PM VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE ON HOLD FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003977 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2020 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PM VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE ON HOLD FOR NOW REF: BAGHDAD 3744 Classified By: PMIN Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. There is plenty of talk about a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Maliki, but it appears unlikely that his opponents will force action any time soon. There was more discussion about removing Maliki among the Kurdish, Sunni Arab and one Shia Islamist party during the Muslim holiday ten days ago. On December 13-14, leaders from the main political parties dissatisfied with Maliki told us that they plan to give him a chance to make good on the demands outlined in a political reform resolution that the Council of Representatives (CoR) passed on November ¶27. If he obstructs progress on those demands, they vowed to push forward with vote of no confidence. Both Shia and Kurds insist that Maliki will need to demonstrate a good faith effort by January 31 provincial elections. Many contacts also admitted that the main reason for the delay in the vote is that they need more time to reach a consensus on who would replace Maliki. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) The improved security situation has allowed politicians to focus on political rivalries, exposing the fissures in Iraq's national unity government. Protracted US-Iraq Security Agreement negotiations revealed the weakness of Iraq's existing political alliances and the strength of political personalities. One thing the majority of parliamentarians agree upon is their dissatisfaction with the governing style of Prime Minister Maliki. His ouster has been a constant topic among Iraq's political elite. The latest Meetings of President Talabani, Kurdish Region President Barzani and Vice Presidents Abdel Mehdi and Hashimi at Lake Dukhan the second week of December brought speculation in force. -------------- WHAT'S DIFFERENT THIS TIME? -------------- ¶3. (C) Politicians have told us the current talk of unseating Maliki is different than in December 2007 and April 2008. Some perceive that the circumstances are more propitious to move against Maliki soon. For example, on November 24, PUK parliamentarian Friad Rwandzi opined that in December 2007 the CoR had the votes to move forward but that U.S. military was in the midst of a surge and political upheaval would have resulted in Iraq's total destabilization. Now that the security situation has improved greatly, Iraq could weather a change in leadership, he asserted. Meanwhile, the fissures between Maliki's Da'wa and ISCI are probably deeper than ever. ISCI, the largest Shia party in the CoR -- probably would have to be a proactive member of any successful attempt to oust Maliki. Their rivalry intensified starting this summer when ISCI rebuffed Maliki's plans to run on a joint list in provincial elections. ISCI saw this move as a good electoral strategy, while Maliki probably took the decision personally. At the same time, Maliki intensified his efforts to create and finance Support Councils in Shia regions (Reftel),a policy ISCI promptly criticized as unconstitutional, partisan, and undermining provincial governments. ISCI official and Vice President Abdel Mehdi told PMIN December 13 that he largely authored the November 27 political reform resolution. It had garnered 142 votes, including many in ISCI, and it was intended as a clear warning to Maliki, he observed. Although ISCI prefers to keep its quarrel with Maliki out of the media, tensions linger. -------------- NO CONSENSUS FOR PM -------------- Q -------------- ¶4. (C) Many of our political contacts opine that PM front-runners are Vice President Adil Abd al-Mehdi and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Mehdi has been the bridesmaid for the last three PM contests. Losing to PM Jafari by one vote in December 2005 was a huge blow for his political party ISCI and its alliance with the Kurds. Adel Mehdi is considered competent and western-user friendly although his party, ISCI, maintains close ties with Iranian officials. Adel Mehdi strongly and publicly supported the US-Iraq Security Agreement. Gaining the trust of Sunni parties will be his largest barrier to the premiership. On December 14, ISCI senior advisor Haitham al-Husseini told PolOff that the Sunni Arabs still do not accept Dr. Adil, and that ISCI will not BAGHDAD 00003977 002 OF 003 support a vote of no confidence unless Dr. Adil is the PM candidate. ¶5. (C) Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi aches to once again be Prime Minister. Some of our Kurdish contacts, especially those high up in Barzani's KDP party, also tell us in private they would support him. Allawi's Iraqiyya party espouses a vision of a secular, moderate