KEY BABIL SHEIKH ON SUNNI PERSPECTIVES, BABIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003932 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON IZ SUBJECT: KEY BABIL SHEIKH ON SUNNI PERSPECTIVES, BABIL POLITICS AND RELATIONS WITH U.S. Classified By: PRT Babil Team Leader Ken Hillas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (U) This is a PRT Babil message. ¶1. Summary (C) In a two-hour meeting on December 10 with PRT Leader and DCG-S, Sunni Sheikh Adnan Janabi painted a largely positive picture of the Sunni community's outlook in Babil. His candidate slate of largely Sunni tribal sheikhs has engaged in discussions with a wide variety of other parties about post-election alliances in the new Provincial Council (PC). These include former Governor Iskander Witwit's Babil Independents list, the Qais al-Mamoury list (formed by the relatives of former Provincial Director of Police Qais who was murdered one year ago) and some minor south Hillah tribal parties. Underscoring the bridging of sectarian divisions, Sheikh Adnan said his slate was even holding talks with Da'wa, which he described as seeking to reach beyond its traditional religious Shi'a voter base. He predicted that his Sunni tribal slate would win 3-6 seats in the new 30-person PC. He also welcomed what he described as Prime Minister Maliki's efforts to become a national leader transcending sectarian divisions. End summary. Babil Sunnis Optimistic About SA, Elections -------------- ¶2. (C) Sunni attitudes are firming up in the wake of the Security Agreement's (SA) approval and the realization that the upcoming elections hold the prospect for gaining a real voice in provincial affairs. The Sunni community in Babil and in other parts of the Center-South was more confident about the future than at any time in the last five years. Al-Qaeda Iraq, which Sheikh Adnan labeled as a foreign entity, had been decisively rejected, even if the related Jaysh al-Islam group still had a small following among some Iraqi Sunnis. He said that the latter could only plant bombs and was not capable of actually exercising influence in the Sunni community. These developments were complemented by positive trends in economic growth, security, and the emergence of the tribal Support Councils (SC). Adnan gave a positive assessment of SCs in Babil and more broadly, saying that they could help counteract Iranian influence. He said that the problems the Diyala Sunni community has faced recently in its relations with the ISF and GOI were specific to that province and did not reflect broader problems in 
Babil or elsewhere. ¶3. (C) The approval of the SA had created a sense that Iraqis were beginning to take back their country, a development that Sheikh Adnan identified as crucial to building public support for a redefined security structure in the region. His father, a Minister to King Abdullah, had been an advocate of CENTO. Sheikh Adnan advocated a similar initiative now that would place Iraq's security in a broader regional framework and could also offer an avenue for engaging the Iranians. Oil, Revenues, and GOI Spending -------------- ¶4. (C) Sheikh Adnan predicted that GOI spending in 2009 would remain close to 2008 levels, despite the drop in oil revenue. He said this was due to Iraq's foreign currency reserves, a preparedness to engage in deficit spending and political necessities during a "year of elections," referring to provincial, local and parliamentary elections, together with possible referenda and constitutional amendments that may also be put to a vote. ISCI Prospects -------------- ¶5. (C) In Adnan's view, the limited amount of political violence in Babil thus far in the election season can be attributed to the fact that ISCI still thinks it has a chance Qattributed to the fact that ISCI still thinks it has a chance to win. When it wakes up to the fact that it cannot, it could become desperate. The sheikh said that ISCI will not give up power willingly, and pointed to the post-election period, when there could be political violence and coercion prior to the sitting of the new PC. Still, he maintained that no one political party had the ability to steal the election across the board. Each party was likely to attempt election fraud, but with limited success. The net result, in his view, would be for the frauds to cancel each other out. He predicted that Governor Salim, whom he characterized as "completely useless," would not be returned to office. He expressed respect, however, for ISCI Regional Coordinator Sayid Hafez Al-Yaseri, whom he said was not an Iranian client. Need for Continued U.S. Presence BAGHDAD 00003932 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) Lastly, Sheikh Adnan, arguably the most influential Sunni Sheikh in the province, spoke passionately about the need for a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq -- more than a token one. In his view, Coalition Forces had to continue to mentor the ISF while helping keep the Iraqi ship of state on an even keel, even as domestic politics evolved. In this regard, he contrasted Da'wa's desire to centralize power in Baghdad with ISCI's preference for devolving power to the provinces. That contradiction made the long-term continuation of the United Iraqi Alliance unlikely, Sheikh Adnan concluded, a development that he said would be good for Iraq. CROCKER