IRAQI NSC DISCUSSES TRILATERAL MEETING WITH U.S.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003747 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI NSC DISCUSSES TRILATERAL MEETING WITH U.S. AND TURKEY, AQI FUNDING, DETAINEES, AND OTHER ISSUES REF: BAGHDAD 3671 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. At the November 23 meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council (NSC),with Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Rafi Essawi sitting in as chair for the Prime Minister, the Council received a report from Minister of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan Waeili on the recent U.S.-Iraq-Turkey trilateral meeting and the tripartite committee to be formed to coordinate on combating the PKK. While there was support for the goal of taking practical steps to combat the PKK, both the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defense raised questions about how the initiative would be implemented operationally and proposed the new committee focus on sharing intelligence. The NSC also received an update on an ongoing investigation of suspects held without detention orders, and discussed the overcrowded facilities in which pre-trial detainees are held. The NSC also discussed the Bayji Refinery's role in terrorist funding, the new national identification card program, junior officer education in the Iraqi Army, and reconstruction projects in Sadr City. The meeting concluded with a recommendation that was not decided, that the meeting should be held on a bi-weekly basis in the future. End Summary. Rule of Law and Detention Affairs Update ¶2. (C) In a follow-up to an issue that the NSC had discussed the previous week, Minister of Justice (MOJ) Safa al Safi told the NSC that the work of the joint committee reviewing the incarceration of detainees who have neither detention orders nor case files is proceeding. He said that the original count of 616 detainees without documents had declined as the committee had found paper work as it checked MOJ records for older files. In addition, some of the detainees had been returned to the police stations that sent the suspects to the MOJ without the proper documentation. The Minister noted that some of the suspects had already been in custody for five years, and locating their records took time. Safi said that the MOJ would continue to work with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to check for arrest warrants, and would transfer such cases as it could to the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) as they became ready. He concluded by stating that the MOJ would provide reports on the findings to the NSC. Detainees in Ninewa: Prison Conditions ¶3. (C) Discussion on detainees moved to the issue of what to do about recommendations (following the recent incident of persecution of Christians in Mosul) regarding pretrial detention and prison facilities in Ninewa. The MOJ noted that in some provinces, such as Ninewa and Diyala, overcrowding in pretrial detention facilities was a serious problem that raised human rights concerns, and where possible, detainees were being transferred to less crowded facilities. Babil, for example, recently opened a new prison, but Baghdad has need of more facilities to ease overcrowding. An additional problem is that suspects lacking a detention order cannot be transferred to prisons because the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS) will not accept them without proper documentation, and many remain detained indefinitely. Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces, General Babikir asked the MOJ how long it would take to transfer suspects out of the overcrowded facilities in Ninewa, and Safi responded that he hoped to complete the transfers in QSafi responded that he hoped to complete the transfers in about one and a half months. ¶4. (S) National Security Advisor Mowafaq Rubaie asked if Badouch Prison, where some of the detainees might be transferred, should be closed and its inmate population transferred elsewhere due to the prison's poor condition and demonstrated lack of security. The MOJ answered Rubaie with a firm "no "and Minister of Defense Abdul al-Qadir added that prison space was too badly needed to close Badouch at this time. The MOD voiced the view that among the correctional facilities in Iraq, Abu Ghuraib loomed as the greatest problem, and that the GOI would have to allocate funds for its renovation following turnover. ¶5. (C) Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani reiterated the need for a pre-trial detention facility. Minister Safi then reminded the NSC that the MOJ's role in handling detainees is administrative, not investigative, and that the MOJ has to rely on the MOI for assistance in transporting detainees. He also stated that the MOJ could deliver a suspect to court only at the direction of the HJC. BAGHDAD 00003747 002 OF 004 Bayji Refinery Proceeds funding Al Qaeda ¶6. (S) Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB) Commander Thalib Kinani briefed the NSC on Al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) efforts to gain funds for its activities through extortion from the Bayji Refinery and its distribution networks. CTB Director Lieutenant General Qinani noted that the vulnerability of the refinery to relatively routine industrial sabotage, not to mention sophisticated IEDs, made it an easy target for AQI extortion schemes. He also said that the weak security situation in Bayji District created a favorable environment for AQI operations. He explained that just as energy related industries are the main source of revenue for the Iraqi economy, so too they are also the primary source of domestic funding for AQI. According to Kinani, the terrorist network uses a combination of embezzlement and extortion, abetted by supporters infiltrated into the facility, who administratively skim a percentage of the refinery's output and force sub-contractors to pay a fifteen percent street tax. He said that AQI is so