Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3772
2008-12-01 16:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
SUPPORT COUNCILS MAY IGNITE KIRKUK'S POWDER KEG
VZCZCXRO3056 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3772/01 3361633 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 011633Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0634 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003772
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUPPORT COUNCILS MAY IGNITE KIRKUK'S POWDER KEG
Classified By: KIRKUK PRT LEADER HOWARD KEEGAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and
(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003772
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUPPORT COUNCILS MAY IGNITE KIRKUK'S POWDER KEG
Classified By: KIRKUK PRT LEADER HOWARD KEEGAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and
(d)
1. (U) This is a PRT Kirkuk reporting cable.
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
2. (C) On November 3, a delegation of Arab leaders from
Kirkuk province met with PM Maliki in Baghdad to propose
forming Tribal Support Councils (referred to as "Majlis Al
Isnad") in Kirkuk province. Arab leaders claim the proposed
Support Councils will be temporary unarmed advisors working
closely with the Iraqi Police (IP) and the Government of Iraq
(GOI),and will focus on reconciliation, development, and
security. They claim that Support Councils could also help
facilitate a deal to remove Kurdish security forces (Assayish
and Peshmerga) from Kirkuk.
3. (C) Turkmen leaders cautiously favor the Councils as a
counter to Kurdish power, but think they will be armed and
fear they will provoke conflict between the Arabs and the
Kurds. Kurdish leaders unequivocally oppose Support
Councils, and claim Maliki is using them to gain influence in
Kirkuk province. Support Councils have the potential to
foment violent confrontation in the province. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --
ARABS PRESENT SUPPORT COUNCIL IDEA TO PM MALIKI
-------------- --
4. (C) On November 3, approximately 80 Sunni Arabs from
Kirkuk province traveled to Baghdad to meet with Prime
Minister (PM) Maliki. Sheikh Abu Saddam (aka Hussein Ali
Salih),head of the Arab Unity Party, led the delegation,
which included provincial political heavyweights such as
Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed, and Arab tribal leaders such as
Sheikh Burhan Al-Assi, also a Kirkuk PC member. The meeting
took place on November 4. In it, Maliki and the Sunnis
discussed forming GOI-sponsored Support Councils in Kirkuk
province. By all accounts, this idea originated with Sheikh
Burhan, and had the support of the entire Arab delegation.
--------------
ARABS SUPPORT UNARMED SUPPORT COUNCILS
--------------
5. (C) According to the Arab leadership in Kirkuk province,
the Support Councils will be multi-ethnic, unarmed advisors.
Each district and sub-district will be allotted one Council,
which will report directly to the GOI on reconciliation,
development, and security. The Councils will have a tribal
flavor, and will work through tribal networks at the district
and sub-district level.
6. (C) In a November 17 meeting with the PRT, Sheikh Abu
Saddam expressed unequivocal support for the formation of
Support Councils. He stated that they would be transitional,
perhaps for three years, until reconciliation is complete in
Kirkuk. He expected that they would report directly to the
Reconciliation Office in Baghdad, although they would also
work closely with Iraqi Police (IP) in the province in an
advisory role. In meetings with the PRT on November 17-18,
Deputy Governor Rakan echoed almost verbatim the sentiments
of Abu Saddam. Both claimed that no Support Council leaders
had been identified.
7. (C) In a November 19 meeting with us, Sheikh Burhan
admitted that he developed the idea of establishing Support
Councils in Kirkuk. He was concerned that USG would oppose
the idea and possibly detain him. Burhan insists that the
Councils will be peaceful and unarmed. He pointed out that
Kurds will also be represented in the Support
Councils--although, he said, the Kurdish parties (PUK and
KDP) will oppose this because they do not recognize Kurdish
tribal leadership. He stated that one duty of the Support
Councils will be to report on Kurdish Assayish (Kurdish party
QCouncils will be to report on Kurdish Assayish (Kurdish party
secret police for the PUK and KDP) actions. Burhan blamed
the U.S. for working with the Assayish in Kirkuk even though
they are "illegal security forces," not affiliated with the
GOI. He said he was unsure if Support Councils would be
necessary if all Assayish and Peshmerga were removed from
Kirkuk province. Like Rakan and Abu Saddam, Burhan said the
identity of Support Council leaders is undecided.
8. (C) The PRT met with Arab Kirkuk PC member Mohammed Khalil
on November 16. Khalil stated that the Councils are
necessary because the Assayish have free reign throughout the
province. He believes that the Councils can be used as a
bargaining chip with the Kurds to remove the Assayish and
Peshmerga from Kirkuk province.
