VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI: SISTANI "VERY NERVOUS" ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000438 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI: SISTANI "VERY NERVOUS" ABOUT CONDITION OF IRAQ Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador on February 10 that his recent meetings in Najaf with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Iraq's other three leading Shia clerics revealed great unease over current economic and social conditions in Iraq, but the four Maraja offered no advice on solutions. Adel blamed Prime Minister al-Maliki for the protracted 2008 GOI budget impasse, adding that he warned Maliki many times that his stalling tactics would harm the nation. On the pending Provincial Powers bill, Adel vowed to veto on constitutional grounds any law that empowers the Prime Minister or the parliament to remove a provincial governor. Adel said Maliki is working on a plan to trim his cabinet to 22 ministers, and that interaction between Maliki and Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi is improving. He agreed with the Ambassador's assertion that the GOI must press Tehran to stop support for militias in Basrah, and Adel claimed the GOI, ISCI, and the Marja'iyah are pushing hard on this front. Labeling GOI ministries as "the real enemy of Iraq's private sector," Adel digressed on the structural challenges of economic reform, and accepted the Ambassador's suggestion that he become engaged in USG-GOI efforts to revitalize Iraq's agricultural sector. End Summary. Trip to Najaf: Marja'iyah Worried -------------- ¶2. (C) Adel briefed on his recent visit to Najaf, where a scheduled 15-minute courtesy call on Sistani turned into a two-hour meeting that ended at 1:30 AM. He also met with Iraq's three other Maraja. Describing them repeatedly as "very nervous," Adel said Sistani and the others brushed off his briefing on improved security to express their extreme concern over Iraq's stagnant economy, high unemployment, and GOI failure to deliver electricity and other basic social services to the masses. Adel said he "tried to calm them," adding that Sistani in particular was perturbed by current conditions: the clerics told him that they were relaying public anger and discontent as communicated to them by the many Iraqis who visit them in Najaf. When he asked them for recommendations and advice, he continued, they only expressed concern. Refusing to divulge the identity of the cleric, Adel added with a chuckle that one of the Maraja confided that Iraq would have a "real mess" on its hands if the U.S. left Iraq now. ¶3. (C) Adel said that after his meetings with Najaf provincial government officials and a host of prominent local citizens, he is optimistic that Najaf and neighboring Karbala provinces have enormous potential to parlay their locations as Shia Islam's pilgrimage centers into leading provincial models of economic growth and development. He expressed appreciation for USG assistance on development of an international airport for Najaf, which he characterized as an engine that will drive investment and economic growth. Pending Legislation and Maliki's "Small Games" -------------- - ¶4. (C) Turning to matters pending before the Council of Representatives (CoR),Adel blamed Maliki for the protracted 2008 GOI budget impasse, adding that he warned Maliki many times that his stalling tactics would harm the nation and "we will all be losers." He recalled that the cabinet had approved the draft budget last November and could have gotten CoR passage by year's end but for Maliki's "small games" with other blocs for the purpose of political advantage or publicity. Adel stated that the Kurds should receive a 17 share percent of GOI revenues, just as they have in years past, but agreed with the Ambassador's point that the Kurds were over-reaching in their demand for GOI payment of Peshmerga salaries. This is a matter that the Kurds and Maliki should discuss in the context of all other issues, Adel stated, but Maliki has not shown inclination to do so. On the pending Provincial Powers bill, Adel vowed to veto on constitutional grounds any law that allows the Prime Minister or the CoR to remove a provincial governor. He said the CoR had not had time to debate the GOI's proposed Amnesty bill, adding that the GOI Executive Council had ordered a review of the draft bill to ensure that it comports with the constitution. Cabinet Shuffle and LTSR -------------- ¶5. (C) Adel said Maliki is working on a plan to trim his cabinet to 22 ministers (not 17 or 18 ministers, as Maliki had previously considered) that will eliminate ministers of state and merge their portfolios into relevant line ministries. For instance, the irrigation portfolio would be BAGHDAD 00000438 002 OF 002 given to the Minister of Agriculture. Adel claimed he urged Maliki to move forward on a new cabinet by promising him that the Shia United Iraqi Alliance would back him up with 70-80 CoR votes. He said talks continue about Tawafuq's return to the cabinet, adding that interaction between Maliki and Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi has improved noticeably. Adel confirmed that Sunni politicians Saleh al-Mutlak and Salam al-Zubaie for the first time attended last week's meeting of the Political Council for National Security in which LTSR was discussed, but noted the Sadrist Trend was again absent from the meeting. The Ambassador urged Adel to reach out to the Sadrists and others to ensure the broadest possible participation in LTSR-related discussions. Basrah and Iran -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador briefed on his recent visit to Basrah, noting that the province's two top security officials told him militia activity is increasing. He urged the GOI to consider an ISF surge into Basrah as part of a larger and carefully coordinated political plan to enhance security and stability there. Adel agreed with the Ambassador's assertion that this effort must include increased GOI pressure on Iran to stop support for militias, and replied that the GOI, ISCI, and the Marja'iyah will continue to weigh in with Iranian interlocutors. "Sometimes we succeed with the Iranians and sometimes we fail," Adel maintained, "and we know that Iran has an agenda they will not discuss with us." Already Bloated, State Still Ravenous -------------- ¶7. (C) Labeling GOI ministries as "the real enemy of Iraq's private sector," Adel digressed at length on the structural challenges of economic reform. He claimed that post-Saddam Iraq's biggest economic success has been the rapid and widespread establishment of a mobile telephone network by private sector entities, adding that Iraq's only economic hope is a GOI policy structure that allows the private sector to flourish. However, he warned that such a move would entail reversing a 50-year trend in which the Iraqi state has acquired most of Iraq's land, assets, and means of production. He and the Ambassador agreed that revitalization of Iraq's once-strong agricultural sector should be a top priority, and Adel accepted the Ambassador's suggestion that he become personally engaged in USG-GOI efforts to strengthen Iraqi agriculture. CROCKER