KIRKUK LEADERS' DISCUSSIONS WITH SPECIAL ADVISOR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003638

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: KIRKUK LEADERS' DISCUSSIONS WITH SPECIAL ADVISOR,
PART II: ARTICLE 140 PROPERTY RELOCATIONS FROZEN, PROS AND
CONS OF CLCS

REF: BAGHDAD 3632

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY PRT KIRKUK TEAM LEADER HOWARD KEEGAN FOR R
EASONS 1.4 (a) AND (d).


1. (SBU) This is the second of two PRT Kirkuk cables
reporting meetings of Senior Advisor (S/A) Krajeski with
Kirkuki Arab, Turkmen, and Kurdish provincial leaders. This
message reports their views on the dispute over agricultural
land contracts under Article 140, and on Prime Minister
Maliki's proposal for a Kirkuk tribally-based security
organization (referred to as "CLCs"*similar to the
Sahwa/Sons of Iraq, except with a direct connection to the
Prime Minister's office).

SUMMARY
--------------

2. (SBU) All groups favored a legally-binding, non-violent
solution to the land contracts issue (albeit supporting it
with significant and sharply different reservations). Kurd
and Arab interlocutors raised the CLC issue without prompting
from S/A Krajeski, with the Kurds opposing and Arabs favoring
the proposal. END SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) On November 10 meetings S/A Tom Krajeski met Kurdish
Governor Abdulrahman Mustafa, Arab Deputy Governor Rakan
Saeed, Kurdish Provincial Council Chair Rizgar Ali (jointly
with KDP PC member Mohammed Kamal),and key provincial
council members from the Turkmen and Arab blocs in Kirkuk.

ARTICLE 140-BASED LAND CONTRACT RELOCATIONS
--------------


4. (C) Resolution #4 of the Article 140 Committee, and the
statute of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property
Disputes (CRRPD) annul agricultural contracts signed as part
of the Saddam-era government of Iraq's "Arabization" policy.
The laws call for the relocation of current Arabs farming
this land (with compensation),and return of the land to
previous (largely Kurdish, Turkmen, and but also some Arab)
owners. Specifically in question are 5,676 Arab farmers in
the Al Hawija area whose contracts were canceled. Governor
Abdulrahman (Kurdish) asked police in October to postpone any
relocations until the end of November. S/A Krajeski has
asked all parties to suspend any action for the near- to
mid-term future in order to maintain stability and avoid
violence in the province. Predictably, Kurdish and Turkmen
leaders strongly support immediate action, while Arab leaders
are resisting implementation.


5. (C) Neither PC Chair Rizgar nor KDP PC member Mohammad
Kamal (both Kurdish) said they would advocate forcible
removal of current renters from land. However, Rizgar
indicated that the CRRPD established under federal law was
not functioning well. He claimed that GOI is intentionally
slowing the allocation of funds intended to compensate
current residents scheduled for relocation for political
reasons: the GOI wanted to delay compensating the (mostly
Arab) renters who would relocate in order to delay their
departure from Kirkuk, which would in turn delay
normalization in the province, ultimately delaying or
preventing Kirkuk from becoming part of the KRG.


6. (C) Rizgar and Mohammed Kamal took strong exception to
S/A Krajeski's recommendation to suspend the eviction of Arab
farmers in order to avoid violence. Saying he "was tired of
this," Rizgar accused the USG of favoring Arabs' claims
regarding the injustice of the proposed evictions without
understanding that the same Arabs had previously obtained
those lands unjustly. He enlarged his diatribe to claim that
the U.S. favors Arabs in Arab-Kurd disputes. He asked why
the USG did not confront Arabs regarding their past
oppression of the Turkmen and Kurds, and advise Arabs of the
need to provide restitution now.


7. (C) Governor Abdulrahman echoed Rizgar's allegation that
the GOI had failed to provide adequate funds to compensate
the Arabs facing relocation, saying he had even asked UNAMI
to pressure the central government to provide funds.


8. (C) The Governor indicated he has decided to delay
implementation of the relocation decision "in order to avoid
bloodshed." He claimed he was under tremendous pressure from
Turkmen and Kurdish PC members and land owners, who demanded
the eviction of the Arab renters. He said he had met with
both and told them he was delaying implementation. He also
proposed a compromise by which current Arab renters could
work with the GOI and reputed original owners to switch the
lease from the GOI to the original owners.


9. (C) Arab PC members Burhan Al Ubedi and Mohammad Khalil

BAGHDAD 00003638 002 OF 002


believe that the law's reference to lands taken for
Arabization referred only to land seized after 1986. After
some discussion they conceded that the law actually
identified 1968 as the year in which Arabization began, but
they claimed this was not correct, implying that the date was
imposed upon Arabs by "the other side."


10. (C) Mohammad Khalil blamed the KDP for inflaming the
situation by issuing provocative statements in the press and
arranging for non-Kirkuki Kurds to move to the province.
Burhan added that people feared intimidation by the Kurdish
political parties regarding the submission of evidence
unfavorable to the Kurds.


11. (C) Mohammad Khalil opined that the success of the
process depends on the financial and moral support of Maliki,
but said the Arabs will wait on any action to give the
committee time to work. Khalil mentioned that on November 14
the Article 140 committee would be holding a meeting in
Erbil, and that the Minister of Energy would be attending the
meeting.


12. (C) Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed (Arab) laced his
comments with inflammatory remarks about U.S. responsibility
for Kirkuk's problems. He also advanced distorted arguments
about the origin of the land dispute, saying that Kurdish and
Turkmen land had been legally taken under the Iraqi
equivalent of eminent domain in the United States, and that
all who had lands taken had received compensation from the
(Saddam-era) Iraqi government. He would not acknowledge that
non-Kirkuki Arabs benefited from Arabization, that Turkmen
and Kurds who had lost land had a constitutional right to
reclaim their lands, or that Arab renters must relinquish
their current land holdings.


13. (C) However, in between these comments, Rakan said the
land contracts situation was frozen for now. He further
stated that he wants displaced Kirkukis to return, and agreed
that Kirkuk needs to find a legal way to resolve the
situation that involves all parties, and through which all
parties follow the law and give up force and violence. He
asked that S/A Krajeski and Ambassador Crocker work with GOI
to activate the committees to start work on solutions.


14. (SBU) Turkmen PC members did not discuss the land
contracts issue.

CLCS
--------------


15. (C) PC Chair Rizgar (Kurd) opposed PM Maliki's proposal
for "CLC" (Concerned Local Citizens) groups with security
functions in Kirkuk, maintaining that the province doesn't
need such groups right now. (NOTE: Our Kirkuki
interlocutors referred to the proposed organization as
"CLCs," even though in practice it may have a different
relationship to the GOI than the Sahwa/SOI/CLC has. END
NOTE.) He said the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police in Kirkuk
agreed. He noted that the Iraqi Constitution does not permit
Maliki to create new security forces, and thinks Maliki
should spend the GOI's money on "the people," and addressing
unemployment, rather than on this program. He said that
Maliki did not consult with Kurds before advancing the
proposal, only with ex-Ba'athists and Kurds who worked under
Saddam.


16. (C) Arab PC member Mohammad Khalil thinks Maliki's
proposal will counterbalance Kurdish militias in the
province. He thought that hiring more Arab and Turkmen for
the Iraqi police would not be a better solution because IP
leadership in Kirkuk is "all from one side."
CROCKER