11. (C) At the end of the meeting, Sambrana briefly inquired
about the state of the trilateral U.S.-Iraq-Iran talks on
security in Iraq. He also related that he would be advising
the GOI regarding its negotiations with the U.S. on a
Strategic Framework Agreement. He was putting an advisory
team together at UNAMI but had no information to share
regarding GOI preparations to begin negotiation.
CROCKER