firmly entrenched within the refinery that some of the ISF deployed to secure it are on the AQI payroll. Kinani recommended that energy production and distribution facilities should be tightly controlled in order to disrupt AQI's revenue stream. ¶7. (S) MOD Qadir complained that its forces had been withdrawn from the refinery at the request of the Ministry of Oil (MOO),and that MOD fuel tanker escorts had been halted by the MOO as well. NSA Rubaie interjected that the MOD battalion at the refinery had been withdrawn because it was suspected of providing support to AQI. Qadir responded that if other agencies had information about Iraqi Army (IA) soldiers involved with AQI, he needed to know about it so that he could take action on the reports. He added that MOO and Ministry of Finance (MOF) funding for security at the refinery had been insufficient. Minister of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA) Shirwan al-Waeili said that there was credible information concerning AQI infiltration at the refinery, and that he hoped to address this issue during Monday's inter-ministerial infrastructure security meeting chaired by the Ministry of Defense. MOI Bulani, in a similar vein to the MOD, said that if intelligence agencies had information concerning police officers involved with AQI, he needed to know so that he could initiate an investigation. ¶8. (S) General Odierno informed the NSC that on November 13, ISOF supported by Coalition forces arrested two individuals on warrants who worked as managers at the refinery and were linked to AQI. He said that AQI derived six hundred thousand dollars a month from the refinery and its associated distribution networks, and an additional four hundred thousand dollars from the Asiacell mobile phone company, gas stations, and cement companies. The General called for a joint plan to address terrorist financing, noting that it could have a significant impact on AQI. ¶9. (S) NSA Rubaie responded that General Odierno had offered an outstanding suggestion, and that there was an urgent need to pursue the economic side of AQI operations. MSNSA Waeili agreed, stating that the NSC must follow up on the recommendations of General Odierno and the MOD. He suggested that the GOI should seek arrest warrants from the courts, and then prepare target folders for ISF who could Qcourts, and then prepare target folders for ISF who could carry out a raid against AQI supporters in the refinery. Kinani noted that AQI revenues from the refinery and illicit fuel tanker taxes had made kidnapping for ransom, a common source of income for insurgents in Iraq, totally unnecessary for AQI. DPM Essawi concluded discussion on AQI, stating that there would have to be follow up on this issue at the Monday infrastructure security meeting. GEN Odierno said he would send a representative to share MNF-I information on terrorist financing in Northern Iraq. National Standard Identification Card ¶10. (C) Brigadier General Mahmoud briefed the NSC on MOI's plan for a national identification card, a goal that the Ministry had hoped to achieve since 1980. He said that the MOI had formed a committee to plan for implementation and logistical support of the initiative, which hoped to produce a single biometric card to replace all other forms of identification in Iraq. He explained that the project would move ahead in two phases. According to the General, during the first phase, the MOI would populate its data base and begin to assign identification numbers to individuals. Every Iraqi citizen will be assigned an identification number, to overcome the problem presented by individuals with the same or similar names. ¶11. (C) Mahmoud said that during the second phase, MOI would BAGHDAD 00003747 003 OF 004 confirm the cards compatibility with other identification systems used in the region. The data base would also be linked to real estate records, with appropriate safeguards to protect citizen's information. He added that the new identification system could be used for the census and to support elections. Mahmoud noted that there were still several unresolved issues, including the construction of card-issuing offices and organizing a campaign to publicize the benefits of the initiative for the Iraqi public. He said that he hoped that the GOI could begin issuing cards in five to six months, and that once begun, he would keep issuing offices open for extended hours with two shifts of workers in order to be able to issue the cards quickly. The data base itself would be designed for security and flexibility, the latter to facilitate easy modifications and fast updates. ¶12. (C) NSA Rubaie asked how long it would take before the MOI could begin issuing cards, and Mahmoud explained that they had yet to finish the concept and choose the supplier. The Minister of Justice said the card would be useful in conjunction with the upcoming national census. MSNSA Waeli said he was concerned over the standards uses and Rubaie said the database had to be protected. Finally DPM Eassawi noted that the initiative was likely to add 2,500 new jobs to the Iraqi economy but asked if the Minister of Finance had approved funding for the project. The MOI said the next step would be to go to the Ministry of Finance. MOD Force Generation Brief on Military Colleges ¶13. (C) Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces, General Babakir opened the discussion on the military education system, stating that the Iraqi Armed Forces continued to face a shortage of junior officers, a challenge not easily overcome because 3-4 years are required to fully train a new military officer. MG Hussein provided the NSC a briefing on the status of the Army's military colleges, explaining that the ISF is currently operating four colleges to expedite filling officer shortages, but when the number of officers in the IA nears the total authorized, the current military education system could be scaled back to a single campus. MOD Qadir and General Babakir were in full agreement that the critical constraint