NEA/DAS BUTLER MEETING WITH FM ZEBARI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000470 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/I - JDAVIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: NEA/DAS BUTLER MEETING WITH FM ZEBARI REF: E-MAIL - HALE TO CROCKER/TUELLER - 10 FEB 2008 Classified By: Classified by NEA/I PDAS Lawrence E. Butler for Reasons 1.4d/b ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 14 meeting, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told NEA DAS Lawrence Butler that he thought Iran postponed the trilat scheduled for February 15 because of the February 12 assassination in Damascus of Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah. Zebari confirmed that Iranian President Ahmedinejad would make an overnight visit to Iraq on March 1 and include a side-trip to Najaf to meet with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Zebari said that the Iraqi MFA had already forwarded to the Presidency and the Prime Minister's offices a recommendation that Iraq follow the USG lead and recognize Kosovo independence, but cautioned that both appeared opposed and that he could not act without their approval. (Note. In a February 17 Ministerial Committee for National Security meeting reported septel, the PM said he would recommend the GOI recognize Kosovo at the February 19 cabinet meeting. End Note.) Zebari dismissed recent Kuwaiti overtures about opening an Embassy, arguing that the GOK still refused "to extend Arab legitimacy to the New Iraq." Zebari thinks the Saudi flag is the only one other Arab countries, particularly Gulf countries, will follow. Zebari informed Ambassador Butler that the GOJ rejected the "check pass" deal Embassy Amman discussed with senior GOJ leadership. Deputy Foreign Minister Libeed Abbawi also attended the meeting. END SUMMARY. Ahmedinejad Visit-Call on Sistani-Iran Trilat-Mughniyah Bombing ¶2. (C) Zebari opened the meeting by complaining that Iran had "failed us again" although he noted that shortly before the talks, originally scheduled for February 15--a date Teheran proposed--Ambassador Qummi told him his delegation was complete and provided names. Zebari is convinced the Iranians postponed the trilat because of the February 12 Damascus bombing that killed senior Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Butler suggested the GOI link the upcoming Ahmedinejad visit to a date for the trilat. Zebari noted that Ahmedinejad has wanted to visit Iraq for quite some time--the last proposed visit would have occurred during POTUS recent Middle East tour--and that the MFA had "always tried to scuttle" the visit on the grounds that timing was not right. Zebari said the March 2 trip was now confirmed. He continued that what was originally an "extensive" four-day program involving travel to Najaf, Samara, Baghdad and Karbala had been scaled back to an overnight stay with a side-trip to Najaf. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbawi informed Ambassador Butler that while President Ahmedinejad is in Najaf, he is scheduled to meet with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. ¶4. (C) Zebari said the point of the trip was to demonstrate Iraq/Iran friendship and reciprocate for the many trips senior Iraqi leadership have made to Teheran. Zebari added he did not expect detailed policy talks, but rather a courtesy and protocol-type visit. Ambassador Butler stressed that the USG had enormous concerns over Iran and their ongoing involvement in Iraq. Zebari warned of a hardening of Iran's attitude, triggered by Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) talks and thinks Teheran will work to undermine USG/GOI achievements in Iraq by "unleashing forces--not immediately, but sometime during the spring." DFM Abbawi explained that Teheran is particularly concerned about the Sunni Al Sahwah (Awakening--Concerned Local Citizen) movements and suggested that Teheran could have ordered recent attacks targeting senior Sahwah leaders. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Butler emphasized that we are aware Iranian leadership perceive the SFA process as a threat. He asked Zebari to convey that the agreement will act as the basis for normal bi-lateral relations and not a mechanism to acquire permanent bases or to make open-ended troop commitments, which neither the USG nor the GOI wanted. Zebari agreed to reassure the Iranians that there was no hidden agenda behind the SFA process. Kosovo Independence--Iraq Unlikely to Follow USG Lead ¶6. (C) Ambassador Butler informed Zebari that his personal sources said Kosovo would declare independence as early as February 17, and that we would recognize Kosovo immediately and hoped Iraq followed suit. He added that this would likely be POTUS' and the Secretary's main policy issue in the short term. Zebari said that although the MFA had forwarded BAGHDAD 00000470 002 OF 002 a positive recommendation to the PMO and to President Talabani on this issue, both appeared opposed, arguing there remained (unspecified) problems and that the issue dovetailed with Iraq's own Kurdish question. Zebari confirmed that during his trip to Moscow, he discussed the issue with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (below). Deputy Foreign Minster Abbawi mentioned that the Serbian Ambassador to Iraq had been lobbying the Foreign Ministry against recognition, arguing that although Kosovo "remained a part of Serbia," Belgrade was ready to provide it self-rule, and that a declaration of independence would open a Pandora's box in the Balkans. Zebari tamped-down expectations about Iraqi recognition saying he would only be able to act pursuant to "very clear instructions" from the Presidency and the Prime Minister's Office. (Note: In a February 17 Ministerial Committee for National Security meeting reported septel, the PM said he would recommend the Cabinet recognize Kosovo at its February 19 meeting. End Note.) Moscow Trip--MOU Contains no Quid Pro Quo ¶7. (C) Zebari disclosed that the MOU he signed with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov erasing almost USD 13 billion in bilateral debt contained no quid-pro-quos or preferential treatment for Russian companies like Lukoil. It does, however, identify areas like oil, electricity and gas ripe for joint cooperative efforts. Zebari said he "refused to tip his hand to Lavrov" over Kosovo. Lavrov confided to Zebari the Kosovo declaration was "inevitable" but assured him Russia would pursue the matter in the UN Security Council. Neighbors--Border and Refugee Working Groups Still Pending ¶8. (C) Zebari remarked that Lavrov would attend the Kuwait Ministerial and confirmed the April 22 date. Zebari noted that the Energy Working Group March 1-2 meeting was on schedule, but told Ambassador Butler he had not heard from either the Syrians or the Jordanians about the Border Security and Refugee Working Groups. He instructed Abbawi to be in touch with Syrian and Jordanian counterparts to make arrangements. Zebari again mentioned that he would like to host in Baghdad a "Core Group" i.e. Neighbors-only, Foreign Minister level pre-con before the Kuwait Ministerial, but worried that March Arab League and Islamic Conference Summits, and a planned excursion of the Baghdad Diplomatic Corps to the KRG precluded the meeting. Arab Embassies--Kuwaitis Won't Extend Arab Legitimacy to New Iraq ¶9. (C) Zebari commented that the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Egyptians were all saying the right things, but were not following through. He mentioned last summer's Saudi exploratory delegation, a Kuwaiti proposal that Iraq and Kuwait simultaneously name Ambassadors, and recent talks in Egypt during which President Mubarak promised to send a team to explore embassy sites. He told Ambassador Butler that he had already offered the Kuwaitis "all options," including the use of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs villa, to set up a Mission. Zebari dismissed what the USG recently heard about the GOK opening a Baghdad embassy saying the GOK would not do it because it "refused to extend Arab legitimacy to the New Iraq." Zebari agreed that establishing a Saudi Mission in Baghdad was critical because the Saudi flag was the only one other Arab states, and particularly Gulf Country states, would follow. UNHCR Refugee Pledge--GOJ Will Not Touch Check ¶10. (C) Ambassador Butler outlined the GOI-GOJ-UNHCR "check pass" deal Embassy Jordan proposed in ref. e-mail. Zebari said the GOJ rejected the deal on the grounds that "they did not want to touch the check" but confirmed that the Iraqi Embassy in Amman still has the USD 8 million dollar check. In a subsequent meeting with Ambassador Crocker reported septel, Zebari blamed Prime Minister Maliki for the delay. CROCKER