AFTERMATH OF DE-BA'ATHIFICATION LAW PASSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000484

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF DE-BA'ATHIFICATION LAW PASSAGE

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Although the Law of Accountability and
Justice was ratified by the Presidency Council on February 3
and awaits publication in the official gazette, the GoI still
has a significant amount to accomplish before the law can be
implemented in any meaningful way. VP Hashimi's unrealized
threat of a veto focused attention on some of the strict
provisions in the law; an intelligent implementation of the
law by a well-intentioned commission may minimize much of the
damage he envisioned. We are urging the Executive Council to
develop regulations that would guide the formation and
initial procedures of the commission that the law will
establish. End Summary.

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Hashimi's Threat
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2. (C) During the ten days that the Presidency Council
considered the Law of Accountability and Justice, VP Hashimi
waffled between a veto and a resigned acceptance of the
legislation, but never endorsed it. As February 3
approached, his public statements became more critical,
eventually claiming he would veto the law. Post urged
Hashimi to pass the legislation, warning him of the stalemate
that would transpire if the draft were returned to the CoR.
Ultimately, Hashimi (and the Presidency Council) neither
signed the law, nor vetoed it; per Article 138 of the Iraqi
constitution, the law was considered ratified ten days after
it was delivered to the Presidency Council. (Note: This is
one of few clear cut examples where a law has been ratified
by the Presidency Council through inaction and for Hashimi at
least the inaction is a signal of Presidency Council
reservations.)


3. (C) According to Rashid al-Izzawi (IIP),the Deputy
Chairman of the CoR de-Ba'athification committee, the largest
of Hashimi's concerns was answering to his Sunni constituency
for the estimated 7000 employees of the security agencies
(General Security, the Intelligence Service, Special Service,
Special Protection, National Security, Military Security,
Military Intelligence, and Saddam's Fedayeen) that could be
fired. This number was first cited by Ahmed Chalabi, but has
never been corroborated and is assumed by Hashimi and his
supporters to be a target-list of Senior Sunni officials.
Hashimi's other major concern, according to Izzawi, was the
lack of a role for the Presidency Council in approving
exemptions; understandably, this concern was shared by
President Talabani and VP Abd al-Mehdi.


4. (C) Izzawi indicated that Hashimi was also concerned with
the law's consistent labeling of the security agencies as
"repressive" or "dictatorial." As well, the VP worried about
the clauses that forced the commission to publish all the
names and ranks of those dismissed by the law and the
provision that excludes some Ba'athists from working within
the presidential commissions and the Ministries of Finance
and Foreign Affairs.

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Hashimi's Plan for Reform
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5. (C) On February 6, the Legal Advisor to VP Hashimi, Munif
Hawas al-Falaj, confirmed that the Presidency Council would
submit formal amendments to the law. The amendments reflect
Hashimi's concerns: exempt those in the security apparatus
from termination if they helped establish the new and current
security apparatus; allow people to serve in the Ministries
of Finance, Foreign Affairs, presidential commissions, and
the judicial council; grant the Presidency Council the power
to approve reinstatement exemptions, instead of the CoR; and,
eliminate the publication of names of former members affected
by the law.


6. (C) According to al-Falaj, the amendments could be pushed
through the CoR quickly enough to avoid any implementation
issues. When asked how long it would require, he said that
he would only need three or four months. He argued that
nothing with the commission could occur until the
commissioners were named, and so amendments could come any
time before that happened. The 60-day window to apply for
pensions or reinstatement was not a pressing concern for the
VP.

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Comment
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7. (C) With the law now ratified, the remainder of the work
is in its implementation. In many places, the law is vague
about processes and the rights of those within its scope.

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Implementing regulations -- that do not contradict the law
and which remain within the intent of the law -- could clear
up much of the ambiguity. Additionally, Hashimi's concerns
could be partially alleviated with such implementing
regulations. In particular, Post is urging the Executive
Council immediately to compile a slate of well-known and
non-partisan candidates for the position of Commissioner for
submission to the Council of Ministers. (Comment: We have
heard rumors that Mahmoud Othman (Independent) is one
potential candidate whose name is being circulated around the
CoR. End Comment.) We are also encouraging the GoI to
clearly define the vague process of obtaining a pension,
including the reemployment and retirement rights and pension
rights of those who receive de-Ba'athification orders after
the initial 60-day and 90-day windows.
CROCKER