SADR CITY: WITH U.S. COMBAT TROOP DRAWDOWN AHEAD,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003905 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2013 TAGS: PGOV IZ PREL SUBJECT: SADR CITY: WITH U.S. COMBAT TROOP DRAWDOWN AHEAD, WHAT'S NEXT? Classified By: Deputy Polcouns John Fox, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraq's Sadr City, home to almost 40 percent of Baghdad's total population of five million, has benefited from dramatically improved security since last spring's joint coalition and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) efforts to stabilize the area. The area also stands, since then, as a tale of two cities: the 20 percent of residents located on the U.S. side of a five meter high concrete wall -- and the great majority of sectors on the other side. U.S. reconstruction funds have steadily flowed into the coalition sector since combat operations ended; on the wall's other side, however, promised GoI funds largely have not. Overall militia activity has diminished, with many contacts describing JAM as "disorganized" -- while still an omnipresent threat. Local leaders have warned that, should ISF not be strong enough to maintain security if/when U.S. combat forces depart by June 2009 (in accordance with the Security Agreement, SA), violence might erupt again. Sadr City thus looms as a key test case of SA implementation. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE FIGHT, THEN THE WALL -------------- ¶2. (C) Sadr City, scene of intense fighting between coalition/ISF and Shia militias in 2004, and from March through May 2008, has seen improved security since that time. The construction of a 4,000 meter long wall across the district stands as the most visible reminder of the battle. The wall enabled coalition forces to end the easy movement of JAM and Special Group criminal fighters into the district,s southern portion, from which they launched rockets against the International Zone. At the same time, the barrier has bisected the poverty-stricken, sprawling neighborhood -- with approximately 20 percent of the city on the southern side (home to CF) and the remainder to the north, an area patrolled exclusively by ISF. (Note: MOI reestablished a police force in Sadr City, but most patrols are still conducted by IA units. End note.) This new IP force has yet to be tested, with most Sadr City residents readily acknowledging that past police had been extensively infiltrated by JAM. -------------- PROJECTS: OUR MONEY VERSUS IRAQI FUNDS -------------- ¶3. (C) CERP-funded projects dominate the southern portion of Sadr City, where an estimated USD 43.2 million has been spent in various sectors, including almost USD 11,000 per day for trash collection. USG-funded projects include 17 sewer, 30 school, 27 electric, 18 trash, seven health, and eight economic development projects. Promised GOI disbursements for the much more populous northern side, however, have not been as forthcoming. Initially, the Prime Minister and other GOI leaders had pledged the launch of USD 100 million in new projects. The GOI's follow through has been limited, according to district-level leaders, who complain that ministry representatives charged with Sadr City development do not coordinate with them in setting priorities, let alone in spending. -------------- MILITIAS: DISORGANIZED AND / OR JUST PATIENT? -------------- ¶4. (C) Militia activity in Sadr City has been limited since the cease-fire, with only sporadic incidents targeting CF and ISF units. Prior to a December 3 District Advisory Council QISF units. Prior to a December 3 District Advisory Council (DAC) meeting, Chairman Hassan Shama estimated that 100 militia members were active within each sector of Sadr (there are 79 sectors in all) -- a figure that would put the total at around 8,000. (Note: U.S. forces believe Shama's figures misstate the problem. The number of fighters, particularly the hard core, is probably much smaller than he believes. Moreover, many of them are inactive. End note.) Shama added, "only the DAC is not controlled by militias." In public comments during the weekly DAC meeting, the chairman predicted that if U.S. forces withdraw from Sadr City in June 2009, the city "will fall back to the black situation" of militia control. The IA brigade commander countered that the IA units would "serve the people" and that the militias would "never come back." ¶5. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear which assessment is the more accurate. The DAC Chairman has an interest in keeping U.S. troops within the city perimeter. The IA units in Sadr City, moreover, have established an effective presence throughout the district. They cooperate actively with coalition forces in pursuing targets and, increasingly, have launched important civil affairs programs. To be sure, problems remain, not least with the discipline of some troops responsible for manning checkpoints. Moreover, a cross-section of Sadr residents (contractors, laborers, officials),while telling Poloff of their general confidence in the Iraqi army's performance in the city, also flagged concerns that the ISF will require continued CF support to beat back any possible future challenge by JAM militias. One resident, a teacher, cited reported IA links in north Sadr City between IA units and criminal gangs. Coordination between CF and the IA appears strong on the U.S. side of the wall, but limited on the other side to targeted actions. The newly reestablished IP represent a step forward, but it is too early to tell how effective a security presence they will be. END COMMENT. ¶6. (U) One local Sadr resident, who has an established relationship with the Embassy, reported seeing open JAM graffiti in city streets, including the following militia messages: -"A pause and we will be right back" -"Long live JAM, we will not bow down to you" -"Keep your children away from the Iraqi Army" - and, "Shoot and scoot" - with IA graffiti response as: "we will keep you so busy you won't be able to close your eyes" -------------- WHAT WILL THE SA BRING? -------------- ¶7. (C) A majority of residents with whom Poloff and a Human Terrain Team member spoke admitted little, if any, knowledge about what the Security Agreement (SA) will mean for Sadr City (i.e., that U.S. combat forces will leave the area by June 2009). Most urged the U.S. to explain the SA details, in order to close the large gap in understanding among Sadr's largely illiterate residents. All roundly complained that the GoI had been mostly silent on the matter and the implications for any continuing security "partnership" with the U.S. Several contacts -- three day laborers, a school contractor, and one Iraqi soldier -- said the people wanted a continued U.S. presence beyond next June in order to reinforce recent security gains; only one, a contractor, thought that the "test" posed by a pullback was needed, so that Iraqis could no longer "point fingers" at Americans and continue to lay blame. -------------- COMMENT: WHAT'S NEXT? -------------- ¶8. (C) Sadr City's recent security gains appear to be the result of the continuing presence of U.S. troops in the city (albeit on the outskirts),the wall itself, and an active IA presence in areas that lie beyond. The near invisibility of central government reconstruction attention to the area -- limited investment and not enough follow-through on promised allocations -- will likely only deepen the area's cynicism toward the Al Maliki government in the months ahead. Whether today's improved security situation holds as coalition combat forces withdraw will be a key test of the implementation of the SA in Baghdad's most populous and historically volatile Qthe SA in Baghdad's most populous and historically volatile district. CROCKER