PETRAEUS DISCUSSES MASHADANI, SYRIA, WITH VP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004070


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PETRAEUS DISCUSSES MASHADANI, SYRIA, WITH VP
HASHIMI

Classified By: Amb Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The replacement for Council of
Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani, GCC
relations generally and Syrian relations specifically, and
concerns about Saudi relations were topics of conversation in
a December 26 meeting between US Central Command General
David Petraeus and Vice President Tariq al Hashimi.
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker accompanied the general and Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) CoR member Osama al Tikriti was also
present. While Hashimi was not forthcoming on a possible
replacement for Mashadani, he was insistent that the new
speaker would come from Tawafuq. Moreover, while Hashimi
indicated his pleasure with his recent travel to Syria,
Turkey and Lebanon, he indicated some concerns with Syrian
sponsorship of Iraqi insurgent and terrorist groups. He also
noted that Syrians were awaiting a goodwill gesture from Iraq
before relations could improve, although Iraqi leadership was
hesitant to act, perhaps because of the insurgent elements in
Syria. Finally, Hashimi relayed that the Saudis were unhappy
with his signing the US-Iraq security agreement, but offered
no details as to why they were displeased. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) General Petraeus expressed America's continued
commitment to Iraq and noted the gains in the Iraqi Security
Forces' professional and institutional capacity. Although
conceding that challenges remained (such as the need for oil
production and servicing contracts and for further security
improvements),Petraeus emphasized the substantial progress
Iraq and the US had achieved together. Petraeus also stressed
the importance of the government of Iraq (GOI) maintaining
momentum of its current programs despite the fact that
falling oil prices would create budget challenges for the GOI
and might require the GOI resorting to deficit spending.
Hashimi acknowledged American contributions and sacrifices,
and the work still to be done. And, while he allowed that
there might be financial difficulties, he remained
noncommittal as to solutions.

Mashadani
--------------


3. (C) As for the recently ousted CoR speaker, the Iraqis
agreed that the speaker's problems were of his own making.
Hashimi observed that there were many conspiracy theories
extant about why Mashadani had been ousted, and whether such
actions would be extended to Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.
When queried about the next speaker, Hashimi averred that it
was Tawafuq's right to put forward a Sunni candidate -- this
had been agreed to by the Kurds and ISCI -- but claimed that
Hewar was interfering and trying to name its own candidate.
While Hashimi allowed that negotiations were ongoing, he
claimed Hewar did not have enough votes to elect their own
candidate.


4. (C) When pushed to identify a short list, Hashimi claimed
secrecy and jested that the Americans knew the short list
anyway. Osama al Tikriti threw out the name of Hachem al
Hassani, a Sunni independent, but Hashimi countered that, as
an independent, Hassani had no support to draw on. Despite
several probes, Hashimi remained reticent to name a
candidate, Tawafuq or otherwise. As Hashimi remained
intransigent in identifying possible candidates, both
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed that the
next leader must be someone with stature and able to lead; it
should not be a choice based on the least common denominator
or on conspiracies.

GCC Relations
--------------


5. (C) Petraeus raised the issue of Iraq's Arab relations,
noting that he was more than half-way through a 20-country
tour encompassing all of the countries that fell under the US
Qtour encompassing all of the countries that fell under the US
Central Command (CENTCOM). Gen. Petraeus announced his
pleasure at being able to report Iraqi progress to the Arab
leaders and that all were focused on the geo-strategic
importance of Iraq. He noted to Hashimi that the reports had
been very encouraging to Iraq,s Arab neighbors.

Syrian Relations
--------------


6. (S) After Crocker noted Hashimi's recent travel to Turkey,
Lebanon and Syria, Hashimi shared details on his meeting with
Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Hashimi claimed the Syrians
were interested in changing their course, and wanted a
positive economic gesture from Iraq; e.g. some agreement on a
Banyas oil pipeline or the Akal natural gas field.
Unfortunately, Iraqi leaders were still hesitant. Hashimi
said he would try to push some positive gesture through the

BAGHDAD 00004070 002 OF 002


Iraqi Presidency Council (PC),but such a move also required
Syrian action against insurgent activities and terrorist
networks operating from that country.


