BASRA RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES SHARE COMMON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003929 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018 TAGS: KIRF PGOV KDEM PHUM IZ SUBJECT: BASRA RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES SHARE COMMON CONCERNS AND OPTIMISM REF: BAGHDAD 2242 Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Senior Advisor Gordon Gray and REO Director met with leaders of Basra's minority Christian, Sunni, and ethnic African communities during three separate meetings November 30 to December 2. Leaders of all three communities called for job creation, expressed caution toward regionalism, and shared a concern over Iranian influence in upcoming provincial elections. Improvements in security and the political process have raised optimism among their ranks. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a recent trip to Basra, Gray engaged local minority leaders in discussions on social challenges and political concerns. On November 30, he met with Basra Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Deputy and Sunni Endowment member Jasim Ahmad Jasim. Jasim's two organizations represent the majority of Sunni interests in Basra. On December 1, Gray traveled to Saint Efram Christian Kindergarten, where he greeted the school's 200 children and met with Chaldean Bishop Father Emad Aziz al-Banna (reftel). The following day, Gray met Talal Jalal Diyaab Thajeer and Haleem Faraj al-Obadi of the Iraqi Freedom Movement (IFM),a party established to defend the rights of Iraqis of African descent, whose numbers they estimate at two million. -------------- Jobs -------------- ¶3. (C) In the discussions, all three leaders identified unemployment as their primary concern and called for government action. Father Emad pointed out that many Christians, like Sunnis, had been forced out of Basra to search for work in recent years. While these displaced were now ready to return, jobs and, increasingly, housing, are hard to find. Father Emad further explained that the number of Christian families in Basra had been cut nearly in half since 2003, leaving just 600 today. (Note: Sunni emigration from Basra has been estimated at 50 to 70 percent since 2003. End note.) Although conceding that security had previously been the main concern, he clarified that jobs were now paramount. Obadi echoed the call for jobs, claiming that Iraqi officials had not been responsive to his party,s demands. When pressed on the issue, however, Obadi -- a Sunni -- acknowledged that his people were generally treated well by the Shi'a and that there was no discrimination in the provision of general services. -------------- Regionalism -------------- ¶4. (C) Jasim, Father Emad, and Obadi agreed that it was not time for Basra to entertain regional aspirations. All conceded, however, that they could be convinced to support such a move given different provincial leadership or circumstances. Jasim feared that regional rule would deprive minority groups of their rights, obviously preferring that Basra not cut ties with Sunni areas of the country. All three leaders rejected the idea of a nine-province region, declaring it to be religiously motivated by Shi'a who want to transfer power and leadership from Basra to Najaf. ¶5. (C) Jasim clarified that, even though his party could be convinced to support a region, regional power would need to be limited in order to avoid likely abuse. Father Emad stated that regionalism was a good idea, but the time was not right. In Obadi's view, IFM would support a region if necessary, but they prefer a unified Iraq. -------------- Elections -------------- ¶6. (C) The three minority leaders were all cautiously optimistic regarding upcoming elections, and shared concern over possible Iranian influence and corruption. Jasim Qover possible Iranian influence and corruption. Jasim credited improved security for allowing Sunnis to participate in the elections this time, as opposed to 2005. He expects voter turnout to be fairly high and speculates his party could gain as many as three seats. Father Emad applauded the adoption of Article 50 of the Provincial Elections Law, which reserves a Christian seat on the Basrawi Provincial Council. Obadi lamented his party's lack of funds and described its BAGHDAD 00003929 002 OF 002 alliance with the Sunni National Dialogue Front (NDF) as financially motivated. IFM will post eight candidates on the NDF ballot, with the leading IFM candidate listed third on the NDF list. Obadi hopes the move will draw attention to his cause. Ultimately, IFM hopes to gain a seat in government by means of a quota system. ¶7. (C) Jasim predicted relative success for ISCI, SAS, and Sadrist parties. He explained that the public is turning away from parties with Iranian links, leading parties such as ISCI and SAS to make efforts to mask their associations. He feared these efforts would likely prove successful, given the confusingly large number of parties and candidate lists. Jasim fears corruption and malfeasance, and praised Basra's Law Support Council Committee for eliciting commitments from all parties to free and fair elections. Obadi strongly criticized foreign political intervention, especially from Iran, and accused some IHEC members of accepting bribes. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Although quite diverse, these minority groups show remarkably similar concerns -- jobs, fear of a "super-region" under Shi'a control from Najaf, election fraud, and Iranian influence. It is significant that job creation, not discrimination, was the leaders' primary concern. In fact, the leaders presented very few contemporary accounts of discrimination and related mostly historical anecdotes. In Basra, there are real signs of tolerance and religious/ethnic mixing: the vast majority of students in Father Emad's Christian school are Muslim; one of the IFM representatives was Sunni, the other Shi'a; and most Basrawis of African descent live in mixed-race neighborhoods. In a province with a jobless rate of approximately 60 per cent, unemployment is not unique to minority groups. ¶9. (C) Regional identity appears to supersede sectarian and ethnic tensions in Basra. All three leaders admitted they might support a region in the future, although further discussion revealed a lack of basic knowledge on the issue. The one certainty is that they do not want a nine-province region because they fear Shi'a control. Finally, all three leaders notably downplayed security concerns, which may confirm much-improved security since Charge-of-the-Knights, and a new confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. End comment. CROCKER