Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3793
2008-12-03 13:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TURKISH-IRAQ-U.S. TRILATERAL SECURITY TALKS: FIRST

Tags:  IZ TU PREL MARR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7405
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3793/01 3381346
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031346Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0672
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0537
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0033
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0079
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003793 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: IZ TU PREL MARR
SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRAQ-U.S. TRILATERAL SECURITY TALKS: FIRST
WORKING GROUP MAKES SLOW PROGRESS

REF: BAGHDAD 3710

Classified By: POL-MIL Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003793 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018 TAGS: IZ TU PREL MARR SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRAQ-U.S. TRILATERAL SECURITY TALKS: FIRST WORKING GROUP MAKES SLOW PROGRESS REF: BAGHDAD 3710 Classified By: POL-MIL Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi, Turkish and U.S. officials met November 29 in Baghdad to discuss modalities of the trilateral Turkey-Iraq-U.S. security committee/working group established at the November 19 ministerial security trilat (reftel). The failure of Kurdish Regional Government and Iraqi Border Enforcement delegates to attend (almost certainly due to GOI miscommunication) limited the session's usefulness. Iraqi Minister of State Waeili expressed his intent to see the trilateral process work, we judge partly because of the added prestige it will bring to his Ministry and partly to have new access into the KRG. Iraqi participants emphasized the GOI's willingness to share information with the GoT - including information requiring immediate action. Turkish Special Envoy Ozcelik said his government wanted to see results from the main, Baghdad-based committee before agreeing to stand up a subcommittee in the KRG or on the Iraqi/Turkish border. Embassy Pol-Mil MinCouns emphasized the importance of making the Baghdad-based committee effective and the need to determine practical means of information-sharing and coordination. The committee scheduled a follow-up session for December 4, when we hope to nail down operational details. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE IRAQI VIEW -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The November 29 inaugural session of the Iraq-Turkey-U.S. Security operational working group was meant to work out operational modalities of the Baghdad-based committee, but was handicapped by the failure of representatives of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Kurdistan Regional government (KRG) to appear. The absence of a KRG representative chagrined Iraqi Minister of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA) Shirwan Waeili, who declared this would not recur. On December 1, KRG state minister Sinjari - who represented the KRG at the first session - told Pol-Mil MinCouns that he had not been invited to the November 29 meeting. (COMMENT: We believe the failure of the KRG and DBE to appear was due to staff miscommunication, not a deeper purpose. END COMMENT.) ¶3. (SBU) Waeili tried to push the group's agenda forward despite the absences. He announced that a 24-hour
intel support center under MSNSA control - the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC)- would serve as home to the working group, which (as discussed at the earlier Ministerial; reftel) would meet at least weekly and be on call to exchange time-sensitive intel. Iraqi intel officers stressed the GOI's willingness to share intelligence with the GoT, including urgent actionable information. Waeili also urged Turkey and the U.S. to name representatives to a KRG-based border subcommittee of the working group and made plain his desire to see the trilateral process work. -------------- THE TURKISH VIEW -------------- ¶4. (C) Turkish Special Envoy to Iraq Murat Ozcelik said his instructions from Ankara were clear: find the best way to maximize the flow of information. To do so, he focused on practical issues such as finding the right representatives to the committee. Ozcelik noted concern that efforts of a similar nature had failed in the past and stressed the GoT position that it wanted to see the Baghdad-based committee prove effective before agreeing to a subcommittee on the Qprove effective before agreeing to a subcommittee on the Turkey-Iraq border. -------------- STAFFING THE COMMITTEES -------------- ¶5. (C) At day's end, Waeili announced that he would continue to lead the ministerial and the working group would be chaired by Major General Abdul Salaam Ifkika Director of the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC) and would include KRG, DBE, and Ministry of Interior representatives and be supported by the NJOC's 24-hour Iraqi Army intel staff. Ozcelik said the GoT wanted its co-chair to the ministerial committee to be a civilian from the Ministry of the Interior. This committee will meet every two months. For the Baghdad-based working group, the GoT will appoint a general officer, although as a practical matter Turkey's resident BAGHDAD 00003793 002 OF 002 defense attach (a colonel) would represent Turkey at most meetings and an Ankara-based general would fly in monthly. U.S. representatives Pol-Mil MinCouns Michael Corbin and MNF-I CJ3 (Operations) Director MG Guy Swan confirmed that the U.S. would assign a one-star U.S. military officer as U.S. co-chair, supported by Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor and other State and military officers to be named. The group agreed to a follow-up session on December 4. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) We view the meeting as yet another step forward, in the painfully slow manner of business in Iraq. The absence of a KRG representative and a representative of the Directorate of Border Enforcement are likely the result of poor planning than of maliciousness. We believe part of the reason for Waeili's eagerness to establish the border subcommittee is to gain access to the border region, over which the GOI has little visibility. We expect the next month will show whether the GOI is both committed to and capable of using this committee structure to exchange actionable intelligence with then Turks in a timely fashion. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I will invest resources and time in making this work, but at the end of the day it is likely the Turks whose patience will run out if the committee/working group does not prove its value. CROCKER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -