TREBIL PORT OF ENTRY: YET A LONG ROAD TO SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003734 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2028 TAGS: ETRD PREL PARM MARR PTER ECON IZ SUBJECT: TREBIL PORT OF ENTRY: YET A LONG ROAD TO SECURITY REF: A. MNFW DIIR OCTOBER 9 2008 ¶B. EMAIL ITAMURA/WILSON AUGUST 25 2008 ¶C. CIA WASHINGTON DC INFORMATION REPORT DTG 050438Z JUN 05 ¶D. EMAIL KENAGY/THERRIEN SEPTEMBER 9 2008 ¶E. BAGHDAD 2964 BAGHDAD 00003734 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: ECOUNS Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 (c, d, e, f). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Investigating reports of orphaned radiation sources at the Trebil Port of Entry (POE),a joint USG/GOI interagency team conducted a POE assessment on November 6, 2008. Although it faces a long list of infrastructure and budgetary woes, Trebil POE sends approximately 12 billion Iraqi Dinar (IQD) per month to the central government, twice that of any other land POE. Because the Government of Jordan (GOJ) does not permit non-oil tanker Iraqi trucks to carry cargo into Jordan, it all must be transloaded on the Jordanian side -- a process the Jordanians fully control. Empty Iraqi trucks take on cargo in the Jordanian-run transload area in no man's land and proceed through a 4-step customs process for passage into Iraq. Due to the combination of corruption, rudimentary training, and poor equipment maintenance, the Iraqi side of the POE is not yet capable of assuming greater responsibility to interdict the accidental or intentional passage of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) materials. It is important that Jordanian officials are aware of Iraq's limited capabilities and continue to carefully monitor shipments to and from Iraq. Until Iraqi POE performance significantly improves, Embassy does not recommend providing the Trebil POE with additional equipment, especially high-tech gear like radiation portal monitors. END SUMMARY. -------------- POE Inspection of Transloaded Iraqi Trucks -------------- ¶2. (S) An interagency team including ECON, DHS, MNF-I, and the Iraq Ministry of Interior (MoI) conducted an assessment of the Trebil Port of Entry (POE) on November 6, 2008. Escorted by the local MNF-W POE Training Team (POETT) and MoI Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) Customs Police, the assessment team first met with the POE Director, BGen Fadhil Mukhlif (Sahawa al Anbar). Speaking through an interpreter, Mukhlif claimed the POE sends over IQD 12 billion per month to the Ministry of Finance (MoF),more than twice the revenue of any other land POE. Trade is also decidedly one-sided, with Jordanian goods that enter Iraq representing 87 percent of the commerce. Mukhlif described a long list of infrastructure woes including a poor water supply, inoperative sewer system, lack of adequate quarters, no electricity transmission from the Iraq side of the border, and only one functional transformer for the sometimes unreliable electricity -- which Jordan actually provides. As concerns the port's security record, in a convenient grammatical ambiguity, the Director bragged, "we have no record of any security breach at this POE." ¶3. (S) Ambiguities aside, standard operating procedures would indicate that security is a big concern. The POE processes approximately 22,000 commercial vehicles per month, all of which must be transloaded (other than the infrequent oil tanker). First, Iraqi DBE Border Police conduct a cursory check of vehicles entering the POE from the Iraq side, including scanning by an X-ray backscatter van to prevent improvised explosive devices from entering the port. The empty vehicles then cross into Jordan for transloading. The Qempty vehicles then cross into Jordan for transloading. The Jordanians do not allow Iraqi POE officials into the transload area, and MNF-W orders do not allow coalition soldiers into no man's land. Therefore, the entire transload process occurs only under Jordanian supervision. After loading in the Naber transload site in Jordan, the vehicles reenter Iraq via a 4-step process: First, MoI Commandos check the vehicle and driver paperwork and conduct a cursory visual inspection for obvious security threats. The vehicle then passes slowly in front of an X-ray backscatter van. (NOTE: POETT personnel said that they had never seen a truck either turned back or searched based on the X-ray backscatter inspection. END NOTE). At the third station, drivers work with local brokers to process their customs paperwork while MoI Customs Police "three hole" the vehicle load (tunnel into the load in three random places) to check for contraband or security threats. After the "three hole" inspection, the truck proceeds to an adjacent parking lot where the driver waits for their broker to finish clearing their paperwork. The entire process takes four to eight hours. BAGHDAD 00003734 002.2 OF 003 ¶4. (S) POE Director Mukhlif noted that the GOI hopes to make this a more co-equal process and will soon build a transload area on the Iraqi side of the border, thus allowing Iraqi supervision of the loading of products destined for Iraq. POE officials were mixed in their opinions as to whether the transload was required by Iraq in order to ensure Iraqi truck drivers have jobs, or required by Jordan for security reasons. -------------- POE Corruption Rampant -------------- ¶5. (S) Brokers must clear paperwork for each truck through at least 15 separate stations, offering many opportunities to collect bribes. POETT personnel said the average total bribe (in addition to the normal customs fees) is approximately USD 150 and that some of the customs revenue goes unreported to the GOI, allowing the port a small independent revenue stream to cover part of their salaries and operation costs. The Port Director noted that the POE scales are also inoperative and had not been serviced since before 2003. Vehicle load weights are estimated, presenting a convenient, systematic opportunity for low-level rent seeking. Numerous MNF-I reports contain references to corruption "at the highest levels" at Trebil POE. ¶6. (S) (NOTE: In a particularly disturbing incident (ref A), Iraqi POE officials recently attempted to turn back a load of approximately 325 blue barrels marked with a skull and cross bones, labeled "Made in Iran." A discussion ensued and while officials were distracted, the Civil Customs Police, known for accepting bribes to expedite shipments, allowed the barrels to pass through the customs holding area into Iraq. END NOTE.) -------------- -------------- No Radiation Detection Capability at the Trebil POE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) The assessment team's visit to the Trebil POE was initiated in response to an NNSA report (ref B) claiming there were orphaned radiation sources from Iraq possibly accumulating on the Jordanian side of the border. Subsequent investigation by a joint DOE/DOS team found the reports to be false ("Site Visit to Jordan-Iraq Border Crossing at Al-Karama, Jordan," October 12, 2008, Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The report concludes that "dumping of sources was a historical problem, not a current problem," and clearly explains in detail the "vigilant" radiation detection practices and equipment on the Jordanian side of the Trebil border (called the Al-Karama border crossing in Jordan): Following transload, Jordanian customs use a portal monitor (SAIC Exploranium AT-900 radiation detection system) to screen all loaded Jordanian trucks and empty Iraqi trucks proceeding into Jordan. Vehicles that trigger the radiation alarm are turned back into the transload area for "decontamination." DOE reports they found no radiological contamination in the transload area and concluded the contaminated materials are re-transloaded and returned to Iraq. Jordanian records (ref C) indicate 41 incidents during January-May 2005 alone in which loaded vehicles that triggered radiation detectors were "sent back to Iraq." (NOTE: Given the time and expense required to clear Iraqi customs, it would be useful to know how Iraqi drivers are convinced to take contaminated cargo back through the Iraqi side of the border and what they do with that cargo once in Iraq. END NOTE.) ¶8. (S) Despite Jordanian Customs officials' claims to the contrary in the DOE report cited previously, the assessment Qcontrary in the DOE report cited previously, the assessment team confirmed the Iraqi side of the POE has no equipment, training, or procedures to either detect or deal with radiological materials. DOE has provided the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) 50 hand held radiation detectors for Iraq to use for radiation border control. ISN has funded the IAEA to provide an additional 50 detectors (ref D). Although IRSRA reports to ISN they have a program in place to train and equip customs officials to use this equipment and that IRSRA has controls in place to monitor the program at the border crossings, POETT Marines and Iraqi POE officials in Trebil both say they do not have any radiation detection capability. "We have never had such equipment anywhere in this port," claimed the POE Civilian Customs Director. "Only the Marines have that kind of capability." -------------- -- Iraqis not Maintaining POE Inspection Equipment -------------- -- BAGHDAD 00003734 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (S) Iraqi maintenance of even simple equipment at the POE is limited. The vehicle scales and baggage X-ray machine have been broken for five years, only one of the two transformers is functional, and as one Marine noted, he volunteered to fix the POE's portable lighting system himself (used for vehicle inspections at night). DHS officials stationed at the POE said that up until a month ago, all of the POE's four X-ray backscatter vans were inoperative. Under a new U.S. maintenance contract, three of the vans have since been fixed and are being actively employed in the vehicle screening process. POETT Marines said that the vans are often inoperative because the Iraqis use poor quality black-market fuel which causes both the van's engine and the generator which powers the X-ray system's electronics to break. Contractors servicing the X-ray backscatter vans confirmed this observation and candidly stated, "The Iraqis are incapable of maintaining this equipment and unwilling to pay for maintenance contracts." (NOTE: Only one of three X-ray backscatter vans at the Zurbatiyah POE is functional (ref E),and one DHS official on the assessment team noted that the broken vans at Zurbatiyah "are full of trash." END NOTE.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (S) Due to the combination of corruption, rudimentary training, and poor equipment maintenance, Embassy does not recommend providing the Trebil POE with additional equipment, especially high-tech gear like radiation portal monitors. We were particularly impressed by the professionalism and competence of the POETT and their outstanding working relationship with POE officials and border guards--there is a continuing need for such capacity building training for the POE staff. Iraqi personnel at the Trebil POE are not yet capable of assuming greater responsibility to interdict the accidental or intentional passage of CBRNE materials. It is important that Jordanian officials are aware of Iraq's limited capabilities and continue to carefully monitor shipments to and from Iraq. CROCKER