"THE AX IS ALREADY IN THE HEAD": RURAL BAGHDAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004018 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: "THE AX IS ALREADY IN THE HEAD": RURAL BAGHDAD OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTIONS, FEARS IRAN REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 3791 ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 3928 ¶1. (U) This is an ePRT Baghdad-5 reporting cable. It is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle accordingly. Not for distribution on the Internet. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In meetings over the past month with political, tribal and governmental leaders throughout three of Baghdad's rural qadas (districts) -- Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah -- trends have emerged that mirror, for the most part, those observed recently in the capital and elsewhere in Iraq (Refs A and B). First, there has been a movement away from sectarian ideology toward a more secular nationalism among political leaders; Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) candidates have reflected that shift in both public and private statements, as well as in their campaign strategy. Second, residents from shopkeepers to sheikhs have demonstrated strong support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, if not for the Government of Iraq (GOI). Third, there is a palpable fear of Iranian influence in all aspects of Iraqi politics and life, leading to broad endorsement of the recently-signed Security Agreement (SA) between the USG and GOI. Finally, interlocutors expressed skepticism over the ability of the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) to conduct objective and impartial provincial elections in January 2009. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (U) This cable presents views culled from more than 20 meetings with leaders from three of Baghdad's rural qadas -- Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah -- conducted by ePRT Baghdad-5 during November and December. DEMISE OF SECTARIAN POLITICS? ¶4. (SBU) Unlike the 2005 elections, which were dominated by religious parties pushing sectarian agendas, the 2009 PC elections will focus attention on the issues affecting all Iraqis: national reconciliation, jobs, education, essential services and security, to name but a few. This is a common refrain, heard among Sunni and Shi,a alike. The people want &stability8 and &unity,8 and are looking for &educated, genuine8 leaders who can deliver on the subjects that matter the most. For their part, candidates have displayed an understanding of the frustration felt by most Iraqis toward their government, and plan to make that dissatisfaction a key component of their election campaigns. Indeed, even the incumbents with whom we spoke plan to not only highlight their accomplishments while in office but also emphasize their differences, real and imagined, wQ the ruling parties. Local residents are, for the most part, dissatisfied with current PC members, noting time and again that they have not adequately represented the people's interests. &Change8 was a common buzz-word among our interlocutors (many had closely followed the US presidential elections). Despite all they have been through over the past few years, Iraqis within Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah repeatedly expressed optimism for the future of their country, beginning with the provincial elections, which many view as a referendum on the GOI,s performance. Repeatedly, local leaders and those aspiring to seats on the PC emphasized the need for both a national view and a focus on the issues of importance to local citizens. PRAISE FOR MALIKI ¶5. (SBU) Whether Shi,a or Sunni, sheikh or shopkeeper, residents of the three rural districts praised Prime Minister Maliki,s efforts to unite the country and bring an end to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq during 2006 and ¶2007. While there was some frustration evidenced at the pace of rebuilding and lack of basic services in many parts of the Qof rebuilding and lack of basic services in many parts of the region the majority of our interlocutors referred to the prime minister as &a good person8 who worked to benefit the country and not just for his party's interests. Maliki received particularly good marks for his negotiations on the SA, where even those most closely allied with the US and coalition forces (CF) respected the hard bargain he drove with the USG. Despite strong support for the prime minister, the GOI on the whole was viewed as alternately corrupt, incompetent and not reflective of the average Iraqi's views. Particular contempt was held out for the major religious parties in power -- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),the Islamic Da,wa Party (Da,wa) and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Predictions for these parties in Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah were bleak: most residents felt that the Islamic parties had caused serious harm to the country, and were confident that they would not fare well in the January elections. FEAR OF IRAN ¶6. (SBU) One current that ran through all of our discussions was a strong fear of Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs. For the most part, this was not an abstract belief that Iran is pulling the strings of certain Iraqi leaders, but an innate, deep-seated certainty that Iran will do all in its power to destabilize Iraq, whether politically, economically or militarily. As explained in great detail to poloff by a BAGHDAD 00004018 002 OF 002 local sheikh, Iraqis, fear of Iran goes back far beyond the Sunni/Shi,a split to the Babylonian period. According to our interlocutors, the primary (and some feel, the only) deterrent to Iran is the presence of CF in large numbers. Thus, there was virtual unanimity on approval of the SA. Stating that &the ax is already in the head,8 a local campaign manager for Jamal Karbuli,s Reform and Dialogue Movement expressed his view that a quick withdrawal of CF would cause irreparable damage to the country and provide an opportunity for Iran to send agents and possibly soldiers across the border. Many pointed to the 2005 elections and reports that Iran had shipped fraudulent ballots into Iraq. There is concern that Iran will act similarly in the upcoming PC elections. SKEPTICISM OVER IHEC,s IMPARTIALITY ¶7. (SBU) Many people questioned the ability of the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) to act as an impartial and objective administrator, noting that its employees and election monitors are selected by, and have strong allegiances to, the political parties in power. Yet despite generally negative perceptions of IHEC and doubt that the PC elections will be free and fair, there is a sense that they will be more open and transparent than in the past. Additionally, although the list of polling places has yet to be published, many Sunni leaders were skeptical that there would be sufficient locations in non-Shi,a areas, especially since turnout is expected to be high. COMMENT ¶8. (SBU) The trends we have noticed in Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah reflect those evident throughout the country. One name that repeatedly surfaced during conversations with both Sunni and Shi,a leaders (though more often with Sunni) is that of Saleh al-Mutlaq and his National Dialogue Front; Mutlaq has a reputation here as an honest broker and one who acts in the interests of the Iraqi people. Lists sponsored by Ahmed Abu Reesha, Adnan al-Dulaymi and Jamal Kabuli were also popular with Sunni interlocutors, while those supported by PM Maliki and former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari were often mentioned by Shi,a. Contempt and disdain were showered on the main Islamic parties (ISCI, Da,wa and the IIP) and on incumbents, who many feel have not acted in their country's interests. Overall, residents in the area are hopeful that the PC elections in January, followed by those for nahia and qada councils in the summer and the Council of Representatives in the fall, will usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for Iraq and its people. CROCKER