FRENCH DIPLOMATS WELCOME VISIT; GUARDED ABOUT IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000434 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/I - JDAVIS, EUR/WE CPALMER PARIS FOR JROSENBLATT, WJORDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: FRENCH DIPLOMATS WELCOME VISIT; GUARDED ABOUT IRAQ ENGAGEMENT Classified By: PolCounselor Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4d/b ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. In a February 12 meeting - the first on French Embassy premises with U.S. Emboffs in at least 18 months, if not since 2003 -- French DCM Alexandre Garcia and Political Counselor Sylvain Fourriere (protect both) told DepPolCounselor that ongoing security concerns and pervasive corruption would limit the scope of French Government and private engagement throughout Iraq. They appeared open to Erbil-based training, but unenthusiastic about Baghdad-based programs. Garcia stressed that France, in its capacity in Baghdad as acting EU President, would press for common GOF/USG priorities, particularly in legislation and Arab diplomatic representation. The French mission, staffed with both Farsi and Arabic speakers, appeared particularly attuned to Iranian influences in Iraq. They worried about the allegiances of key ISCI players and urged greater USG engagement with the Sadr trend. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/NF) DepPolCounselor and PolOff met on February 12 at the French Embassy in Baghdad with French DCM Alexandre Garcia and Political Counselor Sylvain Fourriere. Garcia, who has been in Baghdad for 18 months, commented that the visit marked the first time during his tour, and perhaps since 2003, that U.S diplomats had called at the French embassy, which is located across the Tigris river in Baghdad's Karadah District, approximately one mile northeast of the Palace complex. ¶3. (C/NF) While the French have raised their profile in Iraq with the opening of an Embassy Branch Office in Erbil, both Garcia and Fourriere cautioned that fundamental obstacles -- corruption in the KRG and security in other parts of Iraq -- limited the scope of engagements that the French Government and French investors would undertake in Iraq. Fourriere was particularly blunt about KRG corruption (and later in the conversation extended his indictment to the whole of the country),describing a system of "nepotism and mandatory payments" and concluding that, sooner or later, the problem would have to be "referred to by name" and tackled head-on. ¶4. (C/NF) The security situation in the rest of Iraq remains the GOF's primary concern, though both took pains to praise Coalition Forces' effectiveness and stressed that conditions in Baghdad, which they monitor daily from their Red Zone headquarters, had significantly improved. They tempered their assessment by underscoring that the lull could end "overnight" since it depends on an array of factors, some of which, like the Jaysh al Mahdi "freeze", were beyond our direct control. The main problem, they continued, was that, despite security gains, basic service provision remained "disastrous, a catastrophe." Local Iraqi staff and Iraqis resident near the French embassy reportedly were limited to an hour of electricity daily and lacked running water; foodstuffs, too, were limited and the supply chain precarious. Neither thought the Maliki government, which they saw as incompetent and out of touch with daily reality, was up to the service challenge. ¶5. (C/NF) Both Garcia and Fourriere placed heavy analytic emphasis on Iran's influence in Iraq, which they believed to be pervasive. (Note: Fourriere and Ambassador Jean Francois Girault, who was absent, have both served in Iran. Fourriere, who claims to speak fluent Farsi, will transfer to Teheran when his Baghdad tour ends in May. Girault, Garcia and Fourriere all speak Arabic. End Note.) Fourriere said that in dealing with ISCI boss Abdel Aziz al Hakim's family, and especially his sons, he was struck by the "extraordinary hold Iran has on them." He described them as "indistinguishable from Iranians" in their speech (they use Farsi in private and with Fourriere) and their habits. Fourriere left no doubt where he thinks their sympathies lie. ¶6. (C/NF) Turning to the Sadr trend, Fourriere declared that, while the movement was clearly tainted by association with Iran, it was fundamentally hostile to Iranian ambitions, since Iraqi nationalism was its driving principle. He thought the trend's "honorable elements" would push for an extension of the JAM freeze, but that the movement was so fragmented that there was no way to be sure who would prevail. Fourriere urged us, to the extent possible, to broaden our engagement with the Sadr trend. ¶7. (C/NF) Asked about French-sponsored training in Iraq, Garcia admitted that the French thus far had only considered the possibility of language and cultural seminars, likely in BAGHDAD 00000434 002 OF 002 Erbil, where France recently opened an embassy office. Garcia appeared open to the suggestion that the GOF could provide training for Iraqi judges in Erbil. He also agreed to look into Baghdad-based training, even briefly raising the prospect of using the Al Rashid hotel in Baghdad for training as he was introducing DepPolCounselor to a colleague who handles legal and cultural affairs. (Note: That colleague's response lacked enthusiasm.) Asked also about French thinking on a potential surge in IDP and refugee returnees, Garcia and Fourriere responded flatly that the latest numbers belied the alleged urgency. With regard to refugees, more Iraqis were still leaving the country each month than returning, Garcia claimed. Fourriere added that the recent spate of returns from Syria had been driven by financial necessity and had now languished. ¶8. (C/NF) Garcia stressed that the French, in their capacity as EU President, were already pressing key GOF/USG priorities, particularly on legislation and expanded Arab representation in Baghdad. (Note: France, which formally assumes the EU Presidency in July, is now the acting EU President, since Slovenia has no diplomatic presence in Baghdad.) ¶9. (C/NF) Comment: The French analysis was striking for its emphasis on the Iranian undercurrents in Iraqi political developments. While that approach plays to the linguistic strengths of staff, it is a message we hear just as often from Iraqi interlocutors. Also notable was the judgment on the precariousness of recent security gains coupled with the indictment of the Maliki administration and the diagnosis of grave, systemic corruption, stretching to the KRG. Our French interlocutors freely acknowledged Coalition achievements and volunteered to be helpful in their EU Presidency role. The impression remains, however, that the French diplomatic presence in Baghdad functions primarily as an analytic perch from which they are not quite ready to stir. Greater engagement will likely come in baby steps. The new French office in Erbil, where the incumbent has deeper ties to FM Kouchner than to the MFA itself, is the more probable platform, but we should not give France a pass on engagement in Baghdad itself. The verdict of corruption could also be a pivot for launching training projects turning on Rule of Law. Pooling views on Iranian inroads into Iraq may equally prove a worthwhile line of exchange. End Comment. CROCKER