SADR CITY: WITH U.S. COMBAT TROOP DRAWDOWN AHEAD,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003905


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2013
TAGS: PGOV IZ PREL
SUBJECT: SADR CITY: WITH U.S. COMBAT TROOP DRAWDOWN AHEAD,
WHAT'S NEXT?

Classified By: Deputy Polcouns John Fox, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraq's Sadr City, home to almost 40 percent
of Baghdad's total population of five million, has benefited
from dramatically improved security since last spring's joint
coalition and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) efforts to stabilize
the area. The area also stands, since then, as a tale of two
cities: the 20 percent of residents located on the U.S. side
of a five meter high concrete wall -- and the great majority
of sectors on the other side. U.S. reconstruction funds have
steadily flowed into the coalition sector since combat
operations ended; on the wall's other side, however, promised
GoI funds largely have not. Overall militia activity has
diminished, with many contacts describing JAM as
"disorganized" -- while still an omnipresent threat. Local
leaders have warned that, should ISF not be strong enough to
maintain security if/when U.S. combat forces depart by June
2009 (in accordance with the Security Agreement, SA),
violence might erupt again. Sadr City thus looms as a key
test case of SA implementation. END SUMMARY.

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THE FIGHT, THEN THE WALL
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2. (C) Sadr City, scene of intense fighting between
coalition/ISF and Shia militias in 2004, and from March
through May 2008, has seen improved security since that time.
The construction of a 4,000 meter long wall across the
district stands as the most visible reminder of the battle.
The wall enabled coalition forces to end the easy movement of
JAM and Special Group criminal fighters into the district,s
southern portion, from which they launched rockets against
the International Zone. At the same time, the barrier has
bisected the poverty-stricken, sprawling neighborhood -- with
approximately 20 percent of the city on the southern side
(home to CF) and the remainder to the north, an area
patrolled exclusively by ISF. (Note: MOI reestablished a
police force in Sadr City, but most patrols are still
conducted by IA units. End note.) This new IP force has yet
to be tested, with most Sadr City residents readily
acknowledging that past police had been extensively
infiltrated by JAM.

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PROJECTS: OUR MONEY
VERSUS IRAQI FUNDS
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3. (C) CERP-funded projects dominate the southern portion of
Sadr City, where an estimated USD 43.2 million has been spent
in various sectors, including almost USD 11,000 per day for
trash collection. USG-funded projects include 17 sewer, 30
school, 27 electric, 18 trash, seven health, and eight
economic development projects. Promised GOI disbursements
for the much more populous northern side, however, have not
been as forthcoming. Initially, the Prime Minister and other
GOI leaders had pledged the launch of USD 100 million in new
projects. The GOI's follow through has been limited,
according to district-level leaders, who complain that
ministry representatives charged with Sadr City development
do not coordinate with them in setting priorities, let alone
in spending.

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MILITIAS: DISORGANIZED
AND / OR JUST PATIENT?
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4. (C) Militia activity in Sadr City has been limited since
the cease-fire, with only sporadic incidents targeting CF and
ISF units. Prior to a December 3 District Advisory Council
QISF units. Prior to a December 3 District Advisory Council
(DAC) meeting, Chairman Hassan Shama estimated that 100
militia members were active within each sector of Sadr (there
are 79 sectors in all) -- a figure that would put the total
at around 8,000. (Note: U.S. forces believe Shama's figures
misstate the problem. The number of fighters, particularly
the hard core, is probably much smaller than he believes.
Moreover, many of them are inactive. End note.) Shama
added, "only the DAC is not controlled by militias." In
public comments during the weekly DAC meeting, the chairman
predicted that if U.S. forces withdraw from Sadr City in June
2009, the city "will fall back to the black situation" of
militia control. The IA brigade commander countered that the
IA units would "serve the people" and that the militias would
"never come back."



5. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear which assessment is the more
accurate. The DAC Chairman has an interest in keeping U.S.
troops within the city perimeter. The IA units in Sadr City,
moreover, have established an effective presence throughout
the district. They cooperate actively with coalition forces
in pursuing targets and, increasingly, have launched
important civil affairs programs. To be sure, problems
remain, not least with the discipline of some troops
responsible for manning checkpoints. Moreover, a
cross-section of Sadr residents (contractors, laborers,
officials),while telling Poloff of their general confidence
in the Iraqi army's performance in the city, also flagged
concerns that the ISF will require continued CF support to
beat back any possible future challenge by JAM militias. One
resident, a teacher, cited reported IA links in north Sadr
City between IA units and criminal gangs. Coordination
between CF and the IA appears strong on the U.S. side of the
wall, but limited on the other side to targeted actions. The
newly reestablished IP represent a step forward, but it is
too early to tell how effective a security presence they will
be. END COMMENT.


6. (U) One local Sadr resident, who has an established
relationship with the Embassy, reported seeing open JAM
graffiti in city streets, including the following militia
messages:

-"A pause and we will be right back"
-"Long live JAM, we will not bow down to you"
-"Keep your children away from the Iraqi Army"
- and, "Shoot and scoot"
- with IA graffiti response as: "we will keep you so busy you
won't be able to close your eyes"

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WHAT WILL THE SA BRING?
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7. (C) A majority of residents with whom Poloff and a Human
Terrain Team member spoke admitted little, if any, knowledge
about what the Security Agreement (SA) will mean for Sadr
City (i.e., that U.S. combat forces will leave the area by
June 2009). Most urged the U.S. to explain the SA details,
in order to close the large gap in understanding among Sadr's
largely illiterate residents. All roundly complained that
the GoI had been mostly silent on the matter and the
implications for any continuing security "partnership" with
the U.S. Several contacts -- three day laborers, a school
contractor, and one Iraqi soldier -- said the people wanted a
continued U.S. presence beyond next June in order to
reinforce recent security gains; only one, a contractor,
thought that the "test" posed by a pullback was needed, so
that Iraqis could no longer "point fingers" at Americans and
continue to lay blame.

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COMMENT: WHAT'S NEXT?
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8. (C) Sadr City's recent security gains appear to be the
result of the continuing presence of U.S. troops in the city
(albeit on the outskirts),the wall itself, and an active IA
presence in areas that lie beyond. The near invisibility of
central government reconstruction attention to the area --
limited investment and not enough follow-through on promised
allocations -- will likely only deepen the area's cynicism
toward the Al Maliki government in the months ahead. Whether
today's improved security situation holds as coalition combat
forces withdraw will be a key test of the implementation of
the SA in Baghdad's most populous and historically volatile
Qthe SA in Baghdad's most populous and historically volatile
district.


CROCKER