SISTANI PRESSURES IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT SOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003773 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2028 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: SISTANI PRESSURES IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT SOFA REFERENDUM REF: GMP 2008 1128676005 Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) We have seen various statements in recent days claiming to represent Grand Ayatollah Sistani's dissatisfaction with the bilateral SoFA recently approved by the Iraqi parliament. Some of the reporting appears to be false. However, a sermon by a Sistani aide that noted problems - from the Ayatollah's perspective - with the SoFA and the Ayatollah's support for a referendum on the agreement may be accurate. Sistani appears to be concerned about the need for national consensus regarding the U.S. military presence in Iraq. His comments will put pressure on the Maliki government to follow through with a SOFA referendum, as demanded by Sunni Arab political leaders. That said, in Maliki's most recent meeting with the Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General, the Iraqi Prime Minister didn't appear much concerned about holding a referendum. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Sistani's Representative Softly Chides GOI on SOFA -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 18, Sistani listed two guiding conditions for acceptance of the SOFA: restoration of Iraq's full sovereignty and a "national consensus" among political blocs toward the agreement. According to Iraqi media,during Friday prayers on November 28, the day after the SOFA was approved by Parliament, Sistani's representative in Karbala, Ahmad al-Safi, stated in a sermon that Iraq will not have complete sovereignty, especially regarding jurisdiction over foreign soldiers and Iraq's alleged inability to search mail and control soldiers from entering and leaving the country (ref A). Safi also expressed "anxiety" that the SOFA lacks guarantees to remove Iraq from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and said the "Iraqi people will judge the agreement during the referendum" in mid 2009. ¶3. (C) On November 29 the international press quoted an unidentified Sistani aide saying that the Grand Ayatollah is concerned that there was no national consensus on (the agreement),and that it will cause instability in Iraq. (Comment: In contrast to Safi, a trusted spokesman for Sistani, we cannot corroborate whether Sistani's office sanctioned the November 29 statement, and both Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, President Talabani and other contacts have expressed doubt to us regarding the source. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- Need for Follow-through on Referendum & Resolution -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Radwan Killidar, an Iraqi politician with deep family ties into the religious establishment in Najaf and in regular contact with the marja'iyya there, told Poloff November 30 that Safi's statements reflected Sistani's desire to pressure the Iraqi government to follow through on the compromises contained in the non-binding resolution on political reform and to implement the referendum on continued American troop presence. ¶5. (C) Jabir Habib Jabir, an independent Shi'a parliamentarian who is close to Sistani's office, told Poloff December 1 that he had spoken with Sistani's office, and that "Safi does not always speak for Sistani." However, he commented that if the message continues to be repeated from Najaf, it should be taken seriously. Jabir expressed personal skepticism regarding the likelihood of a referendum in mid 2009, expressing doubt that Parliament could organize it on schedule. ¶6. (C) Shaykh Fateh Kishef al-Ghita, a prominent Shi'a Q6. (C) Shaykh Fateh Kishef al-Ghita, a prominent Shi'a scholar with strong ties to the Najaf Hawza, told Poloff December 1 that he too had contacted Sistani's office. The comments attributed to the unnamed Sistani aide were inaccurate, Kishef al-Ghita stated. However, Safi's statement accurately reflected Sistani's thinking about the problems with the SoFA. Al-Ghita said Sistani had consistently underlined that "the agreement must reflect the will of the Iraqi people," and that once the referendum was included in the package, Sistani had no choice but to support it. Al-Ghita also commented that by using Safi to deliver the message (rather than issuing a statement),Sistani is putting a degree of distance between himself and the issue. Al-Ghita predicted that the referendum would serve as a rallying point for the Sadrists. BAGHDAD 00003773 002 OF 002 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Safi regularly speaks on Sistani's behalf and is one the Grand Ayatollah's most trusted messengers. His comments build upon Sistani's pre-vote admonition that the SOFA must obtain a national consensus, and appear to reflect the Grand Ayatollah's view that consensus requires that the Sunni-initiated referendum take place. Some prominent Sunni Arab and Shia contacts (including VP Abd al-Mahdi and Salih Mutlaq ally in the parliament Shaykh Fellah Zaydan al-Lubhaibi) have opined that a referendum could be delayed indefinitely. These alleged Sistani messages, however, will pressure the Iraqi government to conduct a popular referendum. In any case, in Maliki's most recent meeting with the Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General, the Iraqi Prime Minister didn't appear much concerned about holding a referendum. CROCKER