PRT ANBAR: ANBAR POLITICAL FIGURES DEMAND COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000457 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT ANBAR: ANBAR POLITICAL FIGURES DEMAND COUNCIL REAPPORTIONMENT, VOICE IN DECISION MAKING REF: (A) BAGHDAD 400 (B) BAGHDAD 425 (C) BAGHDAD 433 Classified By: PRT Anbar Team Leader James Soriano for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Sheikh Ali Hatim Suleiman and Hameed Al-Heiss aired their grievances with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) in a meeting with MNF-West and the PRT at Camp Fallujah on February 16. Both disavowed any support for political violence, although they uttered public threats against the IIP earlier this month. Both made clear their objective to loosen the IIP's control over the Provincial Council (PC), perhaps with a reapportionment of seats. In response to their presentations, the Coalition reps pressed Ali Hatim and Heiss to take steps in public to disavow threatening language. End Summary. Public Threats -------------- ¶3. (C) Anbar political figures Sheikh Ali Hatim Suleiman and Hameed Al-Heiss met with MNF-West Deputy Commanding General and PRT Team Leader at Camp Fallujah on February 16 to discuss recent political developments in the province. Ali Hatim sought the meeting several weeks ago, before he and Heiss uttered public threats against the IIP. The IIP controls the Anbar PC and is the province's dominant party. ¶4. (SBU) In a February 6 interview in Baghdad with Al-Hurra television, Heiss said that he would "take up arms" to drive the IIP from Anbar if it did not relinquish power in thirty days. Heiss alleged that the IIP was strengthening Al-Qaeda. "We will resort to going to the streets and will impose a curfew," he said. "We will have to use force to get them out of Anbar Province. We will use weapons and treat them the way we treated Al-Qaeda. We are against the existence of the Islamic Party and its leaders and supporters in Anbar Province." ¶5. (SBU) It is not clear whether Ali Hatim was present at the time of Heiss, statement, but he made a media comment of his own on February 11, in which he allegedly threatened to kill IIP members if the party does not relinquish control over the PC. ¶6. (C) Believing that Heiss and Ali Hatim crossed a line, the PC voted on February 9 to file a legal complaint against them (Ref A). That complaint has since been filed and the matter is under investigation. Vice President Hashimi has also weighed in with a letter to the Ambassador criticizing Ali Hatim's and Heiss, behavior (Ref C). ¶7. (C) At the Camp Fallujah meeting, however, both Ali Hatim and Heiss disavowed advocacy of political violence, with the former stressing that he and his followers would take steps to stop such acts if they occurred. Both also favored a dialogue with the IIP on reaching a power sharing agreement. Grievances -------------- ¶8. (C) Both criticized the IIP for purportedly having a lock on political and economic power in the province. Their list of grievances includes the following: because of its religious affiliation, the IIP is the cause of the insurgency; the IIP-dominated PC lacks popular backing and is not representative of all factions; Council seats should be re-apportioned to address that deficiency; the IIP controls the provincial budget and construction contracts; PC members did not stay in Ramadi to fight Al-Qaeda; they fled to the relative safety of Baghdad during the height of the insurgency. Both interlocutors say they have been shut out of the reconstruction process, despite the fact that they have submitted competitive bids on provincial government projects. In their view, the victory over the insurgents is attributable to the actions taken by the province's tribes. ¶9. (C) On the last issue, Heiss pointed to the role he and Ali Hatim played in fighting Al-Qaeda: both were wounded several times. Both were also founding members of the "Anbar Salvation Council," along with the late Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, which expelled Al-Qaeda from Ramadi. That organization was the precursor to the "Iraq Awakening Movement," or Sahawa Al-Iraq (SAI),now led by Sattar's older brother, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha. Both Heiss and Ali Hatim continue to speak publicly in the name of the Anbar Salvation Council, but the extent of their support is not clear. Nonetheless, they made clear that their war records should accord them a voice in provincial affairs, which, they maintain, the IIP has denied. BAGHDAD 00000457 002 OF 002 Three Options -------------- ¶10. (C) During a recent visit with CoR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashadani, Ali Hatim said they discussed three options for resolving the Salvation Council's grievances: (a) restructure the PC so that all factions would have a voice; (b) hold provincial elections this spring; and (c) cause the departure of the IIP from the province. Restructuring the PC came up several times during the discussion, and Ali Hatim stressed the point in his summary statement at the meeting's end. Council re-apportionment is a standing issue with the SAI. Both Ali Hatim and Heiss applauded the SAI's recent move to become a political party (Ref C). ¶11. (C) Neither spoke well of the Anbar Higher Committee (AHC),an informal body formed in December to act as a forum for conflict resolution. "It was formed on the wrong basis," Heiss said, meaning that the AHC is the work of six local political figures who acted without broader consultation. Nonetheless, they signaled their willingness to speak with the IIP within the AHC framework. Coalition Response -------------- ¶12. (C) In response to Ali Hatim's and Heiss, presentations, the MNF-West Deputy Commanding General and PRT Team Leader made the following points: the Coalition supports the peaceful resolution of local political disputes; any outbreak of politically inspired violence would be unacceptable; both Heiss and Ali Hatim should take steps to publicly disavow political violence and not merely condemn it privately; both have the responsibility to shore up the province's stability and not be seen as undermining it; the USG supports provincial elections, but they would not be held this spring as Ali Hatim and Heiss desire; and that both should seek a dialogue with the IIP, and that the Coalition would broker such contacts, if asked. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) As Anbar enters the post-conflict period, disputes have come to the fore over the control of the PC, patronage, and the budget. Political jockeying is to be expected. What is unacceptable is if green-on-green disputes boil over into violence. Hence, the PC's fear that threatening public utterances create conditions for violence. MNF-West and the PRT told Ali Hatim and Heiss that, despite their grievances, they should drop the inflammatory rhetoric. In the near term, MNF-West and the PRT will undertake another round of engagements with prominent tribal sheikhs. Part of those talks will be to seek a way of resolving the Salvation Council grievances. End Comment. CROCKER