BAGHDAD 00003772 002 OF 003
-------------- --------------
KIRKUK TURKMEN CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORT SUPPORT COUNCILS
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Turkmen PC members gave the PRT no clear position on
the issue of Support Councils in the province, but Turkmen
leaders seem cautiously in favor of them. Turkmen PC member
Najat Hussein (ISCI) said that the Support Councils may work,
but should only exist for a limited period. He worried that
Maliki would use the Support Councils to make inroads into
the security forces of Kirkuk. Najat believes that a major
point in favor of the Councils is that they will
counterbalance the Assayish and Peshmerga in the province.
He stated that the Assayish and Peshmerga presence in Kirkuk
is illegal and not authorized by the Iraqi constitution.
Najat primarily sees the Support Council issue as a point of
contention between the Kurds and the Arabs.
10. (C) Turkmen PC members Majeed Izzat and Torhan Mudhir
(both ITF) presented similar views. Both Majeed and Torhan
believe that Support Councils could be useful in alleviating
security problems caused by the Assayish and Peshmerga.
Majeed believes the Councils should be temporary and active
only until security improves. Both seemed to believe that
the Councils would be armed. Turkmen PC member Tahseen Kahea
feared that the Turkmen might be caught in the middle of a
conflict between Arab Support Councils and Kurdish security
forces.
11. (C) The PRT met with Deputy Chief of Police General
Turhan Abdulrahman Yousif in Kirkuk on November 17 to discuss
the Support Councils. General Turhan is a self-described
independent Turkman, but is believed to be affiliated with
the ITF. General Turhan thinks the Support Councils are a
good idea so long as they remain unarmed. He sees them as
assets for the Iraqi Police (IP),especially at the district
and village level, where he thinks they will be most
effective. Turhan told us that the IP have a difficult time
in villages, especially where tribal influence trumps
government; Support Councils could help to bridge this
divide. Turhan said he had heard that possible Council
leaders were Sheikh Abu Saddam, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Assi,
Sheikh Burhan, and other tribal leaders.
12. (C) General Turhan also commented in depth on the status
of the Assayish in Kirkuk province. He puts the number of
Assayish in the province at approximately 8,200, divided
between the PUK (4,500) and KDP (3,700). Of the total, three
to four thousand physically serve within the metropolitan
area of Kirkuk city. He stated that he heard these numbers
directly from "the sources" (alluding to the heads of the
Assayish groups). He estimated that 60% of the current
employees are indigenous to Kirkuk. The presence of these
groups in the city is no secret, as their facilities are
heavily barricaded, often flying the KRG flag and occupying
public buildings. The Assayish are estimated to have 73
facilities throughout the city, which disturbs the other
ethnic groups there.
13. (C) General Turhan complained that the IP have no control
over the Assayish--in fact, he claimed he must go through
Coalition Forces (CF) to address any issues involving the
Assayish or Peshmerga. He referred to the Assayish as
"illegal" and called them more of a threat to the province
than Support Councils would be. He believes the Councils
could help to contain the Assayish and maybe even lead to
their removal from Kirkuk. Turhan predicted opposition to
the Councils from many in the IP however, because IP members
are loyal to the PUK and KDP rather than the GOI.
Qare loyal to the PUK and KDP rather than the GOI.
-------------- --------------
KIRKUK'S KURDS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSE SUPPORT COUNCILS
-------------- --------------
14. (C) Kurdish leaders in Kirkuk province vehemently oppose
the Support Councils idea. They are convinced that the
Councils will be "armed militias," illegal under the Iraqi
constitution. The leaders refer to any Kurd who is willing
to participate in Councils as a "traitor." They also believe
that the Councils are an attempt by Maliki to extend the
influence of his party into Kirkuk.
15. (C) Opposition to forming Support Councils in Kirkuk was
the first contentious topic PUK member and PC Chairman Rizgar
Ali addressed in his November 10 meeting with Senior Advisor
Krajeski. He believed there was no need for them in Kirkuk,
and that "all local leaders agree" on this. He claimed the
Constitution did not permit Maliki to create such a new force
and called upon him to drop the idea, saying the resources to
be devoted to them would be better spent on providing other
public services. He claimed that Maliki planned to fill the
Support Councils with Ba'athists and Kurds who had served
Saddam Hussein.