7. (S) Petraeus observed that Iraqi hesitation was not helped
by the openly allowed presence of al Qaeda facilitators and
former Saddamists in Syria. Hashimi claimed he had made this
point to Assad; many Iraqis viewed Syria as accommodating al
Qaeda and former Saddamists. Although Tikriti hypothesized
that Syria's activities were Iran-linked, Hashemi offered
that Assad said the Syrians were not coordinating their
activities in Iraq with Iran. The Syrians, Hashimi opined,
would not sacrifice their Arab identity, although he thought
the Syrian views on Hamas in Lebanon were different. Hashimi
stated that he told Assad that if he continued the Iraqis
will dig a big trench between Iraq and Syria. Petraeus
stressed that Syria needs to emphasize Arab ties because Iran
couldn't provide the level of economic support Syria needs;
only the Gulf States, Iraq, the Arab world, and Europe could
do that. Petraeus emphasized that Assad knew about al Qaeda
foreign fighter facilitator Abu Ghadiyah and his activities,
and Syrian Military Intelligence allowed Ghadiyah to continue
as long as the fighters and suicide bombers continued on into
Iraq. Ghadiyah,s successors, he noted, were already getting
established. He added that the Syrian regime should be very
concerned about such deals with extremists, citing the
situation the Pakistani government currently faced with
extremists they had condoned.

Spillover Conspiracies?
--------------


8. (C) Tikriti noted that Maliki was also worried about the
presence of Ba'athists and former Saddamists in Syria, again
linking Mashadani's ouster to a possible Maliki ouster.
Petraeus noted that it was hard to say if Ba,athists still
provided money to Iraq insurgents; he noted that Hashimi
should have enmity and no sympathy for the Iraqi Baathist
leaders in Syria, as they were true Saddamists like those who
undoubtedly killed his brother. Tikriti's comment introduced
the topic of the Dokan meeting at the end of November, and
how it had only increased Maliki's suspicions. Hashimi
insisted, however, that Maliki had been invited to join in
and that there had been nothing underhanded in the meeting.


9. (C) As the US team attempted to learn more, Hashimi --
somewhat abruptly -- signaled a close to the meeting by
extending his thanks for the work and sacrifices of the
coalition and expressing concerns that the ISF must be both
competent and capable. This was necessary to prevent a
security vacuum. The security partnership between the US and
Iraq must continue. Petraeus assured Hashimi on both counts
and offered to have Lieutenant General Frank Helmick from
MNSTC-I provide an updated briefing on the steady progression
in capability of the ISF, with a great deal of focus on
ethics, professionalis, and building a national force.

Saudi Concerns?
--------------


10. (S) As the meeting concluded, Hashimi indicated he would
be leaving on Sunday (December 28) for Kuwait, with onward
travel to Bahrain and the UAE. While both sides agreed on the
importance of maintaining good GCC relations, Hashimi
introduced an issue with the Saudis. He asserted they were
unhappy with his signing of the security agreement and had
received a very negative response from them. Petraeus
reassured Hashimi of the positive responses he had obtained
from the Saudis during his recent trip concerning the
security agreement. Crocker sought clarification as to
whether the negative message was about the security
Qwhether the negative message was about the security
agreement, or an excuse to create an issue. The Ambassador
also pointed out the Saudi government was extremely complex,
and that it may not have been a message from the Saudi
government per se, although Hashimi insisted it was from
allies close to the king. The Americans promised to look into
the situation for clarification. (Note: Amb Crocker and GEN
Petraeus suspect that the Saudis were not unsupportive of the
security agreement -- as they want to see the US stay in
Iraq; rather, they likely have decided to back parties other
than the IIP in the provincial elections. End Note.)


11. (U) General Petraeus has cleared on this cable.
CROCKER