Iraq. Allawi has two big weaknesses, however. He has not vested much time or effort in going after the position, instead spending much time in Jordan and London. In addition, parliamentarian Safia Suhail told us this autumn that she left Iraqiyya because Allawi still associates with Baathists. This too is a reason why the Communist Party of Iraq's Hamid Moussa left Iraqiyya. ¶6. (C) On December 14, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Representative Rowsch Shaways told PolOff that the Kurds would be satisfied with either Abdel Mehdi or Allawi. But KRG Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein chimed in that with Allawi a red line for ISCI and Abdel Medhi a red line for Iraq Islamic Party (IIP),there is no consensus PM candidate. Kurdish parliamentary bloc leader Fuad Masum told PMIN December 11 that it would be hard to remove Maliki in the absence of an agreed successor. In the meantime, he concluded, Maliki's enemies will just keep talking and waiting. On December 1, Shia Independent Jabir Habib Jabir told PolOff that there simply aren't the CoR votes (139) to secure one or the other. Jabir argued that the Kurds should be extremely reluctant to initiate anything, and despite tensions between ISCI and Da'wa, he doubted that ISCI would participate in any vote. As for the other parties who may wish to pursue this, Jabir posited that the PM could pluck them off one by one ("a ministry for Saleh al-Mutlaq and Hewar," for example). Jabir said that the upcoming provincial elections will answer a lot of questions about the PM's popularity. He added that he would not be surprised if the PM fared well, which in turn could heavily influence the next national elections. -------------- FOR LACK OF A BETTER ALTERNATIVE - WAIT -------------- ¶7. (C) Hanging up the phone with President Talabani on December 9, PUK Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih relayed to EmbOffs that Talabani, Barzani, Abdel Mehdi and Hashimi are "not eager right now for change and that the top politicians are open to reform." Salih added that if there is a genuine chance or reform, they should try it. On December 13, Abdel Mehdi told PMIN that these four leaders would first try to secure Maliki's approval to implement the November 28 political reform program. Only if Maliki refused or made promises not kept, Abdel Mehdi, said, would there be a concerted effort to bring a no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister. (Hashimi said basically the same thing to PMIN on December 13, but with more venom against the Prime Minister.) On December 14, KRG President Masoud Barzani told PolOff that both ISCI and the Kurdish Alliance are willing to give Maliki a chance to adopt policies in the political reform resolution before charging ahead with a vote of no confidence. He reminded PolOff about when the CoR voted House Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani out of power and Tawafuq offered no viable alternates. In the end, Mashadani was allowed to continue as Speaker. Barzani said they cannot risk having just anyone taking Maliki's place. On December 15, Iraqiyya's Husam al-Azzawi suggested that many of the blocs would like to use the threat of a no-confidence vote to bring about a Qto use the threat of a no-confidence vote to bring about a cabinet reshuffle, which he indicated might be a better alternative. -------------- U.S. HAVE A VOTE? -------------- ¶8. (C) Some Iraqi politicos may well seek American counsel before they would act against Maliki. On December 11, Iraqiyya's Medhi Hafedh told PolOff that Iraqis won't try to remove Maliki without the blessing of the U.S. However, noting that U.S. influence in Iraq is diminishing, on December 11, KDP Industry Minister Fawzi Hariri told PolOff that unseating Maliki is purely an internal matter. He added that once the political elite comes to a consensus on the replacement candidate, the vote could happen very fast. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) If the Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Shia enemies of Maliki were to succeed in a vote of no-confidence against him, it would likely paralyze the Iraqi central government for months. Previous experience in 2005 and 2006 suggests that the Iraqi political blocs would negotiate ferociously for BAGHDAD 00003977 003 OF 003 cabinet seats. The Embassy has warned them that such paralysis would be very damaging. In any case, given the lack of a clear successor (much less agreement on other cabinet slots),we doubt a no-confidence vote will go forward before the provincial elections unless Maliki stirs up some new confrontation. The circumstances might change after the provincial elections. For example, if Maliki's Da'wa performs well in those elections, ISCI might judge that it was Maliki's position as prime minister that unfairly swayed the electorate. ISCI, then, might have a new incentive to seek his ouster beginning in early February. CROCKER