KURDISH WAR OF WORDS WITH MALIKI ESCALATES OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003808

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH WAR OF WORDS WITH MALIKI ESCALATES OVER
PM'S TRIBAL SUPPORT COUNCILS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS 1.4
(b) and (b).


1. (C) Summary/Comment: A war of words between Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG),precipitated by Maliki's plan to create Tribal Support
Councils in areas disputed by the KRG and the GOI, has
steadily escalated in the past week, drawing attention to a
range of differences between the KRG and the GOI. The Kurds'
concerns parallel those of the Shi'a Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq (ISCI),who share the fear that Maliki's Support
Councils are intended to project Maliki's Dawa party's
influence at
the expense of its rivals. It is unlikely that this rhetoric
will lead to military conflict. However, the prominent
public airing of KRG grievances, Maliki's responses and
piling on by other parties could lead to a no-confidence vote
in the Maliki government and a resulting paralysis of
government. End Summary/Comment.

GOI Plan for Support Councils; KRG, ISCI Opposition
-------------- --------------


2. (C) What began as a controversy over Prime Minister
Maliki's plan to develop Support Councils last summer and his
insistence on implementing that plan in the face of
opposition from Kurds and his own Shi'a Coalition ally ISCI,
has escalated in the past weeks into a heated war of words.
This rhetorical crisis was precipitated by Maliki's plan to
extend Tribal Support Councils, ostensibly a mechanism for
government delivery of resources to tribal leaders in the
provinces, to areas in the central and southern parts of the
county, where Maliki claims to have created them to gain
support for the political process and national reconciliation
(Note: Opponents of the Support Councils claim Maliki is
using them to advance narrow
partisan or sectarian interests. End Note) On November 18,
the Iraq Presidency Council (President Talabani, Vice
President Hashimi and Vice President Mahdi) called on Maliki
to terminate his plan to establish Support Councils, which
are run through the Prime Minister's Office, and, instead, to
organize tribal support for Iraqi security agencies. The
letter - which leaked to the press - asserted that creation
of the councils was unnecessary given the improved security
situation. It also said that the Iraqi leadership had not
agreed on the scope, policies or future of such councils.
The Kurds and ISCI have asserted that without involvement of
parliament, the cabinet or provincial governments, the
creation of such councils was illegal. In fact, ISCI heir
apparent Ammar al-Hakim slammed the TSCs as
"unconstitutional" in an October discussion with PMin.


3. (C) Strong Kurdish opposition to Support Councils came in
the wake of the tense KRG-GOI standoff in Khanaqin in August
over what the KRG interpreted as an effort by Maliki to
establish a military presence in a disputed city. The KRG
interpreted Maliki's plan to establish Support Councils in
disputed areas such as Kirkuk as another means of creating a
military presence there loyal to Baghdad against the Kurds.
Similarly, on September 24 ISCI issued the first major public
rebuke of Maliki's Support Councils in a a statement that
characterized the TSCs as a partisan ploy to favor Da'wa.
ISCI said that Da'wa intended to use the state to buy tribes
and support for its party and intended to create a dual
government.

Maliki Responds
--------------


4. (C) Maliki answered his critics in a November 20 press
conference, accusing the Kurdish leadership of violating the
Iraqi constitution by signing oil contracts with foreign
QIraqi constitution by signing oil contracts with foreign
countries. Then, in a letter to Talabani dated November 27,
and made public on December 3, Maliki said that the Support
Councils were meant to form a part of a fragile Iraqi
security system for which the Prime Minister, and not the
Presidency, was constitutionally responsible. He argued
that to act differently -- to consult the Presidency --
violated the constitution, would impede work and paralyze the
state. He said that Iraqi army and police were incapable of
imposing the rule of law without the support offered by
tribal councils now and by
the support councils at later stage. Addressing Kurdish
concerns that the councils would be armed, Maliki stated that
he had not provided Support Councils with any guns, rifles or
bullets. Maliki accused Talabani of leaking the Presidency
Council's November 18 complaint and said that had forced him
to respond.

KRG Raises the Stakes
--------------


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5. (C) The KRG responded December 1 to Maliki's press
conference, after holding its fire to avoid complicating the
passage of the SoFA ratification law, a bill both the KRG and
Maliki supported. The KRG stated that Maliki intended to
suspend the constitution to effect a more highly centralized
government, impose the decision of one party to the exclusion
of other parties in the coalition, militarize the country by
using the Iraqi army for political purposes, and establish
political groups armed and funded by the government.
Specifically, the KRG accused Maliki of trying to create
groups to support the Prime Minister in disputed areas. To
do so, the government was enlisting former collaborators who,
armed and paid for
by the federal government, would destabilize and sow
dissension in the Kurdistan Region. The KRG said that
whether the Support Councils were constitutional was a
question to be decided by either the Council of
Representatives (CoR),the Presidency Council or the Federal
Supreme Court. Raising the stakes, and linking
Maliki's action on Support Councils to other KRG grievances
against the GOI, the KRG asserted that the GOI's attempt to
send in the Iraqi Army and create Support Councils in Article
140, the constitutional provision for resolving disputed
areas. It charged that the Khanaqin incident was never about
security, but rather was an attempt to change the facts on
the ground and bypass the constitution.


6. (C) President Talabani, in a December 1 press conference
in Kurdistan, was less confrontational, saying that Maliki
was his friend, still enjoyed the confidence of the
parliament and the main Iraqi forces, and had made some
positive achievements and possibly some negative ones. He
added that criticism of Maliki should be made through
official channels and that disputes should not be aired in
the media. But at the same time Talabani noted that Maliki's
insistence that Support Councils were legal would have to be
tested in the constitutional court.

