PRT-WASIT; MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000367 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PRT-WASIT; MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SADRIST TREND IN WASIT REF: FRAGO 053 TO MND-C OPORD 08-001 BAGHDAD 00000367 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Classified by: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1. 4 (b, d). This is a PRT-Wasit reporting cable. ¶1. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Summary. On Jan 31 at FOB Delta PRT Team Leader (TL) met two Sadrist Trend representatives: Ahmed Hasan Ebrah, Deputy Chairman of the Wasit Provincial Council (PC),and Ahmed Khazaim, Chairman of Al Kut City Council. Ebrah (1) relayed a message from Sadrist Trend leadership in Najaf and stressed their awareness of the meeting, (2) expressed the desire to forge a new relationship with the US, (3) emphasized Sadrist nationalist credentials, and (4) requested, as a gesture of good faith, the release of prisoners as well as USG intervention to reform IP tactics and operations in al Kut. End summary. ¶2. (S//REL USA, ACGU) At the outset, Ebrah said he had received authorization for the meeting from Najaf and that the "office manager" of Sayid Muqtada had instructed him to "make a good start" with the PRT. The official statement from Najaf, read by Ebrah, began, "We are looking for a new page in our relations with America." Ebrah opened by declaring that "Sadrists fight injustice, are Iraqis from well-known tribes, and have no relationship with other countries or organizations. We are poor but proud people and loyal to our country." Ebrah claimed that miscommunication between the Sadrists and the Coalition had "started before 2003, when the opposition outside Iraq did not inform the Americans of the Sadrist opposition inside Iraq." Miscommunication continues today, he claimed, because Iraqis "close to you" continue to pass false information. Since Moqtada al Sadr,s ceasefire order, Ebrah said, "we have been listening for an American response," he added. ¶3. (S//REL USA, ACGU) PRT Team Leader stated that the USG does not object to the peaceful pursuit of political goals by a political movement, but opposes any organization that resorts to violence as a political tool, intimidates Iraqi citizens, or foments chaos for political gain. While expressing agreement with these principles, Ebrah and Khazaim, when pressed, admitted that "we know we have people out of control who claim to be Sadrists" but asserted they report violations, to their headquarters. They observed that the ceasefire had exposed divisions in their organization. Both men refused to comment on the future of the ceasefire, only saying that it was "up to the Sayid." ¶4. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Ebrah expressed the immediate need for provincial elections and acknowledged that Sadrists anticipate significant gains, perhaps a PC majority. He reminded us that while the Sadrists sat out the 2005 election, they had succeeded in winning every al Kut District Council seat only a few months later. (Note: The three Sadrist PC members defected from other parties to the Sadrists after the 2005 election. Ebrah defected from Fadilah. End note). Despite prospects for increased power, Sadrists do not aspire to dominate provincial politics, but instead seek to be part of a multi-party government, Ebrah insisted. As if to support his avowed preference for power-sharing, Ebrah suggested abolition of local councils because "Sadrists would dominate government at that level," and he praised the politically-independent PC Chairman Mohammed Hasan Jabir. (Note: Jabir rejected recent invitations to join the Sadrist Trend and, in a recent meeting with the PRT, advocated aggressive police action against Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) in al Kut. End note.) Though Sadrists expect political success, "powerful forces are against them," for example, "all election workers in the southern provinces are controlled by opposing political parties." Ebrah appealed for assurances that the next elections would be fair. ¶5. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Ebrah expressed reservations about PRT priorities, saying "Democracy is not understood by poor, uneducated and unemployed people and does not matter to those struggling to survive. Instead, people want basic services and improved infrastructure." Following a well-worn rhetorical line, Ebrah cited the British-built al Kut dam as the sort of progress Iraqis need to see, but he claimed that thus far there was no evidence of US or GoI investment in Wasit. The current government has failed to provide for the people, Ebrah said, strongly agreeing with a suggestion that the present provincial government and DGs were corrupt and self-dealing. As for the national government, he continued, "we don't care about Ministries, we care about the people, and we can serve them without (Ministry positions)." ¶6. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Ebrah stated that the "Head Office in Najaf" would authorize future meetings with "senior people" BAGHDAD 00000367 002.2 OF 002 upon satisfaction of two conditions: prisoner release and a change in IP tactics. (Note: Ebrah said OMS officials would meet only with US civilians, not CF. End Note) Ebrah provided a list of fifty detainees and asked for their release. The PRT outlined release program requirements and agreed to submit the request to CF. Ebrah then spoke at length about tactics employed by the IP during Wasit operations. He commented that US forces "treat prisoners as humans," and that "when CF raid a house, nothing is stolen." Citing his own experience in CF custody (a case of mistaken identity, he explained),"there are no beatings, and without evidence, detainees are released." Ebrah contrasted CF tactics with the alleged brutal IP treatment of citizens and prisoners, actions which the IP claim take place under US instructions. (Note. Ebrah supported the nomination of MG Hannin as IP Chief, despite official OMS opposition, but said he has not seen American support for the Chief since Hannin assumed the office. End note.) ¶7. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Fortuitously, the PRT received the OMS-requested prisoner release just as Third Infantry Division (3ID) issued directions to compile prisoner release requests as part of a reconciliation program. That program seeks to: (1) facilitate engagement between local leaders and CF; (2) ensure local leaders assume responsibility for post-release conduct; and (3) empower local leaders by creating visible results from their leadership efforts. Sixteen of the names on the OMS list also appear on 3ID,s list of release candidates. PRT is working closely with 214 FB to vet these names and assess their eligibility for release. As releases are approved, PRT will use this leverage to arrange successive meetings with OMS representatives. ¶8. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Comment: The OMS representatives pitched themselves as Iraq,s "true patriots," with a nationalist streak that makes them resistant to the influence of foreign nations, namely Iran. We will take advantage of the 3ID planned release program in the context of the OMS prisoner release requests in order to build PRT credibility with the OMS and prepare future engagements, aiming at a more senior cadre. BUTENIS