NEIGHBORS PROCESS: UNAMI ROLLS UP ITS SLEEVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000509 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EG IR IZ KU TU UN SY SUBJECT: NEIGHBORS PROCESS: UNAMI ROLLS UP ITS SLEEVES Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4(B ) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At his February 20 introductory call at Embassy Baghdad, Ambassador Gerard Sambrana, Special Political Advisor to SRSG de Mistura, exchanged views on the Neighbors Process with PolMil M/C and PolCouns. Sambrana communicated de Mistura,s commitment to try to improve the "process" of the Neighbors Process and was eager to hear U.S. views on how progress might be made. He described the support mechanism which was being put into place with UNAMI,s help, his understanding of GOI views of the process, and discussed the upcoming calendar of working group meetings leading up to the April 22 Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Kuwait. PolMil M/C and PolCouns related U.S. views of what had been accomplished to date and how the Neighbors Process could further contribute to a stable Iraq. Sambrana revealed that de Mistura had offered him up to the GOI as an advisor regarding upcoming bilateral negotiation of security agreements with the U.S. END SUMMARY. -------------- UNAMI IS HERE TO HELP -------------- ¶2. (C) Sambrana explained that de Mistura had asked him to spearhead UNAMI,s efforts to energize regional engagement with Iraq,s neighbors, while noting that he was currently &between assignments8 as a French diplomat. SRSG de Mistura considered providing technical assistance to the GOI with respect to the Neighbors Process as being within UNAMI,s mandate under UNSCR 1770. Sambrana appeared eager to carry out this mandate, both by assisting the GOI to create a support mechanism for the Neighbors Process and by using UNAMI,s good offices and his own ideas to invigorate the effort. While newly arrived in Iraq, Sambrana brings credibility to his position as a diplomat of some thirty years experience and the former French Ambassador to Eritrea. -------------- WHAT THE PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD DO -------------- ¶3. (C) Based on his meeting with Iraqi DFM Abbawi the previous day, Sambrana concluded that Iraq saw the Neighbors Process as furthering the goals of national reconciliation and economic development, but that it did not expect dramatic results. The GOI saw the working groups as venues to facilitate discussion at a technical level, but not as decision-making bodies. The greatest challenges to the Neighbors Process which Sambrana identified were the lack of trust among the participants, their lack of a common vision of the future of Iraq, and their differing opinions regarding the current state of affairs in the country. Despite these obstacles, Sambrana was forthright in his assurances that both he and SRSG de Mistura would try to push the process to achieve results. ¶4. (C) While agreeing with Sambrana,s assessment of the challenges inherent in the process, PolCouns and Pol-Mil M/C outlined the benefits already achieved for Iraq. The inaugural Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Sharm al-Sheikh and the months that followed saw a significant change in the attitudes of GOI leaders, PM Maliki in particular, towards Iraq,s neighbors and the UN. The GOI was now willing to consider the UN and to some degree the other participants as potential partners in building a stronger Iraq. As to the effect of the process on the neighbors, it was apparent that Syria and Iran were not willing to subject their relationships with Iraq to the same scrutiny as the others. -------------- SUPPORT MECHANISM FOR THE NEIGHBORS PROCESS -------------- ¶5. (C) Sambrana related that UNAMI was proceeding to work with the Iraqi MFA on establishing a support mechanism for the Neighbors Process on the basis of terms of reference which had been circulated to the Neighbors, UN Missions in New York (agreement to which was apparently achieved by non-objection rather than affirmative expression of agreement, according to Sambrana). The support mechanism will be headed by Mohammed al-Humaimidi, a professional Iraqi diplomat who had been deputy chief of mission in New York. His unit will be located within the Iraqi MFA with a staff of eight junior and mid-level diplomats: two supporting the ministerials and two dedicated to each working group (energy, refugees, border security). At the request of the GOI, UNAMI will provide a five day block of training for the staff in March and will consider Iraqi requests for computers and other equipment, to include VTC connectivity with UNAMI. BAGHDAD 00000509 002 OF 002 -------------- IMPROVING THE PROCESS AND THE WAY AHEAD -------------- ¶6. (C) Sambrana expressed support for moving forward quickly with another round of working groups before the third Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Kuwait set for April 22. Sambrana foresaw a regularized series of meetings to support steady progress, including UNAMI country team meetings in Amman every 1-2 months, meetings with the UN coordinators from the Neighbors participants in Amman every 2-3 months, and further meetings with the participating governments. ¶7. (C) Sambrana reviewed the state of play regarding the next round of working groups. The Energy Working Group was set for March 2-3 in Istanbul. Syria had not yet set the next iteration of the Border Security Working Group which was to take place in Damascus, possibly because it was also concerned with hosting the upcoming Arab League summit. (NOTE: This conflicts with FM Zebari's statement to the Ambassador that Syria would host the working group in early March. END NOTE) If the SARG was unable or unwilling to move forward, Sambrana indicated that Iraq would propose Egypt or Kuwait as substitute host. There would be a preparatory meeting for the Refugee Working Group on March 24. ¶8. (C) Fostering better integration between the output of the working groups and the agenda of the Expanded Ministerial will be one of his goals, related Sambrana. He felt that the working groups should be able to produce proposals that would be discussed and approved at the Expanded Ministerial and clearly reflected in its communiqu. He also indicated that he thought each working group should produce agreed minutes, something which had not been done previously. -------------- NEW WORKING GROUPS A BRIDGE TOO FAR -------------- ¶9. (C) Sambrana floated the idea of adding a working group on water, an issue affecting all of the participants in the Neighbors Process since they shared watersheds, and inquired about possible connections between the Neighbors Process and the ICI and IRFFI. PolCouns explained that water and counterterrorism had been mooted as possible additional working group topics before the Istanbul ministerial, but that it had been decided that adding further working groups would overtax the process. PolCouns related that the U.S. saw the ICI, which involved specific commitments by the GOI, as the primary conduit for economic cooperation between Iraq and the international community, while the Neighbors Process primarily focused on political and security issues. He asked for Sambrana,s support in using the Neighbor,s Process to expedite the exchange of ambassadors between Iraq and its Arab neighbors. -------------- BORDER SECURITY -------------- ¶10. (C) PolMil M/C outlined GOI bilateral diplomacy with its neighbors which had achieved some success at improving border security, supplementing the regional approach. The Border Security Working Group could usefully build confidence among the neighbors by agreeing to a small number of noncontroversial concrete items. PolMil M/C offered that the U.S. and other observers (G8, UN) were possible sources of technical expertise to assist with such items, for example information-sharing between governments. It would also be invaluable if the Neighbors would follow through on their commitment, stated in the Istanbul communiqu, to open missions in Baghdad. The same could be said of international NGOs. -------------- IRAN, SFA NEGOTIATION -------------- ¶11. (C) At the end of the meeting, Sambrana briefly inquired about the state of the trilateral U.S.-Iraq-Iran talks on security in Iraq. He also related that he would be advising the GOI regarding its negotiations with the U.S. on a Strategic Framework Agreement. He was putting an advisory team together at UNAMI but had no information to share regarding GOI preparations to begin negotiation. CROCKER