VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI: SISTANI "VERY NERVOUS" ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000438

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI: SISTANI "VERY NERVOUS" ABOUT
CONDITION OF IRAQ

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told the
Ambassador on February 10 that his recent meetings in Najaf
with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Iraq's other three
leading Shia clerics revealed great unease over current
economic and social conditions in Iraq, but the four Maraja
offered no advice on solutions. Adel blamed Prime Minister
al-Maliki for the protracted 2008 GOI budget impasse, adding
that he warned Maliki many times that his stalling tactics
would harm the nation. On the pending Provincial Powers
bill, Adel vowed to veto on constitutional grounds any law
that empowers the Prime Minister or the parliament to remove
a provincial governor. Adel said Maliki is working on a plan
to trim his cabinet to 22 ministers, and that interaction
between Maliki and Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi is
improving. He agreed with the Ambassador's assertion that
the GOI must press Tehran to stop support for militias in
Basrah, and Adel claimed the GOI, ISCI, and the Marja'iyah
are pushing hard on this front. Labeling GOI ministries as
"the real enemy of Iraq's private sector," Adel digressed on
the structural challenges of economic reform, and accepted
the Ambassador's suggestion that he become engaged in USG-GOI
efforts to revitalize Iraq's agricultural sector. End
Summary.

Trip to Najaf: Marja'iyah Worried
--------------


2. (C) Adel briefed on his recent visit to Najaf, where a
scheduled 15-minute courtesy call on SISTANI turned into a
two-hour meeting that ended at 1:30 AM. He also met with
Iraq's three other Maraja. Describing them repeatedly as
"very nervous," Adel said SISTANI and the others brushed off
his briefing on improved security to express their extreme
concern over Iraq's stagnant economy, high unemployment, and
GOI failure to deliver electricity and other basic social
services to the masses. Adel said he "tried to calm them,"
adding that SISTANI in particular was perturbed by current
conditions: the clerics told him that they were relaying
public anger and discontent as communicated to them by the
many Iraqis who visit them in Najaf. When he asked them for
recommendations and advice, he continued, they only expressed
concern. Refusing to divulge the identity of the cleric,
Adel added with a chuckle that one of the Maraja confided
that Iraq would have a "real mess" on its hands if the U.S.
left Iraq now.


3. (C) Adel said that after his meetings with Najaf
provincial government officials and a host of prominent local
citizens, he is optimistic that Najaf and neighboring Karbala
provinces have enormous potential to parlay their locations
as Shia Islam's pilgrimage centers into leading provincial
models of economic growth and development. He expressed
appreciation for USG assistance on development of an
international airport for Najaf, which he characterized as an
engine that will drive investment and economic growth.

Pending Legislation and Maliki's "Small Games"
-------------- -


4. (C) Turning to matters pending before the Council of
Representatives (CoR),Adel blamed Maliki for the protracted
2008 GOI budget impasse, adding that he warned Maliki many
times that his stalling tactics would harm the nation and "we
will all be losers." He recalled that the cabinet had
approved the draft budget last November and could have gotten
CoR passage by year's end but for Maliki's "small games" with
other blocs for the purpose of political advantage or
publicity. Adel stated that the Kurds should receive a 17
share percent of GOI revenues, just as they have in years
past, but agreed with the Ambassador's point that the Kurds
were over-reaching in their demand for GOI payment of
Peshmerga salaries. This is a matter that the Kurds and
Maliki should discuss in the context of all other issues,
Adel stated, but Maliki has not shown inclination to do so.
On the pending Provincial Powers bill, Adel vowed to veto on
constitutional grounds any law that allows the Prime Minister
or the CoR to remove a provincial governor. He said the CoR
had not had time to debate the GOI's proposed Amnesty bill,
adding that the GOI Executive Council had ordered a review of
the draft bill to ensure that it comports with the
constitution.

Cabinet Shuffle and LTSR
--------------


5. (C) Adel said Maliki is working on a plan to trim his
cabinet to 22 ministers (not 17 or 18 ministers, as Maliki
had previously considered) that will eliminate ministers of
state and merge their portfolios into relevant line
ministries. For instance, the irrigation portfolio would be

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given to the Minister of Agriculture. Adel claimed he urged
Maliki to move forward on a new cabinet by promising him that
the Shia United Iraqi Alliance would back him up with 70-80
CoR votes. He said talks continue about Tawafuq's return to
the cabinet, adding that interaction between Maliki and Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi has improved noticeably. Adel
confirmed that Sunni politicians Saleh al-Mutlak and Salam
al-Zubaie for the first time attended last week's meeting of
the Political Council for National Security in which LTSR was
discussed, but noted the Sadrist Trend was again absent from
the meeting. The Ambassador urged Adel to reach out to the
Sadrists and others to ensure the broadest possible
participation in LTSR-related discussions.

Basrah and Iran
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador briefed on his recent visit to Basrah,
noting that the province's two top security officials told
him militia activity is increasing. He urged the GOI to
consider an ISF surge into Basrah as part of a larger and
carefully coordinated political plan to enhance security and
stability there. Adel agreed with the Ambassador's assertion
that this effort must include increased GOI pressure on Iran
to stop support for militias, and replied that the GOI, ISCI,
and the Marja'iyah will continue to weigh in with Iranian
interlocutors. "Sometimes we succeed with the Iranians and
sometimes we fail," Adel maintained, "and we know that Iran
has an agenda they will not discuss with us."

Already Bloated, State Still Ravenous
--------------


7. (C) Labeling GOI ministries as "the real enemy of Iraq's
private sector," Adel digressed at length on the structural
challenges of economic reform. He claimed that post-Saddam
Iraq's biggest economic success has been the rapid and
widespread establishment of a mobile telephone network by
private sector entities, adding that Iraq's only economic
hope is a GOI policy structure that allows the private sector
to flourish. However, he warned that such a move would
entail reversing a 50-year trend in which the Iraqi state has
acquired most of Iraq's land, assets, and means of
production. He and the Ambassador agreed that revitalization
of Iraq's once-strong agricultural sector should be a top
priority, and Adel accepted the Ambassador's suggestion that
he become personally engaged in USG-GOI efforts to strengthen
Iraqi agriculture.
CROCKER