Maliki's Move?
--------------


7. (C) Commenting on the recent heightened rhetoric between
the KRG and the PM, Maliki's Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah
told the DCM December 3 he was surprised Talabani had decided
to publish the Presidency Council letter critical of Support
Councils and claimed Talabani at first favored the Support
Councils. Abdullah claimed the Maliki Government had
specifically avoided contacting northern tribes that oppose
the KDP or PUK. Abdullah said that the Implementation and
Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) --
the body directly under the Prime Minister responsible for
the Support Councils -- included Shi'a,
Sunnis and Kurds. Abdullah insisted that Support Councils
were not an election tool for Da'wa as ISCI claims. The
Support Councils were designed to support the "government,"
not a specific party. Abdullah stressed the need to solve
the controversy of Support Councils behind closed doors,
rather
than escalating the public accusations.


8. (C) But criticism of Maliki is on the rise: Vice
President Adil Abd al-Mahdi complained to the Ambassador
December 1 of Maliki's increasing reluctance to consult other
(non Da'wa) Iraqi leaders and said hE+,QAQQ%9QQto draw
more attention to Maliki's misdeeds. In the presence of KRG
President Barzani, they joked that "the Barzani-Maliki
divorce is being dealt with by their lawyers." KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani told PolOff that the KDP hopes
Maliki will try to defend himself via the press.
On December 3, Fuad Hussein intimated that the public feud
lays more groundwork for "a political transition." Many
politicos here perceive the heightened rhetoric is the start
of a move to unseat Maliki. Many in the Kurdish political
bloc perceives that Maliki is not serious about implementing
the provisions of the constitution to solve the outstanding
issues of disputed areas, displaced Kurdish populations,
security and
oil. Many in Maliki's Shia Islamist Coalition partner,
meanwhile, feel Maliki is not sharing power with ISCI. ISCI
sees its alliance with the Kurds, founded on similar
positions on federalism, as an essential pillar of Iraq's
political landscape but has been reluctant to openly break
with Da'wa or risk undermining its standing on the Shia
street, even though ISCI and Da'wa are currently competing
for upcoming
provincial elections. Maliki's Support Councils are
increasingly stressing ISCI's partnership with Da'wa,
since ISCI perceives them as undermining its advantage in
southern provincial government and security posts.



10. (C) We do not perceive that a move to unseat Maliki in
the near future is inevitable. Independent Kurdish Coalition
MP Mahmoud Othman told us December 1 that only when one
reaches a crisis does the solution begin to emerge. He noted
that the heightened rhetoric between Maliki and the
Kurds/ISCI notwithstanding, the work of the "Five
Committees," (the committees established in early October by
the PUK, DPK,
ISCI, and Da'wa and including the IIP to address common
issues of concern) continues. Deputy Prime Minister Barhem
Salih told the Ambassador November 29 that the particular
committee charged with developing solutions to the disputed
territories issue had agreed on a way forward. Moreover the
main blocs all agreed during the SoFA vote negotiations in
parliament to expand the committees to include other parties.
It may be that the difficulty of choosing a new prime
minister, and the hope that ongoing quiet discussions will
develop agreed ways forward on issues like power sharing, may
ultimately enable Maliki to dodge the bullet over the next
weeks at least.
CROCKER

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the Support Councils, the KDP is indeed expecting to draw
more attention to Maliki's misdeeds. In the presence of KRG
President Barzani, they joked that "the Barzani-Maliki
divorce is being dealt with by their lawyers." KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani told PolOff that the KDP hopes
Maliki will try to defend himself via the press.
On December 3, Fuad Hussein intimated that the public feud
lays more groundwork for "a political transition." Many
politicos here perceive the heightened rhetoric is the start
of a move to unseat Maliki. Many in the Kurdish political
bloc perceives that Maliki is not serious about implementing
the provisions of the constitution to solve the outstanding
issues of disputed areas, displaced Kurdish populations,
security and
oil. Many in Maliki's Shia Islamist Coalition partner,
meanwhile, feel Maliki is not sharing power with ISCI. ISCI
sees its alliance with the Kurds, founded on similar
positions on federalism, as an essential pillar of Iraq's
political landscape but has been reluctant to openly break
with Da'wa or risk undermining its standing on the Shia
street, even though ISCI and Da'wa are currently competing
for upcoming
provincial elections. Maliki's Support Councils are
increasingly stressing ISCI's partnership with Da'wa,
since ISCI perceives them as undermining its advantage in
southern provincial government and security posts.



10. (C) We do not perceive that a move to unseat Maliki in
the near future is inevitable. Independent Kurdish Coalition
MP Mahmoud Othman told us December 1 that only when one
reaches a crisis does the solution begin to emerge. He noted
that the heightened rhetoric between Maliki and the
Kurds/ISCI notwithstanding, the work of the "Five
Committees," (the committees established in early October by
the PUK, DPK,
ISCI, and Da'wa and including the IIP to address common
issues of concern) continues. Deputy Prime Minister Barhem
Salih told the Ambassador November 29 that the particular
committee charged with developing solutions to the disputed
territories issue had agreed on a way forward. Moreover the
main blocs all agreed during the SoFA vote negotiations in
parliament to expand the committees to include other parties.
It may be that the difficulty of choosing a new prime
minister, and the hope that ongoing quiet discussions will
develop agreed ways forward on issues like power sharing, may
ultimately enable Maliki to dodge the bullet over the next
weeks at least.
CROCKER