for the military education system is the under-funding that has left many officer cadets training in substandard facilities, a problem likely to be solved only when the current surge in officer recruitment declines to a sustainable level. U.S. - Iraq - Turkey Trilateral Meeting ¶14. (S) MSNSA Waeili briefed the NSC on the trilateral meeting between the U.S., Iraq, and Turkey that the GOI had hosted in Baghdad on November 19. Waeili said that the three parties had agreed to form a sub-committee, to deal with combating the PKK. The committee would focus on sharing intelligence and coordinating operations against the PKK. He said that the participants had also discussed the possibility of establishing liaison officers (LNOs) in the KRG. Waeili noted that in addition to representatives from ministries and agencies based in Baghdad, the GOI delegation had included representatives from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). ¶15. (S) The Ambassador stated that he had been pleased to participate in the meeting at the invitation of the other two parties, and noted that an attempt to form a similar tripartite committee several years ago had not worked well. Qtripartite committee several years ago had not worked well. He said that the three nations are trying again, now that the security situation in Iraq has improved and the government has grown stronger. He also noted that the meeting was an opportunity to signal strengthened relations between Iraq and Turkey, while eliminating a dangerous threat to all, the PKK. The Ambassador told the NSC that the Embassy was coordinating our efforts on this initiative with MSNSA Waeili and Turkish special envoy to Iraq Murat Ozcelik. He said that the committee had met, and a work plan discussed, but in order to see some results we must move quickly to translate good intentions into action. ¶16. (S) MOI Bulani said that establishing the committee was a good first step, supported as it would be by the staff of the MSNSA, but that it should not be forgotten that the MOI already had a committee that dealt with KRG security issues. MSNSA Waeili responded that with regard to these committees, a careful approach is required, as Turkey tended to resist Kurdish representation at official meetings, despite strong support from the U.S. and GOI. He added that the intent of this committee was to deal with immediate needs such as actionable intelligence and operational coordination, rather than broader political issues. Rubaie interjected that he BAGHDAD 00003747 004 OF 004 wanted to go on record that it was important that the committee address the fact that notification of imminent Turkish operations flows from the GOT through MNF-I to the PM's National Operations Center (NOC) in Baghdad, a process that can take two hours. As a result, the PM doesn't hear about Turkish operations until after they have taken place. He stated that the GOI wanted a secure, direct link with the GOT, so that notifications could be received directly in a timely manner. ¶17. (S) MOD Qadir supported Rubaie,s point about notification and asked what type of operations the sub-committee would be undertaking. He said the issue was constant Turkish cross border artillery and air strikes which were threatening civilians. He asked Waeili what responsibilities would be assigned to MOD or MOI, and wanted to know what procedures and methods had been agreed upon. He stated that the GOI's effort must be unified, and that the Ministries concerned needed a briefing on the MSNSA's concept. MSNSA Waeili responded that there would be a plan, but that it would be the work of all three sides, not just the GOI. He reiterated that the objective of the committee would be to exchange intelligence and coordinate operations in order to assure that the PKK could not use Iraqi territory. ¶18. (S) MinDef Qadir responded that there were two separate issues that had to be addressed: indirect operations, such as intelligence collection, that could influence the reality in the area of operations; and direct operations, generally kinetic in nature, which included aerial and indirect fire interdiction. He said that the new trilateral mechanism should not conduct operations but should focus on intelligence sharing. He stated that LNO's on the border would be a good means of sharing information. Reconstruction report on Sadr City/Shula ¶19. (C) The Minister of Migration (MOM) Dr. Abd al-Samad provided an introduction to a detailed presentation on reconstruction work in Sadr City. Among the projects completed, in process, or proposed where: -High density residential developments -Medical centers -Dental facilities -Blood banks -Prenatal care facilities -Street pavement -School equipment -IT systems (including 10,000 Dell computers) -Copy machines -Blackboards -Electrical Generators -Solar Cells -Sanitary Trucks In addition, contracts for 1000 new custodial personnel in the residential compound were touted as a means of providing employment to Sadr City. Unresolved issues delaying the projects included land acquisition, opposition from local councils who felt they had not had input, and land use conflicts with both the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition forces. MSNSA Waeili noted that the high density development within and adjoining Sadr City might pose security problems in the future. He said that it might be preferable to distribute housing in lower density areas away from the urban core. ¶20. (SBU) The meeting concluded with a recommendation from both the MOD and MOI that future NSC meetings be held on a bi-weekly basis, as the Ministers now found that there had many competing demands on their time. NSA Rubaie objected to this suggestion, stating that if the NSC's long agenda of security items was not addressed weekly, the agendas would be doubled and the meetings could last four or five hours. DPM Essawi stated that he would forward the recommendation QDPM Essawi stated that he would forward the recommendation for a bi-weekly meeting to the PM. CROCKER