EPRT BAGHDAD: IDP RETURNS IN SAB AL BOUR --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003763 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2013 TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL PREF SUBJECT: EPRT BAGHDAD: IDP RETURNS IN SAB AL BOUR -- SUCCESSFUL, SO FAR REF: A. BAGHDAD 3109 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3188 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3189 Classified By: Deputy political counselor John G. Fox, reasons 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Two years ago, Sab al Bour was a virtual ghost town, with fewer than 2,000 people of a population that had numbered 58,000 in 2003 (and an almost equal mix of Sunni and Shia). The village could now be a model of reconstruction and reconciliation for other Iraqi cities. Over 3,500 families have returned since the beginning of 2008, and an average of 200 people return each day. This influx is due in large part to both a dramatic reduction of insurgent activity within the city and a successful effort on the part of the U.S. brigade operating in the region, Baghdad EPRT-5 and the GOI to develop and maintain essential services. Returnees are eligible for two payments from the GOI: one million Iraqi dinar (approx. USD 800) to assist them in re-settling into their former home and an additional amount if their house had been damaged or destroyed while they were away. Returnees have been receiving both these payments, though often not as quickly as they would like. END SUMMARY. AN EFFICIENT PROCESS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The sub-district (nahia) council, in cooperation with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM),has established an efficient and well-organized system to welcome, track and assist IDPs as they return to their homes. Sab al Bour is a walled city, with only one entrance and exit. Upon arrival at the town gates, IDPs are directed to the local governance center. There they meet with nahia council representatives, produce evidence (typically a deed or property lease) of having formerly resided in Sab al Bour, complete a detailed questionnaire and proceed to the Joint Coordination Center (JCC). The JCC, staffed by Coalition Forces (CF),Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP),tracks all incoming IDPs in a database, takes each returnee's photograph and fingerprints, and provides them with information about government services available to residents. RETURNEES RECEIVING GOI PAYMENTS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Upon re-integration into the city, IDPs are encouraged to apply for two GOI payments. First, each IDP family is eligible for one million Iraqi dinars upon re-settlement into their former home, whether owned or rented. According to the head of the returnee registration center, approximately 75 percent of returnees have received this amount (2/25 at the JCC estimates closer to 50 percent). Although the process is long and daunting to many residents, often taking up to six months, the vast majority receives payment. Governor of Baghdad Hussein Tahan attributes delays in payments to the difficult task of vetting each claim. He noted that he had uncovered over 300 fraudulent applications. ¶4. (SBU) Returnees whose home has been damaged or destroyed while they were away are also eligible for an additional GOI payment to assist them with rebuilding (reftel A). Residents must provide evidence to the nahia chairman, who reviews the applications and decides which to forward to the Baghdad Governorate. Since August 3 when Prime Minister Maliki's issuance of Order 101 established this fund, 118 Sab al Bour families have applied for this assistance. The nahia council forwarded 68 to the Governor's office. Recipients, while grateful that the GOI had provided some assistance, repeatedly told ePRT POLOFF that the money Qsome assistance, repeatedly told ePRT POLOFF that the money was not nearly enough to enable them to rebuild houses which, in many cases, had been completely destroyed. WHY ARE SO MANY RETURNING? -------------- ¶5. (C) The main reason for the relatively large return IDPs is improved security. From October 2006 to April 2007, 2/25 counted over 150 insurgent attacks in Sab al Bour, including 11 IED explosions and 26 murders. Two years later, from April 2008 to October 2008, there were only three attacks, none of which were either IEDs or resulted in deaths. This improvement has led MND-B to assert that the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups, once BAGHDAD 00003763 002 OF 002 in control of Sab al Bour, have been defeated by the joint efforts of CF and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). ¶6. (SBU) Almost all the returnees interviewed by EPRT poloff noted improved security as the most important factor in their decision, with the improvement in essential services such as water treatment, electricity and communications the second most important. On November 15, Baghdad EPRT-5 officers attended the opening of one of two new water-treatment plants for the city, which together will provide potable water to a majority of the population. Additionally, since the recent opening of 11kv and 33kv lines and an upgraded substation to serve the city, funded jointly by CF and the GOI, residents report that they have regularly been receiving six to eight hours of electricity per day (consistent with CF data); this is higher than the national average. Many returnees also cited lower costs in Sab al Bour than in Baghdad (the location from which most IDPs have returned) and the desire to be reunited with extended family and friends as factors in their decision. ¶7. (SBU) Unlike in other regions within Baghdad Province that have reported an increase in IDP returns recently (reftels B and C),squatters have not been a problem in Sab al Bour. Although Prime Minister Order 101 gives ISF the right to forcibly evict squatters from the homes of returnees, no such actions have been necessary, according to the nahia council chairman. According to employees in the IDP returnee center, approximately 300 houses remain uninhabited in Sab al Bour, though they expect families to return to them soon. Not all return; some have chosen to rent their homes to other returnees, some of whom previously resided in Sab al Bour, and others from nearby areas. There are now several small but active real estate offices specializing in rentals within the city. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Sab al Bour is currently a success story. One of the most dangerous cities in Iraq has become a model of IDP returns in many respects. As residents return in large numbers and begin to rebuild their homes, however, the town' s resources will be stretched. Schools, health clinics and other public services are already at their limits. Residents have begun lobbying higher levels of government to provide them the capital and operating budgets needed to meet the expanding populace's needs. As a rural nahia within Baghdad Province, Sab al Bour does not receive much attention from provincial leaders and is often left to solve its own problems. Baghdad EPRT-5, together with CF, will continue to work with and support local and provincial-level leaders as they work to ensure the government honors its obligations to provide needed services to all of Sab al Bour's residents. CROCKER