VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000437

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON
LATEST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) During a February 11 meeting, the Ambassador and Vice
President Hashimi discussed the Executive Council (Ex-Co),
the Political Council for National Security (PCNS),Tawafuq's
return to government, legislation, threats by Anbar sheikhs
directed at the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Hashimi's U.S.
travel plans. Hashimi questioned PM Maliki's commitment to
the Ex-Co, noting success would be achievable only via
creation of a specific "roadmap," or joint work program. The
PCNS, he believed, was being distracted by issues other than
its core mandate: the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Talks.
Hashimi blamed Maliki for delays in reaching a final deal to
return Tawafuq to government, and said it was imperative that
he be given a stronger role in the security field. On
legislation, in his view, the budget impasse was an issue for
Kurds and Shia to settle. He revealed no objections to the
draft Provincial Powers law, and said it was the
responsibility of provincial councils to fire a governor.
The draft amnesty law would likely be voted on during the
current session, following recent improvements. On Anbar,
Hashimi complained about recent public threats of violence
toward his Islamic Party made by two Anbari politicians, and
confirmed that the party was pursuing legal action in court.
Hashimi provided a letter on the subject (septel) in which he
criticized U.S. support to the individuals who made the
threats. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Vice President was joined in the 60-minute
meeting by Political Advisor Khalil Azzawi, and a notetaker.
The Ambassador was accompanied by Staff Assistant and POLOFF
(note-taker).

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Executive Council - A Slow Start
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3. (S) Asked to comment on the Ex-Co, Hashimi stated that
after three meetings, "nothing significant" had been
accomplished. "You say that Maliki has changed, but I don't
see it." If he had more authorities, "the Council would be
more productive; more than mere empty promises." It was
imperative, he added, that the Council agree to a "roadmap"
or a specific plan of action. So far, he lamented, "there
has been nothing to lead me to believe we're moving in the
right direction." Nevertheless, he said that a paper he
circulated among Ex-Co members on devising an "Iran policy"
would be debated at the next meeting. He said it was
undecided whether the Council would meet on February 13, but
that the Presidency Council would convene ahead of any fourth
Ex-Co meeting. Asked to enumerate agenda items, Hashimi
instead complained that the Council needed by-laws to be
effective. Similarly, the group of deputies assigned to
follow up on agenda items -- the "Support Committee" -- was
not functioning.

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Political Council for National Security
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4. (S) Hashimi believed the PCNS would keep to its bi-weekly
meeting schedule, convening next on February 16. The PCNS,
he said, was assigned the job of managing the Long-Term
Strategic Framework (LTSF) talks with Washington. To that
end, participation had been widened (bloc leaders
representing 10 seats; down from 15) so that any LTSF
agreement would have maximum legitimacy among political
groups when it came time for CoR ratification. Invitations
were therefore extended to Hewar leader Saleh Mutlaq,
Iraqiya, former Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zoubai, and
others. Hashimi said he had also made special efforts to
encourage Sadrist participation. Despite the single mandate
of the PCNS, he said, other "security issues" (e.g., the
situation in Diwaniyah) was included on the group's agenda,
distracting the group from its primary raison d'etre.
Hashimi complained that this group, too, had no by-laws.
Last, the VP noted that he was encouraging former PM Ayad
Allawi to participate, but the latter was concerned by rumors
that the GOI might bring charges against him. Allawi needs a
clear statement from the PM on this issue, he added.

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Tawafuq Front's Return
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5. (S) Asked about Tawafuq's plans to return to government,
Hashimi said teams from Tawafuq and the PMO reached an
agreement on February 5 regarding reciprocal demands, but

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complained that the PMO's team returned the next day with
unilateral changes (Note: PMO lead negotiator categorically
denied the allegation to POLOFF in private on February 11.
Nevertheless, the agreement has not yet been signed by
leaders pending Tawafuq's presentation of candidates for its
6 cabinet seats. End note). Hashimi said he had no
intention of returning Tawafuq's ministers to the same Maliki
cabinet. Rather, as the Presidency Council had agreed, they
would await formation of a new, smaller cabinet as discussed
in the Executive Council. "Maliki wants us to return to the
Cabinet, which he says he will re-shuffle after one month;
there's no way we're just filling empty slots." Hashimi
insisted that the most important issue for him was the
security file. "We must be treated as equals, like the
Kurds." He insisted that the Sunnis be included in
decision-making on military and intelligence matters. The
Vice President requested Embassy assistance to press Maliki
to accept a stronger Sunni role in the security realm. To
highlight his frustration in this regard, Hashimi related a
recent incident where he said two juveniles detained in a GOI
Baghdad jail were released, only to be killed before their
parents' eyes as they left the building by "Sadr militias."

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Legislation Issues
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6. (S) Budget: The Ambassador implored Hashimi and other
Iraqi leaders to quickly resolve the budget impasse, in order
to provide funds to ministries and provinces to deliver
services. Hashimi responded with a familiar denunciation of
the Maliki government, questioning its "standards" and
professionalism but said Tawafuq "could live with" 17 percent
being apportioned to the Kurds. "We've made our reservations
known; but we aren't looking to make problems for the Kurds,"
he said. After all, "the money is going to Iraqis." The
"technical issues" which had led to the current impasse, the
Vice President commented, stemmed from shortcomings of Iraq's
Constitution. On a draft Provincial Powers bill, Hashimi
simply said, "we're waiting; ISCI and Dawa are disputing --
we're open minded about it." The provincial council must be
responsible for firing a governor; "otherwise, what's the
role of the PC? -- this would create chaos." On amnesty
legislation, Hashimi said that recent changes to the law made
it more acceptable, and predicted its passage during the
current legislative session.

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Anbar Tribal Figures Threaten IIP
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7. (S) The Ambassador told Hashimi that he had received the
VP's letter (septel) on public threats made by two Anbar
sheikhs against the IIP in that province. The Ambassador
said he would respond formally, and declared there was "no
way" that the USG would either support or endorse comments
made by the offending Anbaris. Nor did the U.S. manipulate
Al Hurra and Radio Sawa to provide a platform for such
threats, as insinuated by Hashimi in his letter. "We had no
role in the comments made by Hamid al-Heiss or Ali al-Hatim,"
he stated. Hashimi said many people were questioning their
motives, and suggesting that U.S. backing had allowed them to
be so brazen. The Vice President also said he warned PM
Maliki that the latter's continued support to these figures
was extremely dangerous, and would have negative
consequences. Asked if the PM was supportive of the Anbar
High Committee, Hashimi said he had the impression that the
PM did not support the group.

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Hashimi U.S. Travel
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8. (C) The Ambassador confirmed a formal request from
Hashimi, conveyed through the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, to
visit Washington April 12-20. The Ambassador suggested that
the Vice President should do less traveling and remain in
Baghdad to deal with the country's problems. Nevertheless,
the USG should be able to accommodate a visit at that time,
pending further consultation.
CROCKER