BAGHDAD 00003772 003 OF 003
16. (C) In a November 18 meeting with the PRT, Mohammed Kamal
(leading KDP PC member) asked why the GOI is willing to spend
money on Support Councils when what Kirkuk really needs is
more development projects. He answered his own question by
stating that Maliki, and in turn Iran, is attempting to gain
power in Kirkuk province. He warned that this is a very
dangerous development for the Americans. The Kurds "refuse
the Support Councils with all of our power" and "Support
Councils are like playing with fire, and this fire will set
off the powder keg." He denied the claim that Support
Councils will be unarmed and said that, even if it were true
in principle, the Councils would eventually obtain arms.
Babakir Sidiq, a leading PUK PC member, echoed this view in a
separate discussion. When asked if he thought the Support
Councils were a reaction to the Assayish and Peshmerga in
Kirkuk, Kamal claimed that there are no Peshmerga in Kirkuk,
and the Assayish number only around 100, and are unarmed. He
said the Assayish are in Kirkuk because CF want them there.
17. (C) Awat Mohammed, PC member from the Kurdistan Toilers
Party, met with the PRT to discuss the Support Council issue
on November 19. Awat repeated many of Mohammed Kamal's
points. He also referred to Kirkuk as a powder keg, with the
Support Councils providing a possible lit fuse. He believes
the Support Councils are either an attempt by Maliki to grab
power in Kirkuk province or an attempt by the Arabs to remove
the Assayish. He said that unarmed Support Councils might be
more palatable, but does not believe that this is the Arabs'
ultimate intent.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
18. (C) As in other provinces, Prime Minister Maliki may be
supporting Support Councils in Kirkuk province to increase
his and his party's influence. Kirkuk's Sunni Arabs have
eagerly embraced the idea as a counter to Kurdish power, and
particularly to Kurdish security forces (Assayish and
Peshmerga). It is possible that Kirkuk's Arab leadership is
backing the Support Council idea in part so they will have
something to trade on the Assayish issue when negotiations
begin under the Article 23 framework (Provincial Elections
Law). We are skeptical though that the Kurds would agree to
such a trade or that PM Maliki would agree to disband the
Support Councils if they did. In the complex
security/political situation in Kirkuk, the Support Councils
have the potential to evolve into an organized armed force
identified with the interests of PM Maliki and Kirkuk's Sunni
Arabs, even if they don't start out that way. They could
thus could pose a risk to security and stability in the
province. END COMMENT.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUPPORT COUNCILS MAY IGNITE KIRKUK'S POWDER KEG
Classified By: KIRKUK PRT LEADER HOWARD KEEGAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and
(d)
1. (U) This is a PRT Kirkuk reporting cable.
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
2. (C) On November 3, a delegation of Arab leaders from
Kirkuk province met with PM Maliki in Baghdad to propose
forming Tribal Support Councils (referred to as "Majlis Al
Isnad") in Kirkuk province. Arab leaders claim the proposed
Support Councils will be temporary unarmed advisors working
closely with the Iraqi Police (IP) and the Government of Iraq
(GOI),and will focus on reconciliation, development, and
security. They claim that Support Councils could also help
facilitate a deal to remove Kurdish security forces (Assayish
and Peshmerga) from Kirkuk.
3. (C) Turkmen leaders cautiously favor the Councils as a
counter to Kurdish power, but think they will be armed and
fear they will provoke conflict between the Arabs and the
Kurds. Kurdish leaders unequivocally oppose Support
Councils, and claim Maliki is using them to gain influence in
Kirkuk province. Support Councils have the potential to
foment violent confrontation in the province. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --
ARABS PRESENT SUPPORT COUNCIL IDEA TO PM MALIKI
-------------- --
4. (C) On November 3, approximately 80 Sunni Arabs from
Kirkuk province traveled to Baghdad to meet with Prime
Minister (PM) Maliki. Sheikh Abu Saddam (aka Hussein Ali
Salih),head of the Arab Unity Party, led the delegation,
which included provincial political heavyweights such as
Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed, and Arab tribal leaders such as
Sheikh Burhan Al-Assi, also a Kirkuk PC member. The meeting
took place on November 4. In it, Maliki and the Sunnis
discussed forming GOI-sponsored Support Councils in Kirkuk
province. By all accounts, this idea originated with Sheikh
Burhan, and had the support of the entire Arab delegation.
--------------
ARABS SUPPORT UNARMED SUPPORT COUNCILS
--------------
5. (C) According to the Arab leadership in Kirkuk province,
the Support Councils will be multi-ethnic, unarmed advisors.
Each district and sub-district will be allotted one Council,
which will report directly to the GOI on reconciliation,
development, and security. The Councils will have a tribal
flavor, and will work through tribal networks at the district
and sub-district level.
6. (C) In a November 17 meeting with the PRT, Sheikh Abu
Saddam expressed unequivocal support for the formation of
Support Councils. He stated that they would be transitional,
perhaps for three years, until reconciliation is complete in
Kirkuk. He expected that they would report directly to the
Reconciliation Office in Baghdad, although they would also
work closely with Iraqi Police (IP) in the province in an
advisory role. In meetings with the PRT on November 17-18,
Deputy Governor Rakan echoed almost verbatim the sentiments
of Abu Saddam. Both claimed that no Support Council leaders
had been identified.
7. (C) In a November 19 meeting with us, Sheikh Burhan
admitted that he developed the idea of establishing Support
Councils in Kirkuk. He was concerned that USG would oppose
the idea and possibly detain him. Burhan insists that the
Councils will be peaceful and unarmed. He pointed out that
Kurds will also be represented in the Support
Councils--although, he said, the Kurdish parties (PUK and
KDP) will oppose this because they do not recognize Kurdish
tribal leadership. He stated that one duty of the Support
Councils will be to report on Kurdish Assayish (Kurdish party
QCouncils will be to report on Kurdish Assayish (Kurdish party
secret police for the PUK and KDP) actions. Burhan blamed
the U.S. for working with the Assayish in Kirkuk even though
they are "illegal security forces," not affiliated with the
GOI. He said he was unsure if Support Councils would be
necessary if all Assayish and Peshmerga were removed from
Kirkuk province. Like Rakan and Abu Saddam, Burhan said the
identity of Support Council leaders is undecided.
8. (C) The PRT met with Arab Kirkuk PC member Mohammed Khalil
on November 16. Khalil stated that the Councils are
necessary because the Assayish have free reign throughout the
province. He believes that the Councils can be used as a
bargaining chip with the Kurds to remove the Assayish and
Peshmerga from Kirkuk province.
BAGHDAD 00003772 002 OF 003
-------------- --------------
KIRKUK TURKMEN CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORT SUPPORT COUNCILS
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Turkmen PC members gave the PRT no clear position on
the issue of Support Councils in the province, but Turkmen
leaders seem cautiously in favor of them. Turkmen PC member
Najat Hussein (ISCI) said that the Support Councils may work,
but should only exist for a limited period. He worried that
Maliki would use the Support Councils to make inroads into
the security forces of Kirkuk. Najat believes that a major
point in favor of the Councils is that they will
counterbalance the Assayish and Peshmerga in the province.
He stated that the Assayish and Peshmerga presence in Kirkuk
is illegal and not authorized by the Iraqi constitution.
Najat primarily sees the Support Council issue as a point of
contention between the Kurds and the Arabs.
10. (C) Turkmen PC members Majeed Izzat and Torhan Mudhir
(both ITF) presented similar views. Both Majeed and Torhan
believe that Support Councils could be useful in alleviating
security problems caused by the Assayish and Peshmerga.
Majeed believes the Councils should be temporary and active
only until security improves. Both seemed to believe that
the Councils would be armed. Turkmen PC member Tahseen Kahea
feared that the Turkmen might be caught in the middle of a
conflict between Arab Support Councils and Kurdish security
forces.
11. (C) The PRT met with Deputy Chief of Police General
Turhan Abdulrahman Yousif in Kirkuk on November 17 to discuss
the Support Councils. General Turhan is a self-described
independent Turkman, but is believed to be affiliated with
the ITF. General Turhan thinks the Support Councils are a
good idea so long as they remain unarmed. He sees them as
assets for the Iraqi Police (IP),especially at the district
and village level, where he thinks they will be most
effective. Turhan told us that the IP have a difficult time
in villages, especially where tribal influence trumps
government; Support Councils could help to bridge this
divide. Turhan said he had heard that possible Council
leaders were Sheikh Abu Saddam, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Assi,
Sheikh Burhan, and other tribal leaders.
12. (C) General Turhan also commented in depth on the status
of the Assayish in Kirkuk province. He puts the number of
Assayish in the province at approximately 8,200, divided
between the PUK (4,500) and KDP (3,700). Of the total, three
to four thousand physically serve within the metropolitan
area of Kirkuk city. He stated that he heard these numbers
directly from "the sources" (alluding to the heads of the
Assayish groups). He estimated that 60% of the current
employees are indigenous to Kirkuk. The presence of these
groups in the city is no secret, as their facilities are
heavily barricaded, often flying the KRG flag and occupying
public buildings. The Assayish are estimated to have 73
facilities throughout the city, which disturbs the other
ethnic groups there.
13. (C) General Turhan complained that the IP have no control
over the Assayish--in fact, he claimed he must go through
Coalition Forces (CF) to address any issues involving the
Assayish or Peshmerga. He referred to the Assayish as
"illegal" and called them more of a threat to the province
than Support Councils would be. He believes the Councils
could help to contain the Assayish and maybe even lead to
their removal from Kirkuk. Turhan predicted opposition to
the Councils from many in the IP however, because IP members
are loyal to the PUK and KDP rather than the GOI.
Qare loyal to the PUK and KDP rather than the GOI.
-------------- --------------
KIRKUK'S KURDS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSE SUPPORT COUNCILS
-------------- --------------
14. (C) Kurdish leaders in Kirkuk province vehemently oppose
the Support Councils idea. They are convinced that the
Councils will be "armed militias," illegal under the Iraqi
constitution. The leaders refer to any Kurd who is willing
to participate in Councils as a "traitor." They also believe
that the Councils are an attempt by Maliki to extend the
influence of his party into Kirkuk.
15. (C) Opposition to forming Support Councils in Kirkuk was
the first contentious topic PUK member and PC Chairman Rizgar
Ali addressed in his November 10 meeting with Senior Advisor
Krajeski. He believed there was no need for them in Kirkuk,
and that "all local leaders agree" on this. He claimed the
Constitution did not permit Maliki to create such a new force
and called upon him to drop the idea, saying the resources to
be devoted to them would be better spent on providing other
public services. He claimed that Maliki planned to fill the
Support Councils with Ba'athists and Kurds who had served
Saddam Hussein.
BAGHDAD 00003772 003 OF 003
16. (C) In a November 18 meeting with the PRT, Mohammed Kamal
(leading KDP PC member) asked why the GOI is willing to spend
money on Support Councils when what Kirkuk really needs is
more development projects. He answered his own question by
stating that Maliki, and in turn Iran, is attempting to gain
power in Kirkuk province. He warned that this is a very
dangerous development for the Americans. The Kurds "refuse
the Support Councils with all of our power" and "Support
Councils are like playing with fire, and this fire will set
off the powder keg." He denied the claim that Support
Councils will be unarmed and said that, even if it were true
in principle, the Councils would eventually obtain arms.
Babakir Sidiq, a leading PUK PC member, echoed this view in a
separate discussion. When asked if he thought the Support
Councils were a reaction to the Assayish and Peshmerga in
Kirkuk, Kamal claimed that there are no Peshmerga in Kirkuk,
and the Assayish number only around 100, and are unarmed. He
said the Assayish are in Kirkuk because CF want them there.
17. (C) Awat Mohammed, PC member from the Kurdistan Toilers
Party, met with the PRT to discuss the Support Council issue
on November 19. Awat repeated many of Mohammed Kamal's
points. He also referred to Kirkuk as a powder keg, with the
Support Councils providing a possible lit fuse. He believes
the Support Councils are either an attempt by Maliki to grab
power in Kirkuk province or an attempt by the Arabs to remove
the Assayish. He said that unarmed Support Councils might be
more palatable, but does not believe that this is the Arabs'
ultimate intent.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
18. (C) As in other provinces, Prime Minister Maliki may be
supporting Support Councils in Kirkuk province to increase
his and his party's influence. Kirkuk's Sunni Arabs have
eagerly embraced the idea as a counter to Kurdish power, and
particularly to Kurdish security forces (Assayish and
Peshmerga). It is possible that Kirkuk's Arab leadership is
backing the Support Council idea in part so they will have
something to trade on the Assayish issue when negotiations
begin under the Article 23 framework (Provincial Elections
Law). We are skeptical though that the Kurds would agree to
such a trade or that PM Maliki would agree to disband the
Support Councils if they did. In the complex
security/political situation in Kirkuk, the Support Councils
have the potential to evolve into an organized armed force
identified with the interests of PM Maliki and Kirkuk's Sunni
Arabs, even if they don't start out that way. They could
thus could pose a risk to security and stability in the
province. END COMMENT.